Suchergebnisse

Aus US-amerikanischer Sicht

Die Autoren vermitteln einen systematischen Überblick über den in den 80er Jahren und insbesondere seit dem Amtsantritt Gorbacevs zu konstatierenden Wandel in der sowjetischen Haltung hinsichtlich der Verifikation (und des Monitoring) vertraglich zugesicherter vertrauensbildender bzw. Abrüstungsmaßnahmen. Dokumentiert wird der sowjetische Positionswandel für folgende Bereiche: KSZE, MBFR und START, Gespräche über strategische Verteidigung und militärische Nutzung des Weltraums, chemische Waffen, INF-Verhandlungen, Atomteststop-Abkommen und Nonproliferationsvertrag. (BIOst-Klk)

I examine how a nation's absolute and relative position in a race to develop a new weapon affects the intensity of its R&D efforts as well as its incentive to engage in an arms control agreement with its rivals. I find that countries tend to devote more resources to weapons development when they are in a position of technological parity; and that the leader of a race outspends the laggard, but both tend to intensify their efforts when the follower catches up. Moreover, I find that, if the process of R&D is to be restricted through interstate treaties, then such treaties may only be introduced in the beginning stages of the race before any major breakthrough has occurred.

MORE THAN THREE DECADES HAVE PASSED SINCE THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR OPENED NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS. THE PROCESS HAS PRODUCED ON INTERIM AGREEMENT AND SIX TREATIES: ABM, SALT II, INF, CFE, START I, AND START II. AT FIRST GLANCE, THIS APPEARS TO BE AN ARMS CONTROL TRIUMPH. A CLOSER LOOK, HOWEVER, FINDS A NEAR TOTAL DISCONNECT BETWEEN EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES THROUGHOUT THE U.S.-USSR STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. AS DEMONSTRATED IN THIS ARTICLE, FACTORS EXTERNAL TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS RESULTED IN REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION. THESE FACTORS INCLUDE: SOVIET FEARS OF U.S.-NATO MILITARY ADVANTAGES; THE SOVIET DECISION TO RAISE THEIR MILITARY BURDEN IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING OBJECTIVES; THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THAT PERENNIAL DISASTER KNOWN AS SOCIALIZED AGRICULTURE; AND THE POLITICAL "DRY TO" OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET EMPIRE.