Suchergebnisse

The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one. ; The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.

U ovom radu se na temelju podataka terenskih anketnih istraživanja iz 2015. i 2016. godine analizira odnos između povjerenja u političke i provedbene institucije s jedne strane te protekcionizma s druge strane. Točnije, u prvom dijelu teksta se nastoji prikazati kako je povjerenje u institucije, kao normativno očekivanje, konceptualno povezano s protekcionizmom. Uz to, temeljem faktorske analize, utvrđuje se protekcionistička dimenzija stavova te se prikazuje njena distribucija kroz posljednje desetljeće. Istodobno, u svojevrsnom istraživačkom predkoraku, rad analizira i socioekonomske te demografske determinante takve dimenzije stavova. Nakon toga, u središnjem djelu analize, prikazuje se negativna međusobna povezanost povjerenja u institucije i protekcionizma, pri čemu su efekti takvog utjecaja nešto izraženiji kod povjerenja u provedbene institucije. Osim toga, regresijski modeli pokazuju kako su, uz protekcionizam, najznačajnije nezavisne varijable koje ispituju razine autoritarnosti i socijalnog povjerenja. Također se prikazuje kakve efekte identifikacija sa strankom na vlasti ima na razine institucionalnog povjerenja. ; This paper analyzes the relationship between trust in political and implementing institutions on the one hand and protectionism on the other, based on field survey data from 2015 and 2016. Precisely, the first part of the text seeks to show how trust in institutions, as a normative expectation, is conceptually related to protectionism. In addition, based on factor analysis, the protectionist dimension of attitudes is shown and its distribution over the last decade is presented. At the same time, in a kind of research pre-step, the paper analyzes the socio-economic and demographic determinants of such a dimension of attitude. After that, in the central part of the analysis, the negative interrelationship between trust in institutions and protectionism is presented, with the effects of such influence being somewhat more pronounced in the case of trust in implementing institutions. In ...

The main purpose of choosing this topic is to conduct in-depth research on the role of developing countries in the WTO, including my own country (Azerbaijan). According to the report, by 2021, the WTO has 164 members. Most of the world's countries and WTO members are countries with weak and competitive economies and developing countries. In my research, I will examine the general reasons for membership in such a global organization, which regulates much of international trade, the reasons why the WTO covers developing countries, the conditions, as well as the difficulties they face during membership and ways to solve these problems. I will try to give detailed information in the introduction to create a clear idea about the organization.

Intelligence agencies have been using open sources since WWII, but the intelligence made of such sources (OSINT) was always considered second-class. It was mostly so because secrets were always regarded as more valuable. Today, due to the new digital and more public way of life, the value of OSINT has been reassessed. Another reason for the change of view comes with the modern concept of security which encompasses threats that can only be addressed by a fusion of all sources. Therefore, all-source analysis with a multidisciplinary approach may be the only way to resolve wicked national security problems. OSINT, thus, in combination with technology (computers), becomes a useful tool that enriches the intelligence analysis. The paper focuses on determining whether the importance of OSINT is increasing by analyzing OSINT through its five modern dimensions. In every dimension, the positive and the negative aspects are compared, creating a picture of the relative value of today's OSINT. Those five dimensions are the Internet as a source, privatization of intelligence, forecasting, high-tech solutions, and responsibility. The research confirms the increasing importance of OSINT. Since OSINT is not given enough attention in intelligence communities, this topic will stay important in the foreseeable future. ; Obavještajne službe koriste otvorene izvore još od Drugog svjetskog rata, ali obavještajni proizvodi takvih izvora (OSINT) su uvijek bili smatrani drugorazrednima. To je uglavnom tako jer su se tajne uvijek smatrale vrjednijima. Danas, uslijed novog digitalnog i sve više javnijeg načina života, vrijednost OSINT-a se ponovno razmatra. Takva promjena u pogledu dolazi i zbog moderne koncepcije sigurnosti koja uključuje prijetnje na koje se može odgovoriti samo fuzijom svih mogućih izvora. Stoga, analiza svih izvora, kao i multidisciplinarni pristup, možda je jedini način za rješavanje naizgled nerješivih (wicked) problema nacionalne sigurnosti. OSINT tako, u kombinaciji s tehnologijom (kompjuterima), postaje sredstvo ...

Pandemijska kriza uzrokovala je mnoge izazove na globalnoj razini. Europska unija pokušala je pravovremeno i optimalno odgovoriti na neke od izazova koji su zahvatili njezino područje, a autorica je uočila sljedeće: ekonomski pad; kriza zdravstvenog sektora; nepostojanje cjepiva; smanjenje mobilnosti građana unutar i izvan državnih granica; širenje dezinformacija te pitanje očuvanja europskih vrijednosti i propadanja demokracije. Uz to što će prikazati reakciju EU na pojedine izazove u 2020. godini, analizirat će i strategije triju država članica koje su primijenile različite pristupe borbi protiv virusa – strategiju Njemačke, Švedske i Mađarske. Autorica će doći do zaključka da je EU uspješno odgovorila na jedan dio navedenih izazova, dok je na drugi dio ipak mogla čvršće reagirati. U borbi s izazovima nije pomogla niti različitost strategija država članica, a neke od njih pronašle su i nove saveznike izvan EU. ; The pandemic crisis has caused many challenges on a global level. The European Union tried to respond in a timely and optimal manner to some of the challenges that affected its area, and the author detected the following: economic decline; health sector crisis; lack of vaccine; reducing the mobility of citizens inside and outside national borders; spreading misinformation and the issue of preserving European values and the decline of democracy. In addition to showing the EU's response to certain challenges in 2020, the strategies of the three member states that have applied different approaches to fighting the virus - strategies of Germany, Sweden and Hungary - will be analyzed. The author will come to the conclusion that the EU has successfully responded to one part of these challenges, while it could have reacted more strongly to the other part. The various strategies of the member states did not help in the fight against the challenges, and some of them even found new allies outside the EU.