Non-Binding International Dispute Settlement
In: Dispute Settlement, ch. 25, 'The Cambridge History of International Law, Volume XII: International Law Beyond the End of the Cold War' (E. Benvenisti and D. Kritsiotis eds., forthcoming).
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In: Dispute Settlement, ch. 25, 'The Cambridge History of International Law, Volume XII: International Law Beyond the End of the Cold War' (E. Benvenisti and D. Kritsiotis eds., forthcoming).
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In: The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 376
ISSN: 2211-6133
In: Political and legal anthropology review: PoLAR, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 45-46
ISSN: 1555-2934
In: The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
Metadata only record ; This section identifies institutions and individuals involved in dispute settlement. Within the village setting and nationwide, individual Gambians have become particularly well-known as skillful mediators and peace-keepers. The skills, characteristics and motivations of individuals shape settlement processes and outcomes. These skillful mediators can determine how laws become adapted to, or do not adapt to, new situations. Whether a conflict is resolved or left to fester is often contingent upon the presence (or absence) of a strong leader. Across all interviews conducted for this study, there seems to be a consensus on the skills of a strong leader. A strong leader must possess: knowledge of tradition, knowledge of traditional ways of solving disputes, knowledge of the laws of the new military government and the former government, reasonableness, recognition of people's position in society, knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and knowledge of local languages. ; Available in SANREM office, FS
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In: Emory Journal of International Dispute Resolution, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 1-32
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In: APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN INTELLECTUAL MAP, pp. 189-226, W. Scott Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds., United States Institute of Peace, 1991
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In: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW, LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, pp. 243-260, K.E. Lindgren, N. Perram, eds., 2011
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The dispute settlement compliance dataset (DISCOD) outlines the implementing measures enacted by World Trade Organization (WTO) Members in response to adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings between 1995- 2016. The dataset provides information of WTO disputes and corresponding legislation that were reported to bring forth compliance. Over 150 legislations were tracked, collected from official sources, WTO (and Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)) documents, WTO Member legislatures, as well as secondary sources. The xml. sheet includes several additional variables coded for further analysis and the word document outlines additional details regarding excluded disputes in which the defendants were exonerated, as well as "horizontal" disputes that involved several sectors.
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In: Economics & politics, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 87-94
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Policy options: Options politiques, Band 20, Heft 5, S. 33-36
ISSN: 0226-5893
In: Global governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 207-226
ISSN: 2468-0958, 1075-2846
In: Max Planck commentaries on world trade law 2
Covers the legislative history, interpretation and practical application of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Articles XXII, XXIII, and XXIV GATT 1994, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the Trade Review Policy Mechanism and the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the GATT 1994
In: TRADE POLICY RESEARCH 2005, Dan Ciuriak (ed.), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005, pp. 51-77.
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In: Economics & politics, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 151-170
ISSN: 1468-0343
This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from "international obligation", a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GATT‐DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.