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U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY TODAY IS PLAGUED BY AN ACCUMULATION OF SHORTSIGHTED DECISIONS THAT CONTINUES TO HANDICAP THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE ITSELF AND ITS INTERESTS. THIS ARTICLE LOOKS BACKWARD AT THE EARLIER GENERATIONS OF DECISIONS THAT SET THE TONE AND CHARACTER OF U.S. STRATEGIC POLICY. AFTER DELVING BRIEFLY INTO HISTORY, IT THEN FAST-FORWARDS TO THE CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, THE RANGE OF EMERGING THREATS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER THAT STEMS FROM THE ONGOING EVISCERATION OF U.S. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE FORCES.

As being state who gained the most attention from all over the world, North Korea has been one of the unique countries which international system has ever seen. With her sole and unparalleled Juche regime which emphasizes on government's self-reliance policy and unpredictable leaders, North Korea has not ceased her dedication to develop nuclear weapons. Since her establishment in 1950 with Korea War and also with 38th Parallel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been trying to enhance her military, economy, industry and also mass weapons of destruction programme. With Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assistance, North Korea was able to start her Nuclear Weapon programme by saying that it was for peaceful uses in 1980. However, her abrupt development and receiving aid from the Soviet Union disturbed USA and European countries. Therefore, North Korea signed Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1993 but she said that she withdrew from the agreement which led first North Korea Nuclear crisis to break out. Although USSR(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was collapsed in 1991, North Korea has not left her devotion to nuclear weapons. With her new leader, Kim Jong Un who took power from his father's abrupt death in 2011, have been aggressive for developing and testing mass weapons of destruction. Since 2009, North Korea made her first missile test in 2012 which was done successfully. Thus, North Korea has become a serious threat which could cause a major effect with her missiles in the international area. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons gives concern to her neighbours and also USA who she designated as her archenemy. With President Donald Trump's inauguration and his words of " bring Fire and Fury" to Northern part of Korean peninsula, made two state's relationship to be conflicted. However, relations of USA and North Korea have been strained ever since. DPRK(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) knows that USSR possessed mass weapons of destruction and used them as deterrent strategy. And she challenged the USA with those weapons. Thus, North Korea, with her nuclear power, she is able to maintain her unique Juche regime as well as her politics both inside and outside without any state especially USA to interfere. Therefore, by using nuclear weapons programme as a deterrence strategy, North Korea have been advancing in her programme and continuing to challenge USA and other states with her mass weapons of destruction. Under the question of why North Korea is willing to develop and possess nuclear weapons and in order to answer and defend thesis question, case study approach is used which approaches a problem with different angles. As the thesis qualitative one, two results were reached. The first result for North Korea's and the second result for other state's. For the first result, it is indicated that North Korea is aware of her unique and unparalleled regime and therefore, in order to avoid USA and also other states to interfere her politics and destroy her regime, she uses nuclear weapons a deterrence tool. Accordingly, North Korea needs mass weapons of destruction in order to support her regime, economy and future of her country. For the second result, all of the states have their reasons for North Korea in terms of mass weapons of destruction. However, they all compromise on one thing: They do not want North Korea to be threat to whole world. In addition, they are against proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because in the past, Second World War set an example of a nuclear war which could only bring chaos, millions of casualties. Therefore, states are against North Korea's ambition to develop mass weapons of destruction. Although they are trying to stop her with sanctions by the United Nations, North Korea does not seem to give up her nuclear weapons yet. Dünyanın en fazla ilgi gören devletlerin biri olan Kuzey Kore, uluslararası sistemin tanık olduğu eşsiz ülkelerden biri olmuştur. Benzersiz Juche rejimi ve eşsiz liderleri ile, Kuzey Kore nükleer silah geliştirme konusundaki kararlılığını hala devam ettirmektedir. 1950'de Kore Savaşı ve 38. Paralel ile kuruluşundan bu yana, Kuzey Kore askeri alandaki kitle imha silahlarını geliştirmeye çalışmaktadır. SSCB'nin yardımı ile Kuzey Kore, Nükleer silah programını 1980'de barışçıl kullanımlar için olduğunu söyleyerek başlatabilmiş ancak, almış olduğu söz konusu yardım ABD ve Avrupa ülkelerini rahatsız etmiştir. Bu nedenle Kuzey Kore 1993 yılında Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Antlaşması'nı imzalamaya zorlanmış, daha sonra anlaşmadan çekildiğini söylemiştir. Her ne kadar 1991'de SSCB çökmüş olsa da, Kuzey Kore nükleer silahlara olan bağlılığını bırakmamıştır. 2011'de babasının ani ölümü yüzünden liderliği devralan yeni lider, Kim Jong Un, kitle imha silahlarını geliştirmek ve test etmek konusunda babasından ve büyükbabasından daha saldırgan bir politika takip etmiştir. Kuzey Kore, 2009 füze testlerinden bu yana, 2012'de füze denemesini başarıyla tamamlamıştır. Böylece, Kuzey Kore , uluslararası sistemin önünde, nükleer füzeleri ile devletler için büyük tehdit haline gelmiştir. Kuzey Kore'nin baş düşmanlarından biri olarak saydığı ABD de, Kuzey Kore'nin nükleer güce sahip olmamasını isteyen ülkelerdendir. Donald Trump'ın ABD başkan olmasıyla ve Kore yarımadasının Kuzey kısmına "ateş ve öfke sözleriyle, iki devletin ilişkileri daha da kötüleşmiştir. Ancak, her iki ülkenin ilişkileri gerginleşse de , Kuzey Kore, kitlesel imha silahlarını ABD ve müttefiklerine caydırıcı bir etken olarak kullanmaya devam etmektedir. Kuzey Kore, zamanında SSCB'nin nükleer silahlara sahip olduğunu ve bu füzelerle ABD'ye meydan okuduğunu ve hatta bunları bir caydırıcı etki olarak kullandığını bilmektedir. Nükleer silah programını caydırıcı bir strateji olarak kullanan Kuzey Kore, kitlesel imha silahlarını geliştirmeye ve ABD ve diğer devletlere de kafa tutmaya devam etmektedir. Kuzey Kore, nükleer füzelerinin verdiği caydırıcılık avantajı ile diğer ülkeleri özellikle ABD'yi kendi iç ve dış politikasından uzak tutabilmeyi başarmıştır. Kuzey Kore neden Nükleer silahlanmayı geliştirmek ve sahip olmak istiyor soru altında, Vaka çalışması yaklaşımını kullanarak sorumu cevaplamaya çalıştım. Vaka çalışması yaklaşımı, bir problemi farklı açılardan inceler ve bu tez de nitel bir tez olduğu için bu tekniğin uygun olduğu düşünülmüştür. Tezde iki sonuca ulaşılmıştır: İlk sonuç Kuzey Kore için, ikinci sonuç ise diğer devletler içindir. İlk sonuçta, Kuzey Kore'nin, eşsiz ve rakipsiz rejimin farkında olduğu ve herhangi bir müdahaleyi, özellikle ABD ve diğer devleti engelleyebilmek için nükleer silahlarını caydırıcılık aracı olarak kullandığı noktasına ulaşılmıştır. Bu yüzden de Kuzey Kore'nin, rejimi, ekonomisi ve geleceği için nükleer güce ihtiyacı vardır. İkinci sonuç için ise, bütün devletlerin nükleer silahlanma hakkında Kuzey Kore karşı nedenleri olduğu belirtilebilir. Lakin, bütün devletlerin ortak bir görüşü var: Kuzey Kore dünyaya bir tehdit olmamalı ve nükleer gücü yayılmamalı. Çünkü İkinci Dünya Savaşı, nükleer savaşın sadece kaos, milyonlarca ölüm getirmesine örnek teşkil etmiştir. Bu yüzden, devletler Kuzey Kore'nin kitlesel imha silahlarını geliştirme ve sahip olma hırsına karşı çıkmaktadırlar. Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından uygulanan yaptırımlarla Kuzey Kore durdurulmaya çalışılmaktadır, ama Kuzey Kore, nükleer silahlanmayı bırakacak gibi de gözükmemektedir.

The new German government has pledged to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. Although this is in keeping with President Obama's aim of achieving "global zero", a world free of nuclear weapons, it cannot impede a debate in Germany on Europe's deterrence strategy. (DGAP-IP/GE)

Economic property crime in China has soared since the country enacted market reforms in the early 1980s. Robbery rates are rising faster than most economic property crimes, such as larceny and fraud, and violent crimes, such as rape, murder, and assault. China's strategy for deterrence is to raise the "price" of the crime by increasing the severity of the penalty. Since 1979, China's criminal law has permitted the use of the death penalty for robbers in nearly all cases, and courts have applied it regularly and in many different types of robbery cases. Since 1983, China has formally engaged in "strike-hard" campaigns, in which the government dedicates massive law enforcement resources to fight a particular crime. The campaigns have targeted robbery and have resulted in mass arrests, swift trials, and severe sentences—including mass executions. Despite these efforts, China has failed to deter individuals from committing more robberies. This Comment argues that China should reform its deterrence strategy by revising its criminal law and "strike-hard" campaigns. China should adopt new deterrence strategies that combine law with sociology, economics, and psychology. Not only will these strategies deter more robbery, they will also deter the more serious crimes often committed during robberies. The new strategies will also provide incentives for individuals to commit less violent crime.

This paper tries to discuss the development of cyberwar that threatens many countries by referring to the example of the North Korean cyberattack against the United States (US). Cyberattack is a relatively new phenomenon that many countries have not been able to anticipate adequately because it is difficult to track it down and also find the actors behind it. So far, countries have frequently accused each other of these attacks, but it is difficult to retaliate or anticipate due to unclear evidence. Unlike conventional warfare, no cyberattack warfare norms have been developed nor have there been any attempts in that direction. One thing that can be done in such a condition is the development of technology that is not only able to ward off the attack but, as stated in the theory of deterrence, can also provide a deterrent effect on the attacking country. By referring to the case of North Korea's attack on the US, we see that even a country as great as the US has not been able to develop a successful deterrence.Keywords: deterrence, cyberspace, cybersecurity, United States, North KoreaTulisan ini membahas mengenai perkembangan perang siber yang menjadi ancaman utama bagi banyak negara hari ini, dengan focus pada serangan siber Korea Utara kepada Amerika Serikat(AS). Serangan siber merupakan fenomena yang relative baru, sehingga banyak negara belum mampu untuk mengantisipasi hal tersebut karena sifatnya yang susah untuk dilacak dan susah untuk mengetahui actor dibalik serangan tersebut. Sejauh ini negara tertentu seringkali dituduh menjadi dalang serangan siber, namun bukti yang seringkali tidak jelas membuat langkah antisipasi atau retaliasi menjadi sulit. Berbeda dengan perang konvensional, hingga saat ini belum ada norma serangan siber yang terbangun, bahkan pembicaraan mengenai hal tersebut cenderung minim. Sejalan dengan hal itu maka dalam perang siber dibutuhkan pengembangan tekonologi yang tidak hanya mampu untuk menangkal serangan tapi juga memberikan efek deterrence bagi negara penyerang. Dengan merujuk pada kasus serangan siber Korea Utara kepada Amerika Serikat, kita dapat melihat bahwa negara sekuat Amerika sekalipun ternyata belum mampu membuat mekanisme deterrence dalam serangan siber.Kata-kata kunci: Deterrence, Ruang Siber, Keamanan Siber, Amerika Serikat, Korea Utara.

In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, South Korea is quietly pursuing an independent conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy. This strategy is unique. Few, if any, nonnuclear states have sought to rely on advanced conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Why is South Korea pursuing a conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy, and what could its impact be on strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula? South Korea's approach should be understood as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment. Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea. Over the long term, capabilities such as advanced ballistic and cruise missiles bolster South Korea's nuclear latency. At the same time, we highlight that the strategy poses numerous technological and operational difficulties and has negative implications for arms race and crisis stability. Given South Korea's approach and North Korea's response, disarmament efforts focused purely on the bilateral U.S.–North Korea relationship will not succeed. Rather, any agreement will now need to address the growing gap in the conventional balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula.

In response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, South Korea is quietly pursuing an independent conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy. This strategy is unique. Few, if any, nonnuclear states have sought to rely on advanced conventional capabilities to deter a nuclear-armed adversary. Why is South Korea pursuing a conventional counterforce and countervalue strategy, and what could its impact be on strategic stability on the Korean Peninsula? South Korea's approach should be understood as both a short- and long-term hedge against U.S. abandonment. Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea. Over the long term, capabilities such as advanced ballistic and cruise missiles bolster South Korea's nuclear latency. At the same time, we highlight that the strategy poses numerous technological and operational difficulties and has negative implications for arms race and crisis stability. Given South Korea's approach and North Korea's response, disarmament efforts focused purely on the bilateral U.S.–North Korea relationship will not succeed. Rather, any agreement will now need to address the growing gap in the conventional balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula. ; publishedVersion

Originally published on 24 August 2023. Paul Dibb's Strategist post, in response to Sam Roggeveen's recent Australian Foreign Affairs article, was on target. But I must quibble specifically with his assertion that no commentator in ...