Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe aim of this Article is to show that the enforcement of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union ('TEU') values vis-à-vis Member States could benefit from the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ('CFR') also in instances where the current interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR prevents this. This would be the case if the CFR were also applicable to purely domestic cases, eg—but not only—with regard to fundamental rights-relevant violations related to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this case, the European Court of Justice, which has already partly taken this path recently, could prevent the violation of core EU values. The most important historical challenge to those values in Europe today is the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and democracy in certain Member States. It is the very purpose of fundamental rights to provide answers to such dangers. When one speaks of the rule of law and democracy, one necessarily also means fundamental rights. This Article thus advocates an EU which perceives itself as a complete fundamental rights union. While the traditional interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR had a balanced division of competence between the EU and its Member States in mind, the disregard of Article 2 TEU values triggers a clausula rebus sic stantibus: the neat federal balance can only be upheld if both ends stick to the original promise made. It demonstrates two ways of completing the European fundamental rights union: treaty revision, on the one hand, and reinterpretation of Article 51 CFR, on the other hand. Both ways have in common that only a complete fundamental rights union can establish a system of fundamental rights protection that is uniform and thus equality-preserving in cases where national fundamental rights fail to provide sufficient protection.

The EU Fundamental Rights Charter should be understood as acknowledging that fundamental rights are the foundation of European democracies and thus underlying EU integration, and that the division of powers between the EU and its Member States is ultimately in the interest of people. This would leave room for the overprotection of rights as a matter of national or international law. Such a rights-based approach would respect international human rights law and fit into EU internal market, citizenship and private law. Respectfor Member State powers would serve as a limiting factor to this approach by limiting the extent of judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU.

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). At <http://www.icj-cij.org>.International Court of Justice, December 19, 2005.In its December 19, 2005, judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo v. Uganda (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Uganda to have engaged in grave violations of the prohibition on the use of force and of its international humanitarian and human rights obligations during its occupation of Congelese territory. The Court also found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations for its treatment of Ugandan diplomats and also for the destruction of their diplomatic premises and the associated archives and records.The train of events leading to this case originated in May 1997 with President Laurent-Desire Kabila's deposition of Zairean dictator Mobutu-Ssese Seko. Having come to power with Ugandan and Rwandese military assistance, Kabila was unsuccessful in his effort to remove Ugandan and Rwandese troops from the DRC (paras. 48–50). The DRC alleged that in August 1998, Ugandan armed forces invaded (para. 29) and then captured and occupied Congolese towns and territory in defiance of Kabila's decision that Ugandan and Rwandese forces should leave the DRC (para. 29–31). Further, the DRC contended that Uganda recruited, funded, trained, equipped, and supplied armed Congolese groups opposed to the Kabila government (para. 32).

AbstractMany people consider that the existence of Article 51 paragraph (1) and (2) in the Criminal Code is a basis for absolute immunity or immunity for officials. No exception for ordinary people who ultimately know the contents of the article who then assume that the law we profess is very damaging to a sense of justice. The existence of this article has also attracted the attention of academics, as evidenced by the number of studies published in publications that we can find in online media. It is this community's assumption that will lead to a setback of the law itself because of the loss of public trust in the existing legal system. Position orders without authority, do not cause criminal abolition, except if the governed, in good faith thinks that the order is given with authority and its implementation is included in the work environment, that is about the sound of paragraph (2) of article 51 of the Criminal Code. The problem that often occurs is that many articles in legislation do not explain in detail the true meaning. If we may examine paragraph (2) in that article, it means that an official's actions can be justified even though there is no prior order, either from the law or an order of an authorized position with only the basis of good faith from the act. The intent of good faith can invite diverse interpretations, then questions arise; what are the criteria of good faith, whichever boundary of good faith is intended, and so on.Keywords: Article 51, Criminal Code, Academics, Justice.