In this thesis, I study different dimensions of the interaction between economic outcomes and EU economic governance with a specific emphasis on the framework for fiscal policy and fiscal stabilization. Each of the three chapters consists of a self-contained research article followed by the corresponding appendix. Chapters 1 and 2 refer to the institutional status quo and examine the impact of existing rules. By contrast, Chapter 3 takes a forward-looking perspective and considers the effects associated with a specific potential reform of the framework.
We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known "breakdown values" which determine their payoff in case of "breakdown". Breakdown occurs with some probability if the first proposal fails and with certainty if the second proposal fails. We characterize Bayesian Equilibria in Sequentially Weakly Undominated Strategies. Our central result is that responders have a signaling incentive to vote "no" on the first proposal under unanimity rule, whereas no such incentive exists under majority rule. The reason is that being perceived as a "high breakdown value type" is advantageous under unanimity rule, but disadvantageous under majority rule. As a consequence, responders are "more expensive" under unanimity rule and disagreement is more likely. These results confirm intuitions that have been stated informally before and in addition yield deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information.
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful,commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any such attempted commitment fails and decays with an exogenously given probability. We characterize and compare symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibria under unanimity rule and majority rules. Under unanimity rule, there are potentially many equilibria which can be ordered from the least to most inefficient, according to how how many commitment attempts must fail in order for an agreement to arise. The most inefficient equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of players. In addition, more efficient commitment profiles cannot be sustained in equilibrium if the number of players is sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the number of players increases. Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency. The reason is that competition to be included in the winning coalition discourages attempts to commit to an aggressive bargaining position. We also show that inefficiencies related to unanimity decision making may be aggravated by longer lags between consecutive bargaining rounds. The predicted patterns are by and large consistent with observed inefficiencies in many international arenas including the European Union, WTO, and UNFCCC. The results suggest that the unanimity rule is particularly damaging if the number of legislators is large and the time lags between consecutive sessions are long.
I study liquidity traps in a model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and finite planning horizons. Backward-looking agents base their expectations on past observations, while forward-looking agents have fully rational expectations. Liquidity traps that are fully or partly driven by expectations can arise due to pessimism of backward-looking agents. Only when planning horizons are finite, these liquidity traps can be of longer duration without ending up in a deflationary spiral. I further find that fiscal stimulus in the form of an increase in government spending or a cut in consumption taxes can be very effective in mitigating the liquidity trap. A feedback mechanism of heterogeneous expectations causes fiscal multipliers to be the largest when the majority of agents is backward-looking but there also is a considerable fraction of agents that are forward-looking. Labor tax cuts are always deflationary and are not an effective tool in a liquidity trap.
With the Swedish student Greta Thunberg, the protest for the environment has taken on a personal face. Her central statement is: "Politicians are doing far too little for climate protection. This is irresponsible towards the youth." Something new has happened: Suddenly young people have become the driving force behind social-ecological change. The urge and perceived urgency to counteract environmental destruction is initially strong. Then, however, one realises that the successes seem small compared to the expectations. Over time, this perceived lack of success leads to people becoming more skeptical, less committed or even resigned. The young of today are the old of tomorrow. When youth is over, a trend towards disappointment and resignation seems inevitable. Can this be countered, and if so, how? Here it is worth drawing attention to the experiences of older people who, contrary to this trend, have shown passionate commitment throughout their lives. In order to be successful in terms of environmental policy, it is first necessary to find out what constitutes a social-ecological transformation. Once this has been clarified, older people can help the younger ones; for they can point out orientation marks for the path of a social-ecological transformation. Four of these orientation marks are examined in more detail here: (i) interdisciplinarity, (ii) time and patience, (iii) trust and (iv) public spirit. From these considerations follows a fifth message: Those who advocate social-ecological transformation must not focus solely on ecological and economic goals, but must look at society as a whole and its relationships. Preserving and promoting the public spirit is essential for the success of major changes.
Most people tend to equate success with merit, a tendency that is particularly pronounced among conservatives. However, in practice it is exceedingly difficult to discern the relative impact of luck and effort to economic success. Based on a large-scale online study that samples the general US population, we investigate whether individuals misperceive the importance of luck for success, and how this mediates their meritocratic beliefs and acceptance of inequality. We randomly assign participants in pairs to compete in an easy or hard work assignment. The tasks are structured such that working on the easy work assignment almost certainly results in better performance and economic success. We show that economically successful participants overweight the role of effort in their success, perceiving high income as more deserved than unsuccessful participants. Subsequently, they demand less redistributive taxation, and they also show little interest in receiving information about the true determinants of their success. These general findings hold true regardless of political orientation. Successful liberals are as meritocratic as conservatives are, sharing the same beliefs in deservingness and preferences for low redistributive taxes.
We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
Many political systems with direct democracy mechanisms have adopted rules preventing decisions from being made by simple majority rule. The device most commonly added to majority rule in national is a quorum requirement. The two most common are the participation and the approval quora. Such rules are a response to three major concerns: the legitimacy of the referendum outcome, its representativeness (the concern with the outcome representing the will of the whole electorate), and protection of minorities regarding issues that should demand a broad consensus. Guided by a pivotal voter model, we conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the performance of different quora in reaching such goals. We introduce two main innovations in relation to previous work on the topic. First, part of the electorate goes to the polls out of a sense of civic duty. Second, we test the performance of a different quorum, the rejection quorum, recently proposed in the literature. We conclude that, depending on the preferred criterion, either the approval or the rejection quorum is to be preferred.
Using geo-referenced data on development projects by the World Bank and China, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the effect of aid on conflict using fixed effects and instrumental variables strategies. The results show that aid projects seem to reduce rather than fuel conflict, on average. Our analysis suggests that this is driven by projects in the transport and financial sectors, and through less lethal violence by governments against civilians. There are no clear differences based on ethnic fractionalization and government affiliation of a region, but some indications of spill-overs to other regions. We also find no increased likelihood of demonstrations, strikes or riots, but a higher likelihood of non-lethal government repression in areas where China is active.
Since the beginning of the finance crisis, the notion of capitalism and the adjective capitalistic are more and more employed in public discourse without making an attempt to define it. In contrast, the concept of market economy is less used. We try in this paper to differentiate both concepts by going back to the approaches by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Fernand Braudel (1902-1985). Marx does not use the term capitalism but only capitalistic production, while Braudel argues on the basis of a wealth of empirical evidence that one has to differentiate between capitalism and market economy, because he sees a contrast between them. For this reason, he has different view of a capitalistic economy as Marx has. JEL classification: B14, B24, P10, P16, P5 Keywords: capitalism, capitalistic production, market economy, political economy
In the wake of several high-profile natural disasters, crowding effects between public relief and private investments in disaster preparedness have recently attracted renewed attention. We examine how non-hypothetical self-insurance behavior by households responds to variations in public investments in relief capabilities based on a large disaster preparedness survey (n = 19,071) conducted in Japan in 2012. The preparedness measure used is emergency drinking water storage, defining a setting in which (i) government provides in-kind, rather than cash, relief and (ii) the crowding effect observed is more apt to be total, rather than partial. In contrast to much of the literature studying crowding effects of cash relief, there is little evidence for crowding out in emergency drinking water, with an upper bound of 2 percent at the intensive margin.
In a climate system that is indifferent about where mitigation is carried out, the logic of comparative advantages favors abatement locations in developing and rapidly industrializing countries. There is evidence, however, that citizens of industrialized countries who voluntarily fund climate mitigation activities are not indifferent about the mitigation location. In our artifactual online experiment, subjects located in a European Union member state took a dichotomous choice between a cash prize and the verified mitigation of one metric ton of CO2. The treatment condition varied the location of the mitigation activity between the European Union and developing countries. We test whether the location impacts on the probability that the mitigation activity is chosen, harnessing between- and within-subject Variation in our panel data. Our evidence shows that subjects responded to the location being made salient, but, contrary to previous concerns, were indifferent between mitigation sites in the EU or developing countries.
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht erstmalig für die Ukraine und Polen, welche Verbindung zwischen der 'pork-barrel'-Politik und dem regionalen Wirtschaftswachstum besteht. Die empirische Analyse erfolgt auf regionaler Ebene für den Zeitraum 2004-2012 anhand des Fixed-Effects-Schätzers. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass zwischen 'political affiliation' (der Zentral- und Regionalregierung) und dem regionalen Wirtschaftswachstum in der Ukraine ein negativer Zusammenhang besteht. Für Polen dagegen wird kein signifikanter Zusammenhang festgestellt. Zudem wird herausgefunden, dass der "pro-russische" Präsident Viktor Janukovych und der polnische Premierminister Jarosław Kaczyński die Regionen mit Wechselwählern finanziell unterstützen, um die Wiederwahlchancen zu erhöhen.
We use an excludable instrument to test the effect of bilateral foreign aid on economic growth in a sample of 96 recipient countries over the 1974-2009 period. We interact donor government fractionalization with a recipient country's probability of receiving aid. The results show that fractionalization increases donors' aid budgets, representing the over-time variation of our instrument, while the probability of receiving aid introduces variation across recipient countries. Controlling for country- and period-specific effects that capture the levels of the interacted variables, the interaction provides a powerful and excludable instrument. Making use of the instrument, our results show no significant effect of aid on growth in the overall sample. We also investigate the effect of aid on consumption, savings, and investments, and split the sample according to the quality of economic policy, democracy, and the Cold War period. With the exception of the post-Cold War period (where abundant aid reduces growth), we find no significant effect of aid on growth in any of these sub-samples. None of the other outcomes are affected by aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries.This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contraast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
