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Scale is an overlooked issue in the literature on interactive governance. This special issue investigates the challenges posed by the scale and scaling of network and collaborative forms of governance. Our original motivation arose from a concern about whether collaborative governance can scale up. As we learned more, our inquiry expanded to include the tensions inherent in collaboration across scales or at multiple scales and the issue of dynamically scaling collaboration to adapt to changing problems and demands. The diverse cases in this special issue explore these challenges in a range of concrete empirical domains than span the globe.

AbstractManuscript typeReviewResearch Question/IssueThis article reviews how and through which channels corporate governance shapes takeover outcomes.Research FindingsWe summarize the main findings of the empirical literature that investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on takeover outcomes. The internal and external governance mechanisms that we consider are: the board of directors, the takeover market, blockholders, financial markets in general, product market competition, and the labor market.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis article adopts an agency perspective of the firm and reviews the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature through the lens of corporate governance. We highlight how the different corporate governance mechanisms affect the takeover process and outcomes.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe article systematizes the current state of the research linking corporate governance and takeovers. In doing so, we emphasize which mechanisms policymakers can use to improve the efficiency of the takeover market. Alternatively, the review also offers indications concerning mechanisms that could be used to mitigate agency conflicts and, as such, increase firm value.

Purpose
– This paper aims to study the impact of a significant negative shock (the reporting of an initial loss) on the stickiness of corporate governance. This paper examines whether corporate governance changes in response to the reporting of an initial loss and also whether ex ante corporate governance weakness impacts on the propensity for change.


Design/methodology/approach
– The study uses three years of corporate governance information spanning the report of an initial loss for companies listed on the UK Stock Exchange. An industry- and size-matched control sample is used in a difference-in-difference analysis to isolate the impact of the loss from underlying changes in governance.


Findings
– The results indicate that an initial loss precipitates an improvement in corporate governance and that this improvement is significantly more pronounced in those companies which displayed either weak or extreme governance before the loss. There is also evidence that the improvement in corporate governance begins before the loss is actually reported.


Research limitations/implications
– This study focuses on a three-year period in the UK only and so is a limitation of the research. Future research could be based on the findings from other jurisdictions or from using other conditioning variables.


Originality/value
– This study contributes to the stream of research that examines negative shocks, and losses in particular, as an event likely to precipitate firm-level changes in corporate governance and offers insights into the reasons for firm-level corporate governance improvements. It demonstrates that, notwithstanding the recommendations of the Combined Code, firms tend to not make improvements without the impetus and need to do so, i.e. corporate governance is sticky.

The purpose of this review is to take stock of how party polarization affects governance in the United States. The article begins by defining polarization and discussing the means by which it can be measured. It is undeniable that the two parties have grown more sharply differentiated. Some evidence suggests that the substantive policy preferences of liberals and conservatives diverge more widely, but the case for ideological polarization in the spatial sense is not definitive. Effects on the institutional processes of US government have entailed a hardening of party divisions and a tendency toward centralization of power. Nevertheless, these more cohesive parties are not more effective than their predecessors at enacting policies or managing routine governing responsibilities. The consequences for public policy seem best characterized as "drift" ( Hacker 2004 , p. 246). There is little evidence that party polarization has promoted ideologically extreme policy outcomes or has systematically advantaged either liberalism or conservatism.