Conservative Defence and Security Policy under David Cameron
In: The Conservatives under David Cameron, S. 151-169
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In: The Conservatives under David Cameron, S. 151-169
In: Canadian defence quarterly: Revue canadienne de défense, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 6-12
ISSN: 0315-3495
In: Security Policy Library, 5/1998
Fjaervoll, D. J.: The future challenges to Norwegian defence and security policy. - S.3-10. Klaiber, K. P.: The future challenges to NATO. - S.11-18. Chesire, J.: Strategic overview and main security challenges faced by Northern Europe. - S.19-31
World Affairs Online
In: Europäische Sicherheit: Politik, Streitkräfte, Wirtschaft, Technik, Band 54, Heft 10, S. 78-79
ISSN: 0940-4171, 0940-4171
In: Défense nationale et sécurité collective. [Englische Ausgabe] : current strategic thinking, Band [65], Heft [2], S. 94-105
ISSN: 1779-3874
World Affairs Online
In: African century publication series 17
World Affairs Online
In: Wilkinson , B , Amadio Viceré , M G & Montague , E 2017 , ' Navigating the Unknown : Barriers to Evidence-Based Defence and Security Policy in the European Union ' , The International Spectator (Istituto Affari Internazionali) , pp. 1-12 . https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2017.1256931
At a time when Europe faces numerous crises, there is a real need for rigorous evidence to underpin effective policymaking. However, a gap between academia and policy creates clear obstacles in the use of evidence in policymaking. Many of these enduring obstacles are manifest in the inherent differences between separate communities: academics have difficulty communicating research in an applicable manner, and policymakers, in turn, tend to focus on operational motivations. The gap widens considerably when foreign, security and defence policy within the complex institutional structures of the European Union is considered. In addition to these well known barriers to evidence-based policy, there are two more obstacles in the defence and security space: sovereignty and dispersed decision-making. A dialogue of best practices must be opened up to broker knowledge in the EU context.
BASE
In: Mirovaja ėkonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija: MĖMO, Band 62, Heft 6, S. 45-55
In: International affairs, Band 73, Heft 2, S. 360-360
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Current Defence Issues, Nr. 2/92
World Affairs Online
In: The international spectator: journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 88-99
ISSN: 1751-9721
In: The international spectator: a quarterly journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 88-99
ISSN: 0393-2729
World Affairs Online
This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...
BASE
This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...
BASE
This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...
BASE