Suchergebnisse

"Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen sozialem Lernen der Arbeitgeber über die Fähigkeiten von Bewerbern und dem Phänomen der Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit. Anhand eines einfachen spieltheoretischen Modells wird gezeigt, dass rationales Lernen der Arbeitgeber aus dem Lebenslauf eines Bewerbers zu Informationskaskaden führen kann. Das bedeutet, dass Arbeiter, die zu Anfang ihres Berufslebens bei Bewerbungen erfolgreich waren, auch später erfolgreich sein werden, Arbeitslosigkeit zu Anfang dafür Arbeitslosigkeit in späteren Jahren automatisch nach sich ziehen kann. Wie stark rationales Herdenverhalten von Arbeitgebern auftritt, die ihre eigenen Informationen über den Bewerber gegenüber den im Lebenslauf komprimierten missachten, hängt von einer Reihe von Eigenschaften des Arbeitsmarkts ab. Insbesondere werden Beschäftigungsdauer und Kündigungsschutz, Lohnsubventionen für Langzeitarbeitslose, Ausbildungsanforderungen und die Wirkung konjunktureller Schwankungen diskutiert." (Autorenreferat)

"Experimental research found contradictory results regarding the occurrence of Informational Cascades. While Anderson and Holt (1997) through lab tests confirm the model of Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) resp., Huck and Oechssler (2000) come to controversial results for crucial issues. This study is an extensive (227 test persons) and as regards contents expanded repetition. It becomes obvious that less than 10% of subjects are able to make deductions from predecessors' actions regarding their private signals, to consider the reliability of the signals and the a priory probability, to accurately use Bayes' Rule, and to thus reach rational decisions." (author's abstract)

We study herding in Borsa Istanbul between 2001 and 2016, focusing on the effects of international investors and market volatility. Herding explains 31% of total variability in the cross sectional standard deviation of beta values, controlling for market fundamentals. We perform time-series analysis of a herding index and find that herding increases following increased trading by international investors, but falls with overall trading volume on the market. Herding rises in response to increased volatility, rather than leading to it, against previous arguments. Investors do not herd during economic crises, but following important events that raise political tension in the country. ; Bu çalışmada Borsa İstanbul'da 2001 ve 2016 yılları arasında sürü davranışı çalışılmış, ve özellikle uluslararası yatırımcı ve volatilite etkilerine odaklanılmıştır. Sürü davranışı, temel pazar göstergeleri kontrol edildiği durumda, yatay-kesitsel beta değerlerindeki hareketliliğin 'ini açıklamaktadır. Elde ettiğimiz sürü davranışı endeksinin zaman serisi analizi, sürü davranışının uluslararası yatırımcıların ticaret hacmi ile arttığını, ancak toplam ticaret hacmi ile azaldığını göstermektedir. Sürü davranışı, artan pazar volatilitesi ile artmakta, ancak -yazındaki kimi iddiaların aksine?pazarda bir volatilite artışına neden olmamaktadır. Sürü davranışının ekonomik kriz dönemlerinde artmadığı, ancak ülkede politik gerilimi artıran önemli olaylar sonucunda yükseliş gösterdiği bulunmuştur

This study develops and tests a theoretical framework, which draws on herd behavior literature and explains how and under what conditions tabloids' attention to misinformation drives broadsheets' attention to misinformation. More specifically, the study analyzes all cases of political and business misinformation in Switzerland and the U.K. between 2002 and 2018, which are selected based on corresponding Swiss and U.K. press councils' rulings (N = 114). The findings show that during amplifying events (i.e., election campaigns and economic downturns) tabloids allocate more attention to political and business misinformation, which, in turn, drives broadsheets to allocate more attention to the misinformation as well–and especially if the misinformation serves broadsheets' ideological goals. Moreover, the findings show differences between Swiss and U.K. media markets only in the case of business misinformation and suggest that the attention allocation process depends in particular on the strength of the amplifying event in a media market. Thereby, this study contributes to the understanding of how and under what conditions misinformation spreads in media markets.

"Financial crises are widely argued to be due to herd behavior. Yet recently developed models of herd behavior have been subjected to two critiques which seem to make them inapplicable to financial crises. Herds disappear from these models if two of their unappealing assumptions are modified: if their zero-one investment decisions are made continuous and if their investors are allowed to trade assets with market-determined prices. However, both critiques are overturned--herds reappear in these models--once another of their unappealing assumptions is modified: if, instead of moving in a prespecified order, investors can move whenever they choose"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site

Herd theory may be useful for understanding the activities of interest groups in the American states. If interest groups are as powerful as most of the literature claims, it should become increasingly easy to statistically explain certain public policy outcomes. The analysis shows this is not the case, and therefore a reexamination of interest group behaviors may be in order. To a large extent, the hiring of lobbyists by interest groups does not seem to result in a greater level of explained variance. If the number of interest groups in a category pressures administrators, such a reaction may be misplaced.