Suchergebnisse

Dedication -- Series Editors' Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- 1: Introduction -- Reference -- 2: Animals as Agents -- Introduction -- Agency -- Beliefs, Desires, Preferences, and Intentions -- Rationality -- Intentionality -- Moral Agency -- Conclusion -- References -- 3: Self-Awareness and Selfhood in Animals -- Introduction -- Self-Consciousness and Self-Awareness -- The Ecological Self and Evolutionary Continuity -- Empirical Evidence for Selfhood in Animals -- Objections to Selfhood in Animals -- Conclusion -- References -- 4: Autonomy and Animals -- Introduction

Engaging Animal Minds : Matters of Perspective / Robert W. Mitchell and Julie A. Smith -- Living with Animals -- The Mental Life of Chickens as Observed Through Their Social Relationships / Karen Davis -- Tangible Affiliations : Photographic Representations of Touch Between Human and Animal Companions / Julia Schlosser -- Beaver Voices : Grey Owl and Interspecies Communication / Albert Braz -- Anthropomorphisms -- The Historical Animal Mind : "Sagacity" in Nineteenth-Century Britain / Rob Boddice -- Science of the Monkey Mind : Primate Penchants and Human Pursuits / Sara Waller -- Can Animals Make "Art"? Popular and Scientific Discourses About Expressivity and Cognition in Primates / Jane Desmond -- Embodiments and Interembodiments -- Toward a Privileging of the Nonverbal : Communication, Corporeal Synchronicity, and Transcendence in Humans and Horses / Gala Argent -- Thinking Like a Whale : Interdisciplinary Methods for the Study of Human-Animal Interactions / Traci Warkentin -- The Meaning of "Energy" in Cesar Millan's Discourse on Dogs / Julie A. Smith -- Inner Experience as Perception(like) with Attitude / Robert W. Mitchell --

Broom (2014) argues that theories of animal ethics need to be better informed by the findings of animal welfare science. We agree, but argue that animal welfare science in turn may need to ask different questions. To date it has largely assumed that society will continue to treat domesticated animals as a caste group that exists to serve us, and that animal welfare is to be improved within that legal and political framework. We offer an alternative model of human-animal relations, and discuss what kind of animal welfare science it would require.

Abstract
Although there is increasing academic attention for the rise of Animal Advocacy Parties (AAPs), existing accounts overlook their emergence in the context of the politicization of race and religion. This contribution deploys Rancière's political thought combined with a critical race theoretical lens to analyze the project of the leading AAP after which most international sister parties are modeled: the Dutch Party for the Animals. We find that the party on the one hand disrupts the anthropocentrism characteristic for the Dutch social and political order but on the other hand affirms and contributes to the policing and racialization of Muslims. This became most apparent in their proposal to ban unstunned religious slaughter. We demonstrate that this proposal was part of the party's general inability to recognize the contemporaneous logics of race and religion. This leads us to conceptualize the party's project as a colorblind, or in non-ableist terms, color-evasive animal politics.

This book presents a radical and intuitive argument against the notion that intentional action, agency and autonomy are features belonging only to humans. Using evidence from research into the minds of non-human animals, it explores the ways in which animals can be understood as individuals who are aware of themselves, and the consequent basis of our moral obligations towards them. The first part of this book argues for a conception of agency in animals that admits to degrees among individuals and across species. It explores self-awareness and its various levels of complexity which depend on an animals' other mental capacities. The author offers an overview of some established theories in animal ethics including those of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin and Lori Gruen, and the ways these theories serve to extend moral consideration towards animals based on various capacities that both animals and humans have in common. The book concludes by challenging traditional Kantian notions of rationality and what it means to be an autonomous individual, and discussing the problems that still remain in the study of animal ethics

Part I Kantian Foundations -- 1 What Is Promising About a Radical Kantian Animal Ethic -- 1.1 Kantianism for Animals -- 1.2 A Constructive, Revisionist, Radical Agenda -- 1.3 Limitations and Responses to Initial Worries -- 1.4 The Way Ahead -- References -- 2 Kantian Moral Concern, Love, and Respect -- 2.1 What Is Moral Concern Kantian-Style? -- 2.2 Kant's Taxonomy of Duties -- 2.3 Others' Happiness as an Obligatory End -- 2.4 Practical Love and Respect for Others -- 2.5 Kant's List of Duties Towards Others -- 2.6 Kant's Restorative Project in Moral Philosophy -- References -- 3 The Case Against Kant's 'Indirect Duty' Approach -- 3.1 Kant's 'Indirect' Account of Duties Regarding Animals -- 3.2 Structural Problems of Kant's Account -- 3.3 Substantive Shortcomings of Kant's Account -- 3.4 The Unhelpfulness of Kant's Account -- References -- Part II Building Kantianism for Animals -- 4 Is the Formula of Humanity the Problem? -- 4.1 Animals and the Formula of Humanity: Some Background -- 4.2 The Esteem-Concern Equivocation -- 4.3 Wood and Korsgaard Against the Esteem-Concern Equivocation -- 4.4 Obligatory Ends: How Kant Derives Duties to Others -- 4.5 What Is the Point of the Formula of Humanity, if Not Moral Concern? -- References -- 5 Animals and the 'Directionality' of Duties -- 5.1 Do We Truly 'Share' the Moral Law? Thompson's Challenge to Kant -- 5.2 First-Personal Versus Second-Personal Accounts of 'Directionality' -- 5.3 Rejecting Thompson's Challenge -- 5.4 Consent, Forgiveness, and Apologies Without Second-Personal Authority -- References -- 6 Kantian Moral Patients Without Practical Reason? -- 6.1 Duties of Respect Towards Moral Non-agents? -- 6.2 Adopting Another's Ends as Our Own -- 6.3 Kant's Denial of End-Directed Animal Agency -- 6.4 Animal 'Ends': Conceptual, Non-conceptual, 'Obscure' -- References -- 7 Kantianism for Animals: The Framework in Five Claims -- 7.1 Duties from Autonomy -- 7.2 The Primacy of Duties over Rights and Claims -- 7.3 Duties to Self and Others -- 7.4 Practical Love and Non-exaltation -- 7.5 Motives Matter -- References -- Part III Using the Framework -- 8 A Kantian Argument Against Using Animals -- 8.1 'External' Arguments Against Using Animals -- 8.2 A Kantian-for-Animals 'Internal' Argument Against Animal Use -- References -- 9 A Kantian Argument Against Eating Animals -- 9.1 The Philosophical Stalemate Regarding Vegetarianism -- 9.2 A Kantian-for-Animals Argument Against Eating Animals -- References -- 10 A Kantian Argument Against Environmental Destruction -- 10.1 Kant and the Environment: Previous Approaches -- 10.2 A Kantian-for-Animals Perspective on the Environment -- References -- 11 Animal Ethics and the Philosophical Canon: A Proposal -- References -- Index.

Various systems already exist to judge animal welfare - of which distress can be one component - in the laboratory setting (see Hendriksen and Morton 1998). Many rely on nonspecific measures; that is they may be manifestations of a number of states, not all of them necessarily indicative of poor welfare. Certainly, there is already good provision for methods to recognise some of the commoner manifestations of distress, arguably they are sufficiently meaningful to categorise various distress states, though to my mind they are for the present still not suited for use as means of strictly quantifying the negative impact/suffering on animal welfare that they represent. Generally they will allow the condition of individual animals to be described and assigned to broad categories, rather than allowing fine distinctions to be made. There is a need to continue to look carefully for means of properly discriminating distress and suffering produced by pain, from suffering and distress caused by other factors - as both the diagnosis of the cause and the provision of effective relief require a proper understanding of the cause of these negative states.

The contemporary animal rights movement encompasses a wide range of sometimes-competing agendas from vegetarianism to animal liberation. For people for whom pets are family members--animal lovers outside the fray--extremist positions in which all human-animal interaction is suspect often discourage involvement in the movement to end cruelty to other beings. In "Loving Animals," Kathy Rudy argues that in order to achieve such goals as ending animal testing and factory farming, activists need to be better attuned to the profound emotional, even spiritual, attachment that many people ha

"Whether writing for a term paper, looking up organizations involving animal rights, or researching information as an animal lover, this is a resource chock full of information on animal rights and welfare. Coverage of issues, controversies, significant historical figures, and ideologies related to the treatment of animals are comprehensive. The essays cover a wide spectrum from the founding of the ASPCA and trapping, to religion and animals. The directory of organizations serves practical purposes, such as where to obtain a three-dimensional model of the frog for educators and both high school and college students".--"Outstanding Reference Sources : the 1999 Selection of New Titles", American Libraries, May 1999. Comp. by the Reference Sources Committee, RUSA, ALA