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Working paper
Environmental Tax Reform: Principles from Theory and Practice to Date
In: IMF Working Paper No. 12/180
SSRN
Working paper
A Tale of Two Taxes: The Fate of Environmental Tax Reform in Canada
In: Review of policy research, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 383-407
ISSN: 1541-1338
AbstractPolicy makers who embrace market‐based approaches to environmental regulation, typically eschew carbon taxes in favor of the political advantages of cap and trade, which offers lower visibility of costs to consumers and the opportunity to allocate valuable permits freely to industry. Against this backdrop, the article examines two surprising proposals for carbon taxes, by the government of British Columbia (BC) and by the federal Liberal Party of Canada. Both reflected a triumph of party leaders' normative "good policy" motives over "good politics." The BC tax alone succeeded first because it was adopted by a party already in government. Second, the onset of a recession before the next elections shifted voters' attention to the economy, which advantaged the BC Liberals but disadvantaged their federal counterparts. However, proposals for carbon taxes were unpopular in both jurisdictions, offering a cautionary tale concerning the fate of politicians' normative commitments absent electoral backing.
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets
International audience ; This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets
International audience ; This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets
International audience ; This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets
International audience ; This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labour Markets
International audience ; This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform that distributes the revenue from a green tax according to varying labour tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous workers, imperfect labour markets (search and match), and pollution consumption externalities. Preferences are non-homothetic (Stone-Geary utility) to take into account the potential regressivity of green taxes (the polluting good is assumed to be a necessary good). If the reform appears regressive, the gains from the double dividend can achieve Pareto improvement, using a redistributive non-linear income tax if the redistribution is not too great initially. Increasing progressivity influences the unemployment rate and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for France and conduct sensitivity analysis.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE
Environmental Tax Reform and Income Distribution with Imperfect Heterogeneous Labor Markets
This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for France than for Germany and UK.
BASE