Distribution of Legislative Powers in the Future Indian Federation
In: International affairs, Volume 22, Issue 1, p. 146-147
ISSN: 1468-2346
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In: International affairs, Volume 22, Issue 1, p. 146-147
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 3, p. 515-548
ISSN: 1939-9162
Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.
In: American political science review, Volume 10, Issue 1, p. 80-95
ISSN: 1537-5943
The aim of the present paper is to describe the regulative powers granted to state boards of health, and to consider the wisdom of these grants as well as their validity as tested by the principle that the law-making powers granted to legislatures may not constitutionally be delegated by them to other agents of government.State boards of health, while primarily administrative bodies, have generally a more or less extensive power to make regulations in supplement to and having the force of statute law. Questions thus arise as to the extent and validity of the ordinance-making powers granted. Does the power to make these regulations, having the force of law, change the nature of these boards? Under what conditions may they exercise their power?
In: American political science review, Volume 10, p. 80-95
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Volume 65, p. 22-30
ISSN: 0031-2282
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, Volume 58, Issue 2, p. 227-248
ISSN: 1477-7053
AbstractThis article proposes a novel theoretical framework to account for the combined effects of regime type and patterns of executive authority on legislative party unity. We argue that broad presidential legislative powers favour coordination between the president and legislative parties under pure presidentialism, whereas under semi-presidentialism, strong presidents increase the potential for intra-executive conflict, submitting parties to cross-cutting pressures. We expect higher levels of legislative authority to increase party unity under presidentialism but decrease under semi-presidentialism. Moreover, when presidents are endowed with limited legislative authority, semi-presidentialism produces higher levels of party unity than presidentialism, but for sufficiently high levels of legislative authority there should be no difference across regime types. Our analyses of 1,586 pooled observations for 72 democracies from all regions of the world using the V-Dem measure of party cohesion demonstrate that presidential legislative authority, in combination with regime type, is indeed a key predictor of party unity.
A leading scholar of Congress and the Constitution analyzes Congress's surprisingly potent set of tools in the system of checks and balances. Congress is widely supposed to be the least effective branch of the federal government. But as Josh Chafetz shows in this boldly original analysis, Congress in fact has numerous powerful tools at its disposal in its conflicts with the other branches. These tools include the power of the purse, the contempt power, freedom of speech and debate, and more. Drawing extensively on the historical development of Anglo-American legislatures from the seventeenth century to the present, Chafetz concludes that these tools are all means by which Congress and its members battle for public support. When Congress uses them to engage successfully with the public, it increases its power vis-à-vis the other branches; when it does not, it loses power. This groundbreaking take on the separation of powers will be of interest to both legal scholars and political scientists
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Volume 58, Issue 2, p. 345-364
ISSN: 1468-5965
World Affairs Online
In: JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 58, Issue 2, p. 345-364
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In: APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Volume 31, Issue 3, p. 347-381
ISSN: 1939-9162
We studied an underutilized source of data on legislative effectiveness and exploited its panel structure to uncover several interesting patterns. We found that effectiveness rises sharply with tenure, at least for the first few terms, even when we control for legislators' institutional positions, party affiliation, and other factors. Effectiveness never declines with tenure, even out to nine terms. The increase in effectiveness is not simply due to electoral attrition and selective retirement, but to learning‐by‐doing. We also found evidence that a significant amount of "positive sorting" occurs in the legislature, with highly talented legislators moving more quickly into positions of responsibility and power. Finally, effectiveness has a positive impact on incumbents' electoral success and on the probability of legislators moving to higher office. These findings have important implications for arguments about term limits, the incumbency advantage, and seniority rule.
Legislative history is the ultimate bugaboo of the textualists-those judges and scholars who assert that in statutory interpretation, "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." The textualists have unleashed argument after argument against legislative history. Textualists assert that judicial use of legislative history seeks a collective legislative intent that does not exist and that would not be law if it did exist. They claim that congressional committees deliberately manipulate legislative history in order to influence statutory interpretation. They argue that legislative history is more ambiguous than the statutes it supposedly clarifies, that it poses a special danger of judicial misinterpretation, and that judges cite it only as a makeweight argument added to decisions already reached on other grounds. Most of all, textualists claim that judicial reliance on legislative history is unconstitutional. They base their claims on separation of powers principles. Textualists observe that the Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress and that the power is non-delegable. If courts, in the process of statutory construction, consult legislative history created by mere committees or individual Members of Congress, they effectively approve an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power. Moreover, textualists argue, the Constitution requires Congress to enact laws using a process of bicameral passage and presentment to the President." Legislative history has not run this difficult gauntlet; it is therefore not law and courts should not consult it.
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In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101066973403
Prepared by the Legislative reference department of the Kansas State library. ; Part 1. The unicameral system - Part 2. The bicameral system -Part 3. Bibliography. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: Legislative studies quarterly, Volume 40, Issue 4, p. 571-598
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Volume 31, Issue 3, p. 347-382
ISSN: 0362-9805