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In this article, we draw attention to the way in which accountability relations are manifested in and through the use of visual evidence. Through their status as representations of what is the case, evidentiary visual images frequently provide a basis for giving accounts and for raising questions regarding distributions of accountability. At the same time, and in a similar manner to numbers ( Munro, 2001 ), such images become part of organized relations of accountability that can be noted as having 'hailing' effects: they call for and prefigure a certain kind of response and dispersing of responsibility. Here we examine how the use of visual evidence is embedded in discursive and material practices that variously create or inhibit possibilities for questioning, or interrogating, this evidence. Drawing on elements of ethnomethodology and actor-network theory, we use 'interrogation' as the basis for depicting a three-part analytical schema focused on opening up, closing down and temporality to explore how visual accountability is worked out in surveillance, traffic management and breast screening images.

Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.

Texto presentado en la conferencia "Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability", Viena, junio de 1997, coorganizada por el Institute for Advanced Studies de Viena y el International Forum for Democratic Studies.

In Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has condemned Greece for yet another instance of human rights violations in border management. By underlining the importance of clear regulations and adequate evidence within border operations, the Court showed avenues to enhance the accountability framework for violations perpetrated at Europe's borders. Its decision contrasts favourably with the approach taken in the EU at large, where both legislators and national and supranational courts generally disregard the opacity in regulations governing border operations and the difficulty of collecting evidence for migrants.

This Article argues that efforts to square the administrative state with the constitutional structure have become too fixated on the concern for political accountability. As a result, those efforts have overlooked an important obstacle to agency legitimacy: the concern for administrative arbitrariness. Such thinking is evident in the prevailing model of the administrative state, which seeks to legitimate agencies by placing their policy decisions firmly under the control of the one elected official responsive to the entire nation-the President. This Article contends that the "presidential control" model cannot legitimate agencies because the model rests on a mistaken assumption about the sufficiency of political accountability for that purpose. The assumption resonates with the premise, familiar in constitutional theory, that majoritarianism is the hallmark of legitimate government. This premise, brought to the fore by Alexander Bickel, now is questioned among constitutional theorists. Moreover, majoritarianism is not enough to legitimate administrative decisionmaking under our constitutional structure for the reason that it does not reliably address the concern for arbitrariness. This Article argues for a more direct focus on the concern for arbitrariness-ana pproach that has at its core a concern for good government, not simply "accountable" government in the post-Bickel, majoritarian sense of that word. The Article demonstrates how a more direct approach suggests new possibilities for resolving the time-honored problem of agency legitimacy and new ways of understanding the perennial puzzles of administrative lawar.

In der Antike war die Gewaltenteilung entlang einer "vertical accountability" strukturiert, die für Integration und Machtkontrolle sorgte. In der modernen Demokratie hat sich diese Struktur in Richtung auf eine "horizontal accountability" verschoben. Jetzt tritt die Funktion der Machtkontrolle in den Vordergrund. Die entscheidende ideengeschichtliche Weichenstellung für diese Transformation liefern Montesquieu und die Autoren der Federalist Papers mit der Ausdifferenzierung der Justiz als dritter Gewalt. Der Beitrag zeigt, welche strukturellen Vorkehrungen Montesquieu und die Federalists gegen den Machtmissbrauch der Judikative vorsehen und welche Bedingungen sie sehen, unter denen die Judikative Macht generieren und erfolgreich verstetigen kann. Für die Transformation der Gewaltenteilung ist insbesondere ein Aspekt entscheidend: Die für die "horizontal accountability" nötige Macht der Judikative setzt eine funktionierende "vertical accountability" dieser Gewalt voraus. (ICE2)