Suchergebnisse

This paper analyzes the evolution of Milton Friedman's thinking about bailouts. It covers bailouts of commercial banks, shadow banks and other financial firms, manufacturing firms, governments, financial markets, and other cases where the term is commonly used. It is based on his academic writings and on the many interviews, op-eds, letters to the editor, and so on through which he communicated his views during and after his transition from professor to public intellectual.

Bundesregierung, Bundestag und Bundesrat sind sich einig: Die NPD muss verboten werden! Der Verbotsantrag wurde im Frühjahr 2001 beim Bundesverfassungsgericht eingereicht, das gesamte Verfahren kann sich aber durchaus mehrere Jahre hinziehen. Der Ausgang ist ungewiss. Der Autor war als Jugendlicher bis zu seinem Ausstieg 1990 selber viele Jahre Mitglied und Funktionär in NPD und DVU. Er weiß, wovon er redet, und er befürwortet ein Verbot. Er begründet dies detailliert und kenntnisreich mit der Geschichte, der Praxis und der Programmatik der NPD - gleichzeitig ist er sich bewusst, dass ein Verbot nicht das Problem des Neofaschismus lösen wird. Auch sieht er die Gefahr einer weiteren Aushöhlung der Grundrechte im Allgemeinen - von der im Interesse eines αsauberen± Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland vor allem ganz andere Bevölkerungsgruppen betroffen sein könnten. Mit seinem Buch will der Autor die Kenntnisse über die NPD vertiefen und verbreitern und gleichzeitig zu einem offensiven Dialog über das Pro und Contra eines Verbots beitragen.

AbstractGovernments are often punished for negative events such as economic downturns and financial shocks. However, governments can address such shocks with salient policy responses that might mitigate public punishment. We use three high-quality nationally representative surveys collected around a key event in the history of the Dutch economy, namely the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, to examine how voters responded to a salient government bailout. The results illustrate that governments can get substantial credit for pursuing a bailout in the midst of a financial crisis. Future research should take salient policy responses into account to fully understand the public response to the outbreak of financial and economic crises.

We develop a theoretical model in which there are public and private firms and a government. When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with bailouts or nationalizations. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In this setting, we analyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalizations of private firms after unprofitable investments lead to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers and employees working for a firm is also affected by the possibility of government interventions, reducing the productive efficiency advantage of private firms.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- contents -- 1 Corporate Bailouts Explained -- Stocks and Bonds -- The Top Ten Companies of 2009 -- Reasons for Bankruptcy -- Corporate Bailout Controversy -- 2 Prerecession Bailouts -- The Penn Central Transportation Company -- Lockheed and Rolls-Royce -- Other Significant Bailouts -- The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act's Rules and Regulations -- Bailouts in the Current Recession -- 3 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis -- What Are Mortgages, and How Do They Work? -- A Shift in the Housing Market -- Bear Stearns -- Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers -- American International Group (AIG) -- 4 The Automotive Crisis -- The Big Three Bailout -- The Troubled Asset Relief Program -- A Second Bailout? -- The Chrysler-Fiat Future -- 5 Corporate Bailout Controversy -- How Do Checks and Balances Work? -- Checks and Balances During a Recession -- Glossary -- For More Information -- Web Sites -- For Further Reading -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Photo Credits

The paper presents an investigation of subnational government bailouts in Germany. In a first part we briefly describe the fiscal federalism system in Germany. The main part of the paper examines the bailout of two West German states. We identify the causes of the financial trouble of both states and examine the institutional settings that forced the federal government to provide bailout transfers. In addition, we investigate the impact these transfers had on the fiscal performance of both Länder. In a further section we provide evidence on bailouts of local governments by the German Länder. A final section summarizes our results and presents policy conclusions.