Suchergebnisse

The political article tests for rational political business cycles models on an unexplored and large data set of Portuguese municipalities. This data allows for a clean test of the models due to its high level of detail on expenditure items, an exogenous fixed election schedule and the homogeneity of local governments with respect to policy instruments and institutions. Estimation results clearly reveal the opportunistic behaviour of local governments, that in pre-electoral periods, increase expenditure on items highly visible to the electorate such as roads and street construction, in an effort to signal competence and increase their chances of re-election. JEL classification: H72, D72, D78 Keywords: political business cycles, public finance, local governments

La stratégie européenne pour l'emploi a été développée dans un contexte de forte critique de la construction européenne. Elle visait à rééquilibrer la construction communautaire en lui adossant un versant social. Le prescrit communautaire a été établi dans le cadre de la méthode ouverte de coordination et a progressivement été unifié autour d'un référentiel libéral de mise en concurrence. La crise de 2008 a subordonné cette politique aux impératifs de compétitivité et d'austérité budgétaire. Classification JEL : O52, D78, H 53, J48

We use a large and unexplored dataset covering all mainland Portuguese municipalities from 1979 to 2001 to evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of grants from the central government to local authorities. Empirical results clearly show that, besides variables that proxy the social and economic development of municipalities, political variables also condition the granting system: (1) grants increase in municipal and legislative election years; (2) the larger the number of years a mayor has been in office the larger the amount of funds transferred to his municipality; (3) municipalities ruled by mayors that belong to the prime-minister's party are favored in the grants distribution process. Keywords: grants, intergovernmental relations, public choice, Portugal JEL classification: H77, D72, D78

Celem artykułu jest prezentacja i ocena ewolucji postrzegania przez menedżerów zmian w środowisku instytucjonalnym w Polsce w latach 2009-2015. Niewystarczająca sprawność funkcjonowania instytucji publicznych i jakość prawodawstwa w Polsce jest krytykowana przez obywateli, przedsiębiorców i polityków. Mimo że dostrzegają poprawę, podobne oceny polskiego otoczenia instytucjonalnego formułują zagraniczni obserwatorzy. Przedstawiane w artykule oceny zmian w otoczeniu instytucjonalnym oparte są na własnych badaniach prowadzonych od 1997 r. W artykule zaprezentowano zarys kanałów transmisji warunków w otoczeniu instytucjonalnym na bieżące i długoterminowe decyzje ekonomiczne.JEL: K00, D78, P37

Whether or not politics cause changes in monetary policy is controversial in the literature. This article re‐examines the link between politics and regime shifts in monetary policy using two alternative approaches. First, empirical results show that both the presidential and Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) chairmanship regimes do not influence monetary policy under the assumption that the Fed closely follows an interest rate rule. On the other hand, evidence also suggests that changes in political regimes are able to account for the deviations from the optimal Taylor rule. (JELE52, E58, D78)

Das Jahresgutachten des Sachverständigenrates für Wirtschaft 2014/15 wurde von der Politik teils heftig kritisiert, weil wichtige politische Entscheidungen infrage gestellt wurden. In Hinblick auf die monierten Einzelfragen gibt es auch aus der Wissenschaft Kritik. Der Sachverständigenrat selbst sieht hingegen seinen Auftrag nicht darin, die Regierung zu beraten, sondern sie kritisch und unabhängig zu begleiten. Seine Aufgaben sind nicht nur in der Politikberatung im engeren Sinne zu sehen, sondern auch in der Vermittlung von ökonomischen Problemstellungen in die Öffentlichkeit hinein. ; The German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) has the legal mandate to independently assess the state of the German economy, to formulate its expert opinion regarding issues of economic policy and to alert readers to any undesirable developments which threaten to arise in this context. While this might not always be easily palatable for representatives from the political realm, the GCEE bases its analyses transparently on the current state of the economic literature and on empirical evidence to contribute to the formation of an informed judgement regarding economic policy issues among policy makers, economic actors and the general public. The GCEE's function is to offer advice to the government and provide information to the public. A survey of politicians and ministry officials shows that this advice is valued by the respondents. However, the members of the council are barely visible in the media and therefore contribute only minimally to the effective information of the broader public. One reason for this shortcoming is that fulfilling both duties is hardly possible from an institutional economics perspective. A useful comparison can be made with the the Netherlands, where the CPB, the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis - a government-financed but independent institution - has played a central role in forecasting economic developments and in analysing the consequences of policy changes in the Netherlands.

A fundamental question in public choice is: How do people vote? According to the preferred outcome (instrumentally) or according to principles (expressively)? The theoretical discussion eventually led to the hypothesis that voters vote non-strategically according to their preferences, as the probability of owning the marginal vote and in turn determining the outcome with a large number of voters is very low. If we add that they weigh their preferences with the impact that the political outcome has on their economic well-being, we come to the conclusion that if the latter is high, they vote instrumentally, if it is low, they are likely to vote expressively. A unique data set on a natural experiment in Switzerland allows us to test this hypothesis. Citizens of the canton of Zurich voted in 2009 on the highly controversial issue whether to tax non-working and hence mobile foreign residents at a special preferential tax base in order to attract them instrumentally as tax payers or to tax all persons at the same base according to general tax principles. Overall, 53% of the voters preferred to abolish preferential taxation of expats. Our econometric analysis reveals that in rural communities, where attracting rich expats has a sensible impact on communities' budget, citizens voted instrumentally, whereas in large cities where the budgetary impact is small, voters voted expressively. This outcome raises a more fundamental question on the design of the democracy. It cannot be overlooked that the two groups voted on two different issues. Rural voter's choice was marginal in the sense that they asked: Should we partly give up our tax principles to obtain additional revenues? Their answer was yes. Urban voters, who expected no sensible revenue effect from the tax privileges, in contrast, asked themselves: Should we give up tax privileges for merely marginal or even no benefits? Their answer was no! But if so why should the urban voters in their situation impose their own values on rural voters whose situation is different? This dilemma could be overcome if urban and rural voters voted separately under a decentralized more "federalistic" design of their government.

There is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income redistribution. While the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representative democracy, the influence of direct democracy on redistribution has attracted much less attention. According to theoretical arguments and previous empirical results, government policies of income redistribution are expected to be more in line with median voter preferences in direct than in representative democracies. In this paper, we find that institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower public spending and revenue, particularly lower welfare spending and broad-based income and property (wealth) tax revenue. Moreover, we estimate a model which explains the determinants of redistribution using panel data provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Office from 1981 to 1997 and a cross section of (representative) individual data from 1992. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income and actual redistribution is lower, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution. This finding might well indicate the presence of efficiency gains in redistribution policies.

How a sustainable fiscal policy can be performed in a federal system is not only a Swiss prob-lem but is also discussed in other federal countries like Germany and Austria, and in the European Union. Contrary to most other countries, the Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal federalism with high fiscal autonomy at all governmental levels, by direct popular rights which include fiscal referenda at the cantonal and local levels, and by particular constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints in order to prevent excessive public debt. In this paper, the effects of these constitutional clauses on public finances are investigated. Using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, we provide evidence that direct democ-racy leads to significantly lower expenditure and revenue. The fiscal constraint, on the other hand, significantly reduces budget deficits. Total, cantonal as well as local expenditure and revenue are the lower the higher the share of local expenditure is.

This paper examines the impact of smoking regulations on restaurant employment in West Virginia, a state with a high rate of smoking prevalence. Using a confidential establishment‐level dataset, our results suggest that smoking bans reduced restaurant employment by between 0.7 and 1.5 workers, depending on model specification. We find that smoking restrictions have heterogeneous impacts across establishments, with the largest impacts on mid‐sized establishments, defined as those with 10–29 employees. Our results also suggest that the impact of smoking restrictions was larger in counties with higher rates of smoking prevalence. (JELL51, D78, H0)

Abstract.  Environmental concerns often figure prominently in opinion polls. But do election outcomes actually affect the environment? I test the influence of the party in power on urban air pollution in 13 Canadian cities. The government's political stripe is not reliably associated with positive or negative effects on air pollution. Provincial parties on both the right and the left are associated with elevated levels of some air contaminants. Federal effects also go in contrasting directions. Overall it appears a change in government is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of changes in air pollution. JEL classification: Q51, Q58, D78

This study is aimed at identifying several problems while analyzing the determinants of population service policies in Lirung sub-district, Talaud archipelago district, North Sulawesi province, Indonesia. This study uses qualitative research methods, the data collection methods used in this study are as follows: interviews with employees and the people served, field observations, literature studies. Population services policy is optimal because it gets political support from the central government and local governments. Local governments often communicate to the public about population service policies. Resources for the implementation of policies and programs, policies and policy formats, and there need to be a real improvement, these factors have not been able to optimize service policies. This work has never been achieved and is the result of our research so that it can guarantee its authenticity. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88 ; Дослідження спрямоване на виявлення кількох проблем під час аналізу детермінант політики обслуговування населення в підрайоні Лірунг, район архіпелагу Талауд, провінція Північний Сулавесі, Індонезія. У цьому дослідженні використовуються якісні методи дослідження, методами збору даних, які використовуються в цьому дослідженні, є такі: інтерв'ю з працівниками та людьми, які обслуговуються, польові спостереження, дослідження літератури. Політика обслуговування населення є оптимальною, оскільки отримує політичну підтримку з боку центрального уряду та місцевих органів влади. Органи місцевого самоврядування часто інформують громадськість про політику обслуговування населення. Ресурси для реалізації політики і програм, політики і формати політики, а також необхідно реальне поліпшення, ці фактори не змогли оптимізувати політику обслуговування. Результати цього дослідження можуть допомогти регіональному уряду провінції Північний Сулавесі, а також урядам Індонезії та всього світу краще зрозуміти значення та мету детермінант політики обслуговування населення в підрайоні Лірунг, найвіддаленішому острові. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88 ; Исследование направлено на выявление нескольких проблем при анализе определяющих факторов политики обслуживания населения в подрайоне Лирунг, округ архипелага Талауд, провинция Северный Сулавеси, Индонезия. В этом исследовании используются качественные методы исследования, методы сбора данных, используемые в этом исследовании, следующие: интервью с сотрудниками и обслуживаемыми людьми, полевые наблюдения, литературные исследования. Политика в области народонаселения является оптимальной, поскольку получает политическую поддержку со стороны центрального правительства и местных органов власти. Органы местного самоуправления часто сообщают общественности о политике обслуживания населения. Ресурсы для реализации политик и программ, политик и форматов политик, и должно быть реальное улучшение, эти факторы не смогли оптимизировать политику обслуживания. Результаты этого исследования могут помочь региональному правительству провинции Северный Сулавеси, а также правительствам Индонезии и всего мира лучше понять значение и цель детерминант политики обслуживания населения в подрайоне Лирунг, самом удаленном острове. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88

Este artículo muestra los efectos que los distintos intereses tienen sobre el desempeño del instrumento económico (tasa retributiva) usado en Colombia para el control de la contaminación en los cuerpos de agua. Para ello se recurre al modelo de subasta de menú desarrollado por Gene Grossman y Elhanan Helpman (1994) y a una combinación de los modelos de grupos de interés de Toke-Skovsgaard-Aidt (1997 y 1998), Per G. Fredrikkson y Noel Gaston (2000) y Gary Becker (1983 y 1985). De la investigación se concluye que siempre que existan diferencias entre las influencias de los diversos intereses se van a obtener niveles de contaminación, que serán los mejores para los grupos más influyentes. Solamente cuando las influencias estén balanceadas los resultados se acercarán a los niveles de contaminación hídrica socialmente eficientes. Palabras clave: regulación ambiental, grupos de interés, subastas de menú, agencia común, impuesto pigouviano. Clasificación JEL: D78, D86, Q53. Abstract: Resorting to the menu auctions model developed by Grossman–Helpman (1994) and combining the interest groups models of Aidt (1997 and 1998), Fredriksson–Gaston (2000) and Becker (1983 and 1985) this article shows the effects that different interests have over the performance of the economic instrument (pollution tax) used in Colombia for the control of pollution in water bodies. Whenever differences exist among the influences of various interests different pollution levels will be obtained; which will be the best for the most influential groups but not so for society as a whole. Only when influences are balanced the resulting pollution levels will approach those socially efficient. Keywords: environmental regulation, interest groups, menu auctions, common agency, pigouvian tax. JEL classification: D78, D86, Q53. Résumé : Cet article montre les effets produits par les différents groups d'intérêts sur la performance du taux de rémunération utilisé en Colombie pour mesurer le contrôle sur la pollution de l'eau. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons, d'une part, le modèle des mécanismes d'enchères développé par Gene Grossman - Elhanan Helpman (1994) et, d'autre part, une combinaison des modèles de groupes d'intérêts de Toke Skovsgaard Aidt (1997, 1998), Per G. Fredrikkson - Noel Gaston (2000) et Gary Becker (1983, 1985). Nous concluons que tant qu'il y a des différences entre les influences des groups d'intérêts, les niveaux de pollution seront les plus élevés pour les groups d'intérêts les plus influents. Ce n'est que lorsque les influences seront balancées que les résultats se rapprochent des niveaux de pollution hydrique socialement efficaces. Mots clés: régulation environnementale, groups d'intérêts, mécanismes d'enchères, taux pigouvien. Classification JEL: D78, D86, Q53.

Abstract. Electoral reforms have been considered as sustainable means of improving on the quality of elections in Nigeria, this is especially as it avails the country, tremendous opportunities in admitting new policies such as new techniques, technologies and improved systems of protecting the welfare of electorates. It is evident from the literature that, public relations overtime has been a unifying factor in accelerating Nigeria's democracy and sustaining its need for periodic elections and encouraging the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Based on the level of malpractices and issues associated with the conduct of elections in Nigeria, it was concluded in this paper that, there are several benefits attached to the process of electoral reforms in Nigeria, hence, it gives government the opportunity to revamp its electoral policies through campaigns, introduction of new technologies, voting and more importantly, the nature of conducting elections bearing in mind that, poorly adopted electoral policies normally lead to the outbreak of crisis from aggrieved parties. It is recommended amongst others that, government at all levels should consider periodic electoral reforms as a strategy for development and as such; they should ensure that only people with credibility are charged with the mandate of presiding over electoral reform committees (ERC).Keywords. Electoral reforms, Public relations, Democracy and elections.JEL. D72, D73, D78.

We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our findings therefore establish that, despite the sophistication of voters and the absence of commitment power, the agenda setter is effectively a dictator. (JEL D71, D72, D78)