Suchergebnisse

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched eight military operations with an executive mandate in the framework of its European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP), all of which have utilized deterrence to fulfil their missions. Some have done so implicitly by having a mission that requires them to keep certain actors from doing something unwanted, whilst others have done so explicitly by having deterrence clearly mentioned as one of their core tasks in their mandates. Despite this, deterrence in the context of CSDP has been an almost totally neglected subject in the academic literature. Furthermore, the EU itself has tended to take the deterrence effect of CSDP operations for granted, which is dangerous because it may blind it to potential problems that may in fact be undermining their credibility. This article seeks to launch a more focused discussion on deterrence in the context of EU security policy by analysing the credibility of CSDP operations' deterrence postures. Based on findings from case studies on operations Althea and Atalanta, it argues that CSDP operations' deterrence postures lack credibility because they have insufficient resources for taking care of their deterrence tasks. Furthermore, they do not communicate threats effectively.

The paper analyzes military capabilities of the European Union, as an important element of the credibility of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It discusses the development of these capabilities, and main problems that go along with the operationalization of these capabilities, as well as the prospects of their further development. Is the intergovernmental approach to the area of the EU security and defense policy a barrier to the development of EU military capabilities? What is the extent of the harmonization between 'military' competences of the EU and national specificities? The paper aims to provide answers to these questions. The first section analyzes the institutionalization of the EU security and defense policy, which includes both the establishment of special political and military structures responsible for the decision-making process within the framework of this policy, and the adoption of specific goals for the development of EU military capabilities. The second section analyzes the main difficulties met in the operationalization of EU military capabilities, concerning the efficiency of decision-making procedures, lack of strategic capabilities, the discord of national reforms regarding the modernization of the armed forces, and duplication of national programs covering the military equipment. The third section discusses the prospects of the development of EU military capabilities in the light of EU member states' military budget cuts. It concludes that the gradual evolution of the EU security and defense policy can be seen as an incentive for coordinating the efforts of the member states in the development of EU military capabilities.

The purpose of the research. The article considers the perspectives of the military integration of the European Union countries in the spheres of security and defense. The author defines the purposes and prerequisites of the integration in these spheres. The strategic documents of the EU such as the Security Strategy of 2003, the Global Strategy of 2016 and the Strategic Compass of 2022 are examined in this article. The article reveals the main features of the EU strategic autonomy and examines the parameters of the EU strategic culture in the field of security and defense. The author assesses the initiatives of the European Union in the field of further strengthening of the security and autonomy. The transformation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been studied by the author. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project was considered in detail as well as the contribution of the EU countries to this project. Conclusions. As a result of the study, the author concludes that European integration is in the process of qualitative changes that affect the formation of the system of collective security and defense. The EU is increasingly acting as a strength pole, and there is a strategic shift from traditional "soft power" to "hard power". Under the pressure of external factors and due to the efforts of the major powers of the region, it is possible to achieve the goal of strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense. The EU is becoming a serious actor not only of the regional but also the global security.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between growth, investment and military expenditure in the case of the European Union‐15.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses fixed panel models, random coefficient models and a trivariate VAR model to examine empirically the relationship between these three macroeconomic variables.FindingsThe results obtained and reported herein show a significant positive effect of the growth rate on the share of military expenditure and on the share of investment. However, on the whole, the findings do not seem to point to any consistent quantitative relation between defence spending and either growth or investment. Thus, they appear to be in line with the findings of other studies.Originality/valueThe economic effects of military spending have drawn considerable attention. Demand side effects on capacity utilisation are one possible channel through which the economy can be positively affected by such expenditure. On the other hand however, reduced investment and capital stock have been reported as a possible negative economic impact of defence outlays that can more than offset any growth inducing effective demand stimulation. The paper attempts a simultaneous assessment of the impact of defence expenditure on both growth and investment for the EU‐15, something that has not been tried before.

Against the background of a sense of crisis in the European Union and in international politics, European Union Member States have since 2016 increased their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy, for example, establishing the European Defence Fund. Scholars have long pointed out that the European Union lacks the necessary 'hard' military power to influence international politics, subscribing to and constituting an image of the European Union as not masculine enough. We are critical of these accounts and develop a different argument. First, building on insights from feminist security and critical military studies, we argue that the European Union is a military power constituted by multiple masculinities. We consider the European Union to be a masculine military power, not only because it uses and aims to develop military instruments, but also because of how militarism and military masculinities permeate discourses, practices and policies within Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Union more broadly. We argue, second, that the crisis narrative allows the European Union to strengthen Common Security and Defence Policy and exhibit more aggressive military masculinities based on combat, which exist alongside entrepreneurial and protector masculinities. These developments do not indicate a clear militarisation of Common Security and Defence Policy, but, rather, an advancement and normalisation of militarism and the militarised masculinities associated with it.

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rapid development of the new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that also included a military dimension and thus embodied the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a military actor on the international scene. This phenomenon had a major impact on the literature concerned with understanding the international role of the EU. For some authors, the birth of the EU as a military actor looked like the beginning of the end for both 'civilian power Europe' and 'normative power Europe'. For others, the emergence of the EU as a military actor meant the birth of the EU as 'real power Europe' on the international scene. Using a different perspective, this thesis shows that the existing interpretations of the international implications of the EU's rise as a military actor missed the most significant aspect of this phenomenon because of their focus on means and the underlying assumption that means determine ends. This thesis uses the social scientific perspective developed by Alexander Wendt in the context of his social theory of international politics to argue that the rapid development of the EU as a military actor in the first decade of the twenty first century supported the transition of the international system from a Lockean security culture to a Kantian security culture. In contrast to a Lockean system, where military actors do not completely exclude the use of violence in the settlement of their disputes, in a Kantian system, military actors do not only exclude settling disputes by violence (the principle of non violence), but they also help each other in the event of an attack on any one by a third party (the principle of mutual assistance). The Wendtian perspective focuses on actors as the drivers of cultural continuity and change in the international system and sees the Kantian transition as the main challenge for the contemporary international system. The Kantian transition in turn depends on prosocial actors that act as friends in relation to the Other with respect to the use of violence. Accordingly, studying the emergence of the EU as a military actor in the light of the Wendtian perspective involves testing the EU against the model of the Wendtian prosocial actor. The analysis performed in this thesis shows that in its first ten years as an emerging military actor the EU behaved primarily as a prosocial actor and thus supported the Kantian transition in the international system.