Suchergebnisse

The two goals of the 1998 state council organizational streamlining were personnel reduction and a change of governments functions. It is argued that the methods being used to achieve personnel reduction do not constitute a real reduction but largely involve transferring staff to other public institutions. Real personnel reduction could not be achieved without a major change of government function. Institutional reforms of both the central and local governments since the 1980s have been adaptions to the changing economic structure from a planned to a market economy. Government functions have served both existing economies. Cadres cannot be reduced unless the government function of direct management of state-enterprises is completely severed. The major contents of the 1998 institutional reform are examined and evaluated. The prospects for the success of the reform are also assessed. (J Contemp China/DÜI)

One of the steps taken by the new government in the political sphere was the abolition of the former national army. On May 7, the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan decided to reorganize the army and navy. According to the decision, the new Azerbaijani army and navy were, in fact, created as part of the Red Army of Soviet Russia. Azerbaijani military units were directly subordinated to the commander of the XI Red Army, and warships to the command of the Caspian fleet. Thus, from the first months of its existence, the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan "voluntarily" renounced the right to have an armed force, which is one of the important conditions of statehood. the Soviet authorities and the 11th Army were accused of open looting in Azerbaijan under the name of "confiscation of the property of the bourgeoisie." After the establishment of Soviet power in Guba, the old system of administrative management was completely abolished and a new administrative system - the Soviet system - was established. The article "Change of government in the Guba region of Azerbaijan and its tragic consequences" concerns the issue about the reactivation of the Armenians in Karabakh and Zangazur, the Azerbaijani army units defending the northern border – Guba. The paper was dedicated to the situation in the militia system improved relatively in the late 1920s. Tha aim of the study is to determine conditions the formation of new government structures in remote villages continued until mid-1921 under the influence of a number of factors. In this context, issues of the Communist newspaper were first listed, number of militiamen in the Guba district was determined, avtivities to increase technical training, communist centers, people`s attitude towards the militia were analyzed. This analysis was conducted with the study of the sources related to the subject, the analysis of the results obtained, the analysis and synthesis of the arguments, and also the comparative analysis method.

ABSTRACT
Researchers have argued that political parties in government matter for policy integration reforms, but the way they do so remains somewhat undetermined. In this paper, we contribute to this literature by tackling two interrelated open questions: How does the presence of different political parties in government, which rely on policy programs on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, shape the intensity of policy integration reforms? To what extent do changes in governing political parties affect the political motivation of policy integration reforms and thereby influence the goals and means of these reforms? To explore these questions, we examine a case where institutional capacity is generally favorable to such reforms. Specifically, we compare policy integration reforms in the UK under the New Labor government (1997–2010) with those passed by the Conservative governments (1979–1996), and by the coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (2010–2014). We find that political parties' policy positions, and respectively, their political motivations, decisively shape the intensity of policy integration reforms, as well as their substantial goals and means. Furthermore, our results imply that changes in governing parties increase the overall frequency but can reduce the coherence of reform programs over time. These results point to a paradox for the governance of problems through policy integration, whereby the presence of high institutional capacity as provided by a majoritarian system can have negative long-term consequences for policies aiming to solve complex problems.

Mit dem unblutig verlaufenen Sturz von S. Milosevics im Anschluss an die Präsidentschaftswahlen vom September 2000 vollzog sich in Jugoslawien ein rascher demokratischer Machtwechsel. Unter dem neuen Präsidenten Kostunica und dem neuen Ministerpräsidenten Djindjic fand das Land binnen kurzem wieder den Weg zur Mitgliedschaft in die internationalen Institutionen, vom Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa über die OSZE, die hier im Januar 2001 eine Mission einrichtete, bis zur Weltbank und dem internationalen Währungsfonds zurück. Neben den Problemen des wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbaus - eine erste größere westliche Finanzhilfe von 1,3 Mrd. US-Dollar kam erst mit der Auslieferung von S. Milosevic an das Haager Tribunal zustande - hängt die Zukunft des Landes entscheidend von der Lösung offener territorialer (Montenegro und Kosovo) sowie ethnisch-politischer (Mazedonien) Streitfragen ab, in denen gegenwärtig (zumindest z.T.) Nato-Truppen als stabilisierendes Element fungieren. (IFSH-Pll)

"Seit vielen Jahren gilt Dänemark als Vorreiter und Vorbild einer aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Bereits 1994 wurden die ersten Reformen durchgeführt, die statt der Versorgung arbeitsloser Personen die Integration in den Arbeitsmarkt in den Mittelpunkt der Politik stellten. Seitdem erhielt Dänemark sowohl seitens der Regierungen anderer Länder als auch in der internationalen Forschungsgemeinschaft hohe Aufmerksamkeit. Dabei wurde und wird Dänemark hinsichtlich seiner aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktpolitik als model of good practice bezeichnet. Denn die dänische Aktivierungsstrategie setzt im Unterschied zur britischen und amerikanischen einen Schwerpunkt auf Qualifizierung und Kompetenzentwicklung statt auf Zwang und Sanktionen. Jedoch fokussieren die meisten Arbeiten hierzu auf den Zeitraum 1994 bis 2001 und geben somit eine nicht mehr aktuelle Einschätzung der dänischen Arbeitsmarktpolitik. In diesem Beitrag soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob Dänemark auch heute noch als model of good practice in der aktivierenden Arbeitsmarktpolitik gelten kann. Dafür wird zunächst erläutert, was 'Aktivierung' in der Arbeitsmarktpolitik bedeutet und welche Strategien von Aktivierung unterschieden werden können. Bezug genommen wird dabei im Wesentlichen auf die Dichotomisierung von enabling und workfare, wobei Dänemark häufig als Beispiel für die enabling-Strategie (Schwerpunkt Beschäftigungsfähigkeit, Qualifizierung, Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe) herangezogen wird, während Großbritannien und die USA offenbar eine workfare-Strategie (Schwerpunkt Beschäftigungsbereitschaft, Niedriglohn, Pflicht zur Arbeit) verfolgen. In einem nächsten Schritt wird die dänische Arbeitsmarktpolitik seit 1994 nachgezeichnet, um so zu identifizieren, von welcher Form von Aktivierung in Dänemark tatsächlich gesprochen werden kann. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass nach dem Regierungswechsel 2001, bei dem eine liberal-bürgerliche Minderheitenregierung die sozialdemokratisch-sozialliberale Koalition ablöste, eine Trendwende hin zu einer workfare-Strategie in Dänemark zu beobachten ist." (Autorenreferat)

AbstractIn classical two-level games, international cooperation is less likely when there is large programmatic distance and smaller domestic win-sets as a result of changing preferences. TheUStrade negotiations with South Korea and Colombia question this hypothesis and emphasize two empirical insights that can be integrated into the two-level game to improve its explanatory power. First, smaller win-sets due to preference changes can mitigate conflicts of distribution and make cooperation more likely if the negotiators are aware of the smaller win-sets. Second, when negotiators perceive the already achieved bargaining results as a new status quo, former positive sum games can transform into zero sum games, which makes cooperation more difficult, irrespective of the size of the win-sets. Negotiators who perceive conflicts as zero sum games will put more effort into avoiding losses and, as a result, domestic constraints cannot be used as bargaining levers vis-à-vis a foreign country.

The African Union (AU) norm relating to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) distinguishes the African peace and security order from other regional and global peace and security orders. This norm assigns the regional organization an intrusive role unparalleled by other international organizations as far as the constitutional and democratic order of member states is concerned. The norm bans UCG and also provides for enforcement measures that received regional constitutional status in the founding treaty establishing the AU. Despite its emergence accompanying the democratization process that countries on the continent ventured into in the 1990s, seen in the light of Africa's unhappy experience with illegal change or seizure of government, this norm cannot be dissociated from the continent's concern about peace and security. Indeed, the norm's defence of constitutional and democratic rule from unconstitutional changes has evolved and been utilized to operate as a means of promoting or securing stability and peace. Simultaneously, while the relatively consistent practice of enforcement of the norm that the AU developed over the years has served the objective of maintaining peace and security in Africa by playing key role in the decline of incidents of UCG, various challenges relating to its efficacy have been observed.

We examine whether changes of government influence compliance with international agreements. We investigate compliance with the NATO two percent target to which all NATO countries committed themselves during the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. The dataset includes the military expenditure by NATO countries over the period 2010-2018. The results suggest that countries that do not (yet) comply with the two percent target have smaller growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP when they experienced a large change of government, e.g. a change from a rightwing to a leftwing government, than countries that did not experience such a large change of government since the NATO summit in 2014. Countries that experienced a large change of government are, thus, less likely to comply with the two percent target. Future research should examine the credibility problem of national governments in other international agreements too.