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Regulatory chill, a key tension between international investment agreements (IIAs) and democratic governance, could be dealt with by creating liability insurance for governments. Existing government insurance programs provide helpful guidelines for an investment arbitration liability insurance that could protect governments' policy space while maintaining the protection IIAs provide to investors.

Seeing the potential for jurisdictional competition to generate a more efficient insurance regulatory structure, proposed is for insurers to act nationally with a single license granted by one state as a means of spurring insurance product & rate competition & innovation while keeping state regulation relevant. References. Adapted from the source document.

"Minimum asset and liability insurance requirements must often be met in order for parties to participate in potentially harmful activities. Such financial responsibility requirements may improve parties' decisions whether to engage in harmful activities and, if so, their efforts to reduce risk. However, the requirements may undesirably prevent some parties with low assets from engaging in activities. Liability insurance requirements tend to improve parties' incentives to reduce risk when insurers can observe levels of care, but dilute incentives to reduce risk when insurers cannot observe levels of care. In the latter case, compulsory liability insurance may be inferior to minimum asset requirements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Life Insurance Mathematics -- Life Insurance Mathetnatics second, expanded edition 1995 -- Copyright -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1. The Mathematics of Compound Interest -- Chapter 2. The Future Lifetime of a Life Aged x -- Chapter 3. Life Insurance -- Chapter 4. Life Annuities -- Chapter 5. Net Premiums -- Chapter 6. Net Premium Reserves -- Chapter 7. Multiple Decrements -- Chapter 8. Multiple Life Insurance -- Chapter 9. The Total Claim Amount in a Portfolio -- Chapter 10. Expense Loadings -- Chapter 11. Estimating Probabilities of Death -- Appendix A. Commutation Functions -- Appendix B. Simple Interest -- Appendix C Exercises -- Appendix D Solutions -- Appendix E Tables -- References -- Index.

Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- About the Author -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction of Takaful in India -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Appraisal of Indian Insurance Market -- 1.3 Research Objectives -- 1.4 Motivation and Significance of the Study -- 1.5 Structure of the Book -- References -- 2 Risk, Risk Management and Insurance: Conventional and Islamic Dimensions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Definition and Classification of Risk -- 2.3 Risk in Islam -- 2.3.1 Islamic Dimension of Risk Management -- 2.4 Dimension of Insurance -- 2.4.1 Prohibited Elements of Conventional Insurance in the Sources of Shari'ah -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Takaful: Concept, Principles, Types, and Models -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Overview of Takaful -- 3.2.1 Concept of Takaful -- 3.2.2 Definitions of Takaful -- 3.2.3 Shari'ah Framework of Takaful -- 3.2.4 Takaful: Shari'ah Scholar Point of View -- 3.2.5 Fundamental Differences Between Takaful and Insurance -- 3.3 Development of Takaful -- 3.4 Main Types of Takaful -- 3.4.1 General Takaful -- 3.4.2 Family Takaful -- 3.5 Takaful Models -- 3.5.1 General Takaful Models -- 3.5.2 Comparison of General Takaful Models -- 3.5.3 Family Takaful Models -- 3.5.4 Comparison of Family Takaful Models -- 3.6 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Takaful in Non-Muslim Countries: A Way Forward -- 4.1 Takaful in Europe -- 4.1.1 United Kingdom -- 4.1.2 The Authorization Process in the UK -- 4.1.3 Legal Issues and Challenges Facing Takaful Industry in the UK -- 4.1.4 Luxembourg -- 4.2 Takaful in Australia -- 4.2.1 Potential for Establishing Takaful -- 4.3 Takaful in Sri Lanka -- 4.3.1 Amana Takaful PLC -- 4.3.2 Ceylinco Takaful Ltd -- 4.3.3 HNB Assurance Takaful -- 4.3.4 Takaful Standards -- 4.4 Takaful in Singapore -- 4.5 Takaful in Thailand -- 4.6 Globalization of Takaful.

Examines terrorism insurance in light of the approaching end of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002's (TRIA's) three-year term. TRIA represents a temporary solution to the lack of such insurance in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The demand for terrorism insurance is looked at. The insurability of the terrorism risk is characterized by catastrophic loss potential, dynamic uncertainty, ambiguity, and interdependencies. Alternative programs and scenarios to TRIA include a market approach, mutual insurance pools, public-private partnerships, compulsory insurance, insurance-mitigation link, and rating agencies.