Averaging of income for income-tax purposes
In: Journal of political economy, Band 47, S. 379-397
ISSN: 0022-3808
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In: Journal of political economy, Band 47, S. 379-397
ISSN: 0022-3808
SSRN
In: Searchlight Books (tm) -- How Do We Use Money? Ser
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Information -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Paid To Work -- Chapter 2: Making A Profit -- Chapter 3: Other Income Sources -- Chapter 4: Income Taxes -- Top Ten Things To Know -- Glossary -- Learn More About Money -- Index/Photo Acknowledgments -- Back Cover
In: Social welfare in New Zealand
In: Ministerial briefing papers
In: Fiscaoeconomia: FSECON : international journal of political economics, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 198-216
ISSN: 2564-7504
The study reveals the causes of inequality of income distribution in high-income countries. In the research, the macroeconomic factors affecting income distribution such as economic growth rate, inflation, unemployment, globalization, technology and public revenues are considered as independent variables. The gini coefficient, which is one of the methods of measuring income inequality, is considered as dependent variable. Dummy variable is also included as an independent variable to the model to eliminate the effects of the global crisis that started in the United States in 2008 and spread all over the world. In the study, which is based on the 2008-2015 period, high-income countries are considered and the factors affecting income distribution are examined by panel data analysis. According to the findings of analysis, it is seen that inflation, economic growth, unemployment and public revenues increase income inequality in high income countries and economic globalization contributes to the improvement of income distribution in these countries. The shadow variable added to the model is also statistically significant. This shows that the crisis has a negative effect on income distribution in high-income countries.
In: China economic review, Band 77, S. 101912
ISSN: 1043-951X
Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes finance unemployment benefits and government consumption. High skilled agents prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer labor income taxation.
BASE
Empirical papers show that labor income and capital income are differently taxed all over the world. We investigate whether this may correspond to individual preferences. We tackle this question in an overlapping generations general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents: young versus old and low skilled versus high skilled individuals. Taxes finance unemployment benefits and government consumption. High skilled agents prefer capital income taxes, while young unskilled and old agents prefer labor income taxation.
BASE
In: NBER Working Paper No. w23578
SSRN
Working paper
In: Economic commentary, S. 1-4
ISSN: 0428-1276
This Commentary investigates whether there has been a growing divergence in the consumption of luxury and necessity goods across income classes. The analysis shows that while necessities represent a majority of the consumption basket for lower and middle income quintiles, their consumption of necessities in inflation-adjusted dollars has been declining in the face of higher prices of such goods and stagnant income growth. Higher income quintiles have seen increases in their consumption of luxuries, simultaneous with a decline in their consumption of necessities.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9022
SSRN
In: CESifo working paper series 4613
In: Public finance
A tax buyout is a contract between tax authorities and a tax payer which reduces the marginal income tax rate in exchange for a lump-sum payment. While previous contributions have focussed on labour supply, we consider the interaction with tax evasion and show that a buyout can increase expected tax revenues. This will be the case if (1) the audit probability is constant and the penalty for evasion is a function of undeclared income or (2) the penalty depends on the amount of taxes evaded, and authorities use information about income generated by the decision about a tax buyout offer when setting audit probabilities. Since individuals will only utilise a tax buyout if they are better off, higher tax revenues imply that such contracts can be Pareto-improving.