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Although students of Raymond Aron's Peace and War might rightly bemoan the fact that this book has had relatively little impact on Anglo-American scholarship, the question arises as to whether Aron has anything significant to teach us today. After all, Aron is often seen first & foremost as a Cold War theoretician: is he the best person to turn to in order to make sense of events like Islamic fundamentalism, global terrorism, & the apparent importance of transnational organizations & treaties, to name just a few pertinent issues? This article hopes to demonstrate that Aron's theoretical framework serves as a very useful starting point in conceptualizing international politics -- including current politics -- in a most comprehensive fashion. The article sketches Aron's distinctive moral contributions to international relations theory & suggests that his conceptual framework can help us to understand, both theoretically & practically, the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism & terrorism. References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper explores the role of classical music in the construction of nationalism in the twentieth century. It takes its point of departure in the Danish composer Carl Nielsen and analyses competing interpretations and receptions of his works. The paper seeks to move beyond the single case study. Hence, it includes three additional cases: the Soviet composer Dimitry Shostacovich (particularly the reception of his 5th Symphony); the position of Paul Hindemith in the Third Reich; and finally the development in Aron Copland's oeuvre. In so doing, it aims to clarify the relationship between classical music and nationalism.

A comparison of the views of Raymond Aron & Bertrand de Jouvenel re the extension & intensification of warfare, pol'al power & technology, limited war & pol'al org, & disarmament & limited war. Both see the French Revolution as a major turning point in military history, after which came a gradual evolution of the notion of the total identification of the nation with the army in Germany during WWI. De Jouvenel accounts for this on the basis of the power of gov's which makes total mobilization possible, whereas Aron emphasizes the role of technology in affecting warfare. The latter sees means & ends as being proportional so that any increase in available means or enlargement of the desired ends increases the other factor. He holds the expansion of an industrial civilization based on sci & its application to industry to be at the origin of the present internat'al pol'al scene, consisting of: planetary unity & the bipolar structure of diplomacy, the spread of communism, & the discovery of weapons of mass destruction. De Jouvenel answers the question of how to limit warfare by arguing that the faculties of power must be limited, while Aron regards the increase of wealth as a necessary condition of justice & soc peace. Both see the limitation of war as requiring a pol'al solution. Whereas de Jouvenel sees the aristocracy as the system which has most effectively limited power, Aron regards democracy as the system which today most effectively limits it. Aron believes that a general war could be prevented from becoming a total war if: (1) the Western powers related their armaments to the various kinds of war that may erupt, so that they could avoid being placed in a military situation for which their arms may be either inadequate or too destructive, & (2) there were no areas which one side would not concede except after having struggled. The West must not carve out for itself objectives that are incompatible with the dignity of the enemy countries. I. Taviss.

The book reviewed here treats of the Israeli-Palestinian military problem as a particular case of the general question of democracies faced with the dilemmas of "counter-insurgency". Combining Raymond Aron's realistic approach and Michael Waizer's ethical approach, the author recommends a different military policy: one that is guided by "empathy", acknowledging the Palestinians' suffering and at least the partial validity of their demands, and by "schizophrenia", pursuing at once the eradication of armed groups and support for civilian populations. This appeal to reason based on "short-term history" (1980-2010) may well overlook the uniqueness of a conflict in which "current events hark back in time" and in which "long[er]-term history" (1920-2010) shows the primacy of "overarching narratives" whose acceptance is a prerequisite for the rational games they authorize. In this case, Zahal's strategic dilemma becomes the Israeli state's political dilemma: to avoid both "hostile empathy" and "defeatist sympathy". Adapted from the source document.

Fifty years after the publication of Paix et guerre entre les nations by Raymond Aron, this book is a little forgotten because it is dated and is heterodox in the international relations subject. However, based on Clausewitz, Aron has presented a prudent strategy able to preserve the freedom of the European peoples which presuppose the citizens' determination to assume their duty of defense on the nation service. Aron condemns the nationalism excesses but defends the political form of nation, as well as, criticizes, on the behalf of the political autonomy, the European project of the founding fathers and defends that the Europeans should rest citizens. Adapted from the source document.

This article identifies a distinct strand of 20th-century liberal thought that was exemplified by Isaiah Berlin, Raymond Aron and, to a lesser extent, Karl Popper. I offer a stylized account of their common ideas and shared political sensibility, and argue that their primarily negative liberalism was a variety of what Judith Shklar called the 'liberalism of fear' -- which put the imperative to avoid cruelty and atrocity first. All three founded their liberalism on a 'politics of knowledge' that was directed primarily against Marxist philosophies of history and less against the idea of bureaucratic planning, as, in contrast, was the case with Friedrich von Hayek's thought. Moreover, all three subscribed to more or less explicit versions of value pluralism, and claimed that, in the circumstances of modernity, Weber's 'clash of values' was exacerbated and required a particularly prudential approach to politics; this prudential management of value conflicts in turn was best entrusted to cultivated bureaucratic elites. All shared an image of a tolerant and humane society -- essentially an idealized version of Britain -- but said perhaps too little on the question how societies without the appropriate traditions of moderation and compromise were to be liberalized. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright.]

The French Political Science Review spent there half a century one of its numbers was 'political Theory.' This volume satisfied, under the aegis of Raymond Aron, influential figures of the main traditions of the time, in France as in abroad: the liberalism (Isaiah Berlin) Marxism (Henri Lefebvre), the 'economic' theories (Anthony Downs, Bertrand de Louvenel) to the theory of international relations (Stanley Hoffman), of analytic philosophy (Richard Wollheim) has the philosophy of Kanto-Hegelian tradition (Eric Weil). Their contributions, however, were content not to illustrate the methods and objects to their own authors, but has struggled to answer even one question, about the nature of this particular approach to politics. In his brief preface, Aron suggest also a more adequate title for this album could have been 'In quest of political theory' as the referent of this entitled him seemed uncertain. Adapted from the source document.

Scholars have long recognized the high levels of participation by organized business in the "pressure system" (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Schattschneider 1960; Scholzman and Tiemey 1986) and have recently begun studying charitable group involvement, or lack thereof, in the policy influence process (Beny and Arons 2003; Berry 2005 and 2006). Few studies, however, have made comparisons of activities across interest group sectors; and none have done so focusing exclusively on nonprofit associations. This study contributes to the recent nonprofit lobbying literature by examining the lobbying activities of membership associations that issue legislator ratings, or "scorecards." Creating a sample from scorecard-issuing groups limits focus to nonprofits that have an indicated interest in congressional policy. Specifically, this study attempts to determine if business associations spend significantly more and charitable associations significantly less on lobbying activities. Using analysis of variance methods, the author finds that business associations do spend significantly more on lobbying than their charitable and ideological tax-exempt counterparts. Labor unions fall somewhere in between business and charitable and ideological groups. Finally, groups employing "complex organizational structures" (Boris and Krehely 2002; Reid 2001) lobby at higher levels than groups with one tax status, although this finding does not apply to charitable groups. Adapted from the source document.