Suchergebnisse

Es ist die mutmaßlich wirkmächtigste 'Meistererzählung' der Weimarer Republik: Die Erinnerung an die gefallenen Soldaten entfaltete in den Jahren von 1918 bis 1933 eine suggestive Massenkraft, die hinsichtlich ihrer nachhaltigen Sinnstiftung keine ernstzunehmende Konkurrenz hatte: Weder die junge Republik noch das untergegangene Reich generierte Erinnerungsszenarien, die in dieser nachhaltigen Form rezipiert wurden. Am Beispiel der zweitgrößten Stadt des Reiches - Hamburg - geht es in diesem Text um Funktionsweisen, Akteure und Sinnstiftungen im Rahmen des politischen Totenkultes in der Weimarer Republik, der sich maßgeblich an Gedenktagen wie Volkstrauertag und Totensonntag etablierte. Entwickelt wird hierbei die Kernthese, dass der Volkstrauertag mit der starken Einbeziehung nationalprotestantischer Sinnstiftungen in erster Linie zur vorbereitenden Entwicklung eines Heldenkultes diente, den wenig später die Nationalsozialisten für wirkmächtige Propaganda-Zwecke nutzten. ; It might be Weimar Republic's master-narrative: In the years 1918-1933, the remembrance of dead soldiers developed a suggestive inertia force which hasn't had any serious rivalry in terms of creating sense for a suffering community: Neither the young 'Republic' nor the lost 'Reich' succeed in generating scenarios of remembrance which were absorbed comparably. Using the example of Hamburg as the second largest city in German Reich, this text deals with functions, players and options of creating sense within covering a Weimar cult of the dead, which primarily was established within memorial days of 'Volkstrauertag' and 'Totensonntag'. In this regard, the following main point is supposed to be designed: Implying a strong national-Protestant sense, the Volkstrauertag was providing a basis for an upcoming 'Heldenkult', which contemporarily was used by the National Socialists to create a powerful, effective propaganda.

Gegenstand des Beitrags sind zwei Gedenkreden zum 80. Jahrestag des Ausbruchs des Zweiten Weltkriegs, gehalten vom deutschen Bundespräsidenten Frank-Walter Steinmeier und vom polnischen Staatspräsidenten Andrzej Duda. Untersucht wird, welche Gedenkdaten die Redner in den Mittelpunkt stellen, welche Selbst- und Feindbilder sie entwerfen und welche Ziele sie verfolgen. Dazu wird in einem ersten Schritt die unterschiedliche Bedeutung des Zweiten Weltkriegs im jeweiligen kollektiven Gedächtnis skizziert; es folgt eine knappe Charakterisierung der Gedenkrede als Textsorte. Den Schwerpunkt bilden eine Analyse der den Reden zugrundeliegenden Perspektiven, einschließlich der präsentierten Thesen, sowie eine Gegenüberstellung der wichtigsten Unterschiede. ; The article analyses two speeches commemorating the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, delivered by the German President Frank Walter Steinmeier and the Polish President Andrzej Duda. The authors examine the two texts and ask what aspects of World War II the politicians evoke in their speeches, what images of the Self and the Other are created and what goals are pursued. In the beginning, the article outlines the different meanings of World War II in Polish and German collective memory, and then it proceeds to briefly characterise the commemorative speech as a type of speech. A special emphasis is placed on the analysis of the perspectives underlying the speeches, including the theses presented, as well as on the comparison of the most important differences. ; L'article contient uniquement le résumé en allemand et en anglais.

The post-communist transformation in Eastern Europe was marked by visual changes through iconoclastic actions and attempts to erase the visibility of the former communist system that was synonymous with the influence of the Soviet Union. Images of the removal and destruction of monuments have found their way into collective memory through their circulation in mass media, textbooks, films, exhibitions, and museums. This article explores the visual representation of "the Russian"1 in various European memory cultures in combination with the visual remembrance of the transformation that started in 1989. It aims to examine how images published in quality mass media in 2009 depict public memory twenty years later.

This article focuses on the factors inhibiting a productive rethinking of the past in contemporary Lithuanian-Russian relations. The rethinking of the past is understood as a process facilitating the reconsideration of historical meanings through adjusting them to the expectations and values of a contemporary society. The author argues that, during this process, historical research — an important tool for encouraging the co-existence of communities — should fulfil certain social functions. Having chosen the Lithuanian-Russian communication space as a case, the author emphasises the need to develop interest in mutual knowledge of cultures of remembrance in this space. Outlining the strategies specific to the prevailing cultures of remembrance in contemporary Russia and Lithuania, the author addresses the question of their proper relationship, as well as that of the appropriateness of politics of history. The criminalisation of certain evaluations of the past and the academic dialogue between historians are regarded as two opposite extremes of politics of history actually existing in the Lithuanian-Russian communications space. The author stresses that research on the values and interpretations of the past peculiar to certain social groups in both Lithuania and Russia may be considered as a basis for further development of the historical dialogue. It is assumed that such research may contribute to the improvement in the field of politics of history.

This article focuses on the factors inhibiting a productive rethinking of the past in contemporary Lithuanian-Russian relations. The rethinking of the past is understood as a process facilitating the reconsideration of historical meanings through adjusting them to the expectations and values of a contemporary society. The author argues that, during this process, historical research — an important tool for encouraging the co-existence of communities — should fulfil certain social functions. Having chosen the Lithuanian-Russian communication space as a case, the author emphasises the need to develop interest in mutual knowledge of cultures of remembrance in this space. Outlining the strategies specific to the prevailing cultures of remembrance in contemporary Russia and Lithuania, the author addresses the question of their proper relationship, as well as that of the appropriateness of politics of history. The criminalisation of certain evaluations of the past and the academic dialogue between historians are regarded as two opposite extremes of politics of history actually existing in the Lithuanian-Russian communications space. The author stresses that research on the values and interpretations of the past peculiar to certain social groups in both Lithuania and Russia may be considered as a basis for further development of the historical dialogue. It is assumed that such research may contribute to the improvement in the field of politics of history.

The main goal of the research is to show the functional dimension of the political rituals associated with the celebrations of the Katyń massacre anniversaries in 1990-2010. Using the method of political linguistics, the study makes it possible to identify ten topoi organizing the Katyń anniversary discourse. They include the topos of "an innocent victim", "violated justice", "compensation", "fair Russians", "friends Muscovites", "elite", as well as the topos of "a shared field of remembrance, reconciliation" ("from foes to friends"), the topos of mutual forgiveness and the anniversary as a special occasion, or the topos of "inhuman land". The pragmatic-semantic analysis of the contents of media reports accompanying the Katyń celebrations allows the author to show a number of functions that the Katyń ritual performed in the Polish culture of remembrance in 1990–2010. The study of functions proceeds from emotional, through normative, legitimization, integration and educational functions, to the performative function. ; Głównym celem tekstu jest ukazanie funkcjonalnego wymiaru rytuałów politycznych związanych z obchodami rocznic zbrodni katyńskiej w latach 1990–2010. Dzięki przeprowadzonej metodą semantyczno-pragmatyczną analizie zawartości treści doniesień medialnych towarzyszących obchodom katyńskim, omówione zostały funkcje, które pełnił rytuał katyński w polskiej kulturze pamięci od 1990 do 2010 roku, takie jak funkcja emocjonalna, normatywna, legitymizacyjna, integracyjna, edukacyjna czy performatywna. Ponadto zaaplikowanie teorii traumy kulturowej umożliwiło analizę mitu założycielskiego, wskazywanego przez polityków w trakcie przemówień rocznicowych, wiążącego się z kłamstwem i prawdą o zbrodni katyńskiej. Zauważony w narracji katyńskiej przymus powtarzania, dotyczący walki z zakłamywaniem historii, odniesiony został do traumy spowodowanej damnatio memoriae, związanej z początkami chrześcijaństwa. W kontekście tych spostrzeżeń, w ramach rozważań na temat funkcji performatywnej, przeanalizowane zostało, obecne w dyskursie rocznicowym po katastrofie prezydenckiego samolotu lecącego na obchody 70. rocznicy zbrodni, zjawisko znane jako "drugi Katyń".

The main goal of the research is to show the functional dimension of the political rituals associated with the celebrations of the Katyń massacre anniversaries in 1990-2010. Using the method of political linguistics, the study makes it possible to identify ten topoi organizing the Katyń anniversary discourse. They include the topos of "an innocent victim", "violated justice", "compensation", "fair Russians", "friends Muscovites", "elite", as well as the topos of "a shared field of remembrance, reconciliation" ("from foes to friends"), the topos of mutual forgiveness and the anniversary as a special occasion, or the topos of "inhuman land". The pragmatic-semantic analysis of the contents of media reports accompanying the Katyń celebrations allows the author to show a number of functions that the Katyń ritual performed in the Polish culture of remembrance in 1990–2010. The study of functions proceeds from emotional, through normative, legitimization, integration and educational functions, to the performative function. ; Głównym celem tekstu jest ukazanie funkcjonalnego wymiaru rytuałów politycznych związanych z obchodami rocznic zbrodni katyńskiej w latach 1990–2010. Dzięki przeprowadzonej metodą semantyczno-pragmatyczną analizie zawartości treści doniesień medialnych towarzyszących obchodom katyńskim, omówione zostały funkcje, które pełnił rytuał katyński w polskiej kulturze pamięci od 1990 do 2010 roku, takie jak funkcja emocjonalna, normatywna, legitymizacyjna, integracyjna, edukacyjna czy performatywna. Ponadto zaaplikowanie teorii traumy kulturowej umożliwiło analizę mitu założycielskiego, wskazywanego przez polityków w trakcie przemówień rocznicowych, wiążącego się z kłamstwem i prawdą o zbrodni katyńskiej. Zauważony w narracji katyńskiej przymus powtarzania, dotyczący walki z zakłamywaniem historii, odniesiony został do traumy spowodowanej damnatio memoriae, związanej z początkami chrześcijaństwa. W kontekście tych spostrzeżeń, w ramach rozważań na temat funkcji performatywnej, przeanalizowane zostało, obecne w dyskursie rocznicowym po katastrofie prezydenckiego samolotu lecącego na obchody 70. rocznicy zbrodni, zjawisko znane jako "drugi Katyń".

Abstract Japan and Germany were allies during World War II, and both countries committed crimes. Even though the Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany was unprecedented in history, Japan has also been found guilty of serious misdemeanours. Today, Germany acknowledges the magnitude of its responsibility and strives to deal with this legacy. However, in Japan, we find no consensus on dealing with the matter. Nonetheless, it would be short-sighted to conclude that Germany did a better job than Japan from the outset. In analysing the different approaches to remembrance culture in the two countries, we use the theoretical framework of civil religion to assess the impacts of the respective civil religions on the culture of commemoration. We hereby analyzed the structural factors as well as the influence of individual political behaviour. Immediately after the war, neither Germany nor Japan were interested in coming to terms with their past. Both countries were subject to Western integration, and both countries experienced remarkable economic growth. One of the major differences between both countries concerns civil religion. While Germany no longer relied on strong nationalism-based politics and instead pursued European integration, in Japan. Shintôism has continued to influence feelings of national belonging, making it more difficult to establish a critical dialogue with the past. Further differences are apparent: the Western origin of Japan's constitution, the conflicting international environment in Japan, the late regime change, differences in education and, most importantly, the impacts of generational change in Germany. The 1968 student generation strongly condemned Nazi aggression and demanded that the older generation face responsibility, which strongly contributed to a reappraisal of the past in the public sphere.