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We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered unrelated. M equilibrium is empirically robust and, despite being set-valued, falsifiable. Results from a series of experiments that compare M equilibrium to leading behavioral game theory models demonstrate its virtues in predicting observed choices and stated beliefs. Data from experimental games with a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and multiple M equilibria exhibit coordination problems that could not be anticipated through the lens of existing models. (JEL C72, C90, D83)

Video games have a unique ability to engage, challenge, and motivate, which has led teachers, psychology specialists, political activists and health educators to find ways of using them to help people learn, grow and change. Serious games, as they are called, are defined as games that have a primary purpose other than entertainment. However, it is challenging to create games that both educate and entertain. While game designers have embraced some psychological concepts such as flow and mastery, understanding how these concepts work together within established psychological theory would assist them in creating effective serious games. Similarly, game design professionals have understood the propensity of video games to teach while lamenting that educators do not understand how to incorporate educational principles into game play in a way that preserves the entertainment. Albert Bandura's (1998) social cognitive theory (SCT) has been used successfully to create video games that create positive behavior outcomes, and teachers have successfully used Howard Gardner's (1983) theory of multiple intelligences (MI) to create engaging, immersive learning experiences. Cognitive behavioral game design is a new framework that incorporates Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) and Multiple Intelligences (MI) with game design principles to create a game design blueprint for serious games.

In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the 'scale-relativity' considerations built into Binmore's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend Binmore's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent (respective) work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism (broadly conceived) and what Binmore calls 'whiggery' as normative political programs.

In this dissertation, I contribute to the literature on Behavioral Microeconomic Theory by analyzing the consequences of well-established departures from rationality and their remedies in strategic interactions. More precisely, I investigate credulity, reduced sensitivity to partitioned prices, and correlation neglect in models of democratic elections, imperfect competition, and contracting under hidden action. Moreover, to facilitate the analysis of other departures from rationality and their impact on economic well-being, I define a solution concept for games between players with dual-selves and discuss its relations to existing equilibrium concepts in the literature on Behavioral Economic Theory.

Game theory and contemporary decision theory provide the mathematical foundation of economics. Neuroeconomics, which principally concerns itself with the integrative study of brain, mind and behavior, builds on this mathematical foundation while also drawing heavily from the repository of experimental paradigms that have grown out of economic game theory and behavioral economics. Game theory is central to neuroeconomics primarily because it constitutes a formal mathematical framework with which to bridge insights occurring at different levels of neuroeconomic analysis. In particular, game theoretic principles can be used to express neuroscientific ideas about the brain, psychological concepts regarding the human mind, and economic predictions of human behavior, thereby making these different ideas more rigorously relatable to each other. In this chapter we provide a nontechnical introduction to game theory and its relation to neuroeconomics. It has been written as an overview of the basic concepts most likely to be encountered in neuroeconomic research. The first part of the chapter introduces the reader to the basic concepts and philosophical underpinnings of game theory in relation to neuroeconomics. The second part is an introduction and discussion of common games, including the games featured in the other chapters of this book.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- PART ONE: INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER ONE: Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future -- PART TWO: BASIC TOPICS -- REFERENCE-DEPENDENCE AND LOSS-AVERSION -- CHAPTER TWO: Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem -- CHAPTER THREE: Mental Accounting Matters -- PREFERENCES OVER RISKY AND UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES -- CHAPTER FOUR: Developments in Nonexpected-Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk -- CHAPTER FIVE: Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field -- INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE -- CHAPTER SIX: Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review -- CHAPTER SEVEN: Doing It Now or Later -- FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL PREFERENCES -- CHAPTER EIGHT: Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market -- CHAPTER NINE: A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation -- CHAPTER TEN: Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics -- CHAPTER ELEVEN: Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases -- GAME THEORY -- CHAPTER TWELVE Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction -- CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Behavioral Game Theory: Predicting Human Behavior in Strategic Situations -- PART THREE: APPLICATIONS -- MACROECONOMICS AND SAVINGS -- CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Mental Accounting, Saving, and Self-Control -- CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting David Laibson -- CHAPTER SIXTEEN: The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment -- CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: Money Illusion -- LABOR ECONOMICS -- CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity -- CHAPTER NINETEEN: Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time -- CHAPTER TWENTY: Wages, Seniority, and the Demand for Rising Consumption Profiles

1. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories -- 2. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games -- 3. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game -- 4. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points -- 5. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof -- 6. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model -- 7. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points -- 8. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game -- 9. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory -- 10. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition -- 11. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncooperative Games -- 12. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.

"It is widely accepted that a large proportion of acquisition strategies fail to deliver the expected value. Globalizing markets characterized by growing uncertainty, together with the advent of new competitors, are further complicating the task of valuing acquisitions. Too often, managers rely on flawed valuation models or their intuition and experience when making risky investment decisions, exposing their companies to potentially costly pitfalls. Playing at Acquisitions provides managers with a powerful methodology for designing and executing successful acquisition strategies. The book tackles the myriad executive biases that infect decision making at every stage of the acquisition process, and the inadequacy of current valuation approaches to help mitigate these biases and more realistically represent value in uncertain environments.Bringing together the latest advances in behavioral finance, real option valuation, and game theory, this unique playbook explains how to express acquisition strategies as sets of real options, explicitly introducing uncertainty and future optionality into acquisition strategy design. It shows how to incorporate the competitive dynamics that exist in different acquisition contexts; acknowledge and even embrace uncertainty; identify the value of the real options embedded in targets; and more.Rooted in economic theory and featuring numerous real-world case studies, Playing at Acquisitions will enhance the ability of CEOs and their teams to derive value from their acquisition strategies, and is also an ideal resource for researchers and MBAs"--

"Behavioral Decision Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

Video games have a unique ability to engage, challenge, and motivate, which has led teachers, psychology specialists, political activists and health educators to find ways of using them to help people learn, grow and change. Serious games, as they are called, are defined as games that have a primary purpose other than entertainment. However, it is challenging to create games that both educate and entertain. While game designers have embraced some psychological concepts such as flow and mastery, understanding how these concepts work together within established psychological theory would assist them in creating effective serious games. Similarly, game design professionals have understood the propensity of video games to teach while lamenting that educators do not understand how to incorporate educational principles into game play in a way that preserves the entertainment. Bandura (2006) social cognitive theory (SCT) has been used successfully to create video games that create positive behavior outcomes, and teachers have successfully used Gardner's (1983) theory of multiple intelligences (MIs) to create engaging, immersive learning experiences. Cognitive behavioral game design is a new framework that incorporates SCT and MI with game design principles to create a game design blueprint for serious games.