Suchergebnisse

During the period 1991-2000 Albania has received an amount of 4.86 mld USD of external assistance. The total of external assistance during 2000-2008 has been 2.93 mld Euro of wich 1.79 mld Euro has been grant and 1.13 mld Euro has been loan. Since 2000, the ratio of external assistance to gross domestic product (GDP) has declined. This is mainly due to increased GDP (which has grown to 8.7 million in 2008 compared with 4.6 million in 2001), than by lowering the levels of external assistance. Over the years in Albania, the nature of the assistance and donors have changed, in particular has changed the nature of the assistance being dominated by technical assistance, development assistance, etc. The assistance referring to development benefiting from multiple sources may create problems regarding management and coordinating from beneficiary country and there by threaten the effectiveness of assistance. In this context it is most possible that different donors develop conflicting programs or overlapping projects reducing the effectiveness of the assistance. Other data suggest that the more the beneficiary country government will be included in the direction and coordination of assistance programs, the more effective and integrated these programs will be in promoting development in the long run period. However, some development experts believe that the presence of numerous donors in one country is not necessarily a bad thing. Competition among donors could resolve development problems and getting results quickly. Referring to the above, in this article we would like to present the following subjects: - How is coordinating external assistance in Albania. Importance, advantages and disadvantages of external assistance coordination. - We will try to identify the «favorite» sectors of donors financing, by analyzing reason of their preferences and distribution of external assistance by region analyzing the fact of concentration of many donors in the same county. - Finally, will try to analyze which is citizen perception about external assistance in Albania. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n3p103

The internationally unrecognized 'Republic of Somaliland' presents a case in which the domestic drivers of peace and development may be examined when aid and other forms of international intervention are not significant variables. The relative autonomy of its peace process offers an alternative perspective on post-conflict transitions to that offered in the majority of the literature, which instead problematizes either the perverse outcomes or unintended consequences of international interventions in conflict-affected areas. The purpose of this article is not to establish the salience of Somaliland's relative isolation in its ability to achieve peace and relative political order, as this is already documented in the literature. Rather, it explores the ways in which that isolation fostered mutual dependence between powerful political and economic actors for their survival and prosperity. It uses a political settlements framework to probe the implications of this dependence for western statebuilding interventions in post-conflict situations. The findings present a challenge to orthodox assumptions about how states transition out of conflict, particularly that: greater vertical inclusivity necessarily strengthens a political settlement; effective Weberian institutions are a prerequisite of an enduring peace; and that external assistance is usually necessary to end large-scale violence in developing states or to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

The authors develop an analytical two-sector planning model, geared towards analyzing policy issues with respect to external assistance, for the Bangladesh economy. Beside providing a numerical understanding of the effects of foreign aid on domestic resource mobilization, the model also points out the critical conditions that need to be fulfilled to realize desired objectives. It is found that the marginal productivity of external assistance tends to rise with the rise of the marginal rate of saving. (DÜI-Sen)

part Part I Introduction -- chapter 1 Introduction -- chapter 2 The study of foreign intervention in civil wars -- part Part II A theory of foreign intervention, warfare and civil wars -- chapter 3 External resources and belligerents' capabilities -- chapter 4 Foreign intervention and warfare conversion in civil war -- part Part III Case studies and empirical observations -- chapter 5 Warfare variation in the Angolan Civil War -- chapter 6 Foreign intervention and warfare conversion in the Angolan Civil War -- chapter 7 Warfare variation in the Afghan Civil War -- chapter 8 Foreign intervention and warfare conversion in the Afghan Civil War -- part Part IV Findings and conclusion -- chapter 9 Conclusion.