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AbstractWe consider a generalization of the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [4]. In the market which we consider, s kinds of indivisible goods are exchanged for money. The market consists of buyers and sellers. Each buyer wants to buy at most one unit of the goods, and each seller may sell more than one unit. First, we show that the set of all competitive imputations is given by the solutions of a certain linear programing problem dual to the optimal problem. Second, we show that the core of the market coincides with the set of all competitive imputations under some condition, and consider the core of the market where s=1 and the condition does not hold.

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, which generalize the Top Trading Cycles to the general case in which individuals are allowed to report indifferences, while preserving a maximal possible set of its desirable properties. ; Authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, through the projects ECO2009-11213 and ECO2009-12836, from Basque Government through the project GIC07/146-IT-377-07, from Andalusian Government through the project P07.SEJ.02547 and from Belgian Federal Government through the IAP Project (contract 6/09).

We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint. ; Nosotros estudiamos un problema de restitución de un bien indivisible (tierra o propiedad) sobre el que dos agentes tienen derechos de propiedad: la persona desposeída y el propietario actual. Un tercer agente, posiblemente el gobierno, busca resolver la situación asignando los derechos de propiedad a uno de los agentes y compensando al otro. Esta compensación no puede ser superior a un monto determinado por el tercer agente. Nosotros caracterizamos una familia de reglas que tienen consideraciones asimétricas de justicia, son inmunes al comportamientos estratégicos, garantizan niveles mínimos de bienestar a los agentes y satisfacen la restricción presupuestal.

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.

We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design. (author's abstract)

Abstract.  A scenario is provided in which a house in Eden Mills, Ontario, is a Giffen good. The conditions derived in the example apply to other indivisible goods as well. JEL classification: D11

A general account of two sets of properties -- fungibility & nonfungibility, & divisibility & indivisibility -- is provided as the distinguishing categories for goods, & it is contended that these distinctions entail complications for structural principles of distributive justice. James S. Fishkin's discussion of structural principles (seeTyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories, Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins U Press, 1979) is provided as an example, & it is argued that: (1) Fishkin's view that value, structure, & assignment are independent holds only to the degree that the goods considered are fungible & divisible; (2) structural principles cannot accommodate highly nonfungible, indivisible goods; & (3) these difficulties can be managed through the application of value-sensitive proviso. Medical care & advanced education are then shown to be highly fungible & indivisible goods, thus supporting the earlier distinction. Provided are specifications of the nature of complementary contributions as well as coordination problems between structural principles & the value-sensitive proviso in their application to distributive justice issues. 1 Figure, 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWith the prevalence of cloud computing emerges the challenges of pricing cloud computing services. There are various characteristics of cloud computing which make the problem unique. We study an abstract model which focuses on one such aspect – the sale of a homogeneous and fully divisible good. We cast onto our model the idea of bundling, studied within the context of monopolist pricing of indivisible goods. We demonstrate how selling a divisible good as an indivisible one may increase seller revenues and characterize when this phenomenon occurs, and the corresponding gain factors.