Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 94, p. 58-64
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 94, p. 58-64
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These are the sheets of a presentation on June 8 2018, at the conference of Dutch and Flemish political science. These sheets give an overview, and see "Voting Theory for Democracy" (VTFD) for precision. Arrow's theorem is that four axioms would be reasonable and morally required each by themselves, but together they result into a contradiction. The deduction stands but the interpretation can be rejected. Arrow confuses voting and deciding. The axiom of "pairwise decision making" can be rejected - and Arrow's label "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is distractive. A method that many would find interesting is Borda Fixed Point. ; This is an update of the sheets of my presentation on March 16 2001 for the Social Choice group in Tilburg, The Politicologenetmaal 2018 has this link: https://politicologenetmaal.eu See Voting Theory for Democracy at https://zenodo.org/record/291985
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In: Public choice, Volume 179, Issue 1-2, p. 125-131
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: New Zealand economic papers, Volume 34, Issue 1, p. 89-110
ISSN: 1943-4863
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Working paper
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"This book develops John Dewey's broad conception of social conflict as a natural process of discovery and preference adjustment, resolving Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem of the impossibility of ordering diverse preferences through voting. It addresses the nature and resolution of today's urgent problems and political polarization"--
In: Economics of planning: an international journal devoted to the study of comparative economics, planning and development, Volume 9, Issue 1-2, p. 5-41
ISSN: 1573-0808
In: World Journal of Social Sciences, Volume 4. No. 1. March 2014
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2.3 More Dimensions and 360 Degree Medianhood: Cox's Theorem2.4 Pairwise Symmetry: Plott's Theorem; 2.5 Default Stability and a Side Trip beyond Majority Rule; 2.6 Essential Packaging; 2.7 Contrasts and Limitations, or Purging Preposterous Premises; 2.8 Observable Evidence of Cycles; 3 Social Rationality; 3.1 Choice Functions and Rationality; 3.2 Rationality and the Classical Framework of Social Choice; 3.3 Arrow's Theorem; 3.4 On interpreting and Misinterpreting the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives; 3.5 Proof of Arrow's Theorem; 3.6 On Not Overstating the Theorem
In: Contributions to economic analysis 145
Front Cover; Social Choice and Welfare; Copyright Page; Introduction to the series; Preface; Table of Contents; List of participants; Introduction; References; PART IA: THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CHOICE: THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM; CHAPTER 1. Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended co-domains; 1. Introduction; 2. Notation; 3. From individual preferences to social preferences; 4. Dictators and oligarchies; 5. Hypothesis on individual preferences; 6. Arrow's theorem; 7. Proof of the theorem; 8. Remarks about weak orders; References.
In: Open Journal of Political Science: OJPS, Volume 5, Issue 1, p. 26-39
ISSN: 2164-0513
In: Public choice, Volume 152, Issue 1-2, p. 83-95
ISSN: 1573-7101
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Working paper