Suchergebnisse

This paper argues that the impact of devolution has been largely misperceived in both liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) accounts of European Union (EU) politics. To address the shortcomings of both LI and MLG, a new data set measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process in the EU-27 is presented. Analysis shows that the relationship between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is overall positive but non-linear, with a strong threshold effect that is best captured by a quadratic function. The causal nature of the link between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is ascertained through qualitative means using process tracing and Mill's method of difference. The article concludes with the necessary updating of MLG and LI frameworks to account for the impact of devolution on EU policy-shaping.

The aim of this study was to identify the circumstances in which the Common Agricultural Policy, once the most centralised policy in the EU, changed, after 2013, into one which is the most decentralised and diversified. The following hypothesis was put forward that the introduction of significant flexibility in the CAP reflects the search by Member States for the most effective ways to identify and implement their own preferences on the EU forum. The research was conducted from the perspective of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory based on a critical analysis of the respective literature and the applicable strategic documents and regulations. In the study, a large heterogeneity of agricultural sectors in the EU has been shown, resulting from several enlargements of the EU. Consequently, it has led to an increasing diversification of national preferences, signifi cantly affecting the shape of the CAP reforms proposed on the EU forum. Other important drivers influencing the changes in the CAP were the introduction of a co¬decision procedure in the area of agriculture, along with the increasing impact of Member States on the decision-making process since the economic crisis of 2008–2009. As a consequence, EU budget negotiations have been dominated by narrowly-defined sectoral and national interests. The concentration of Member States on an acceptable net position contributes to maintaining the status quo in terms of the expenditure part of the EU budget or its reduction. Thus, there is a risk that the deficit of European integration in areas assuming the distribution of costs and benefi ts between Member States may have a negative impact on the future of the EU.

This paper argues that the impact of devolution has been largely misperceived in both liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) accounts of European Union (EU) politics. To address the shortcomings of both LI and MLG, a new data set measuring institutionalized regional involvement in the domestic EU policy-shaping process in the EU-27 is presented. Analysis shows that the relationship between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is overall positive but non-linear, with a strong threshold effect that is best captured by a quadratic function. The causal nature of the link between devolution and institutionalized regional involvement is ascertained through qualitative means using process tracing and Mill's method of difference. The article concludes with the necessary updating of MLG and LI frameworks to account for the impact of devolution on EU policy-shaping.

The principle aim of this article is to analyze EU's response to the covid-19 pandemic within the ambit of measures incorporated to tackle the economic fallout and health-related problems. The article makes use of two important theories of European integration, i.e., liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism in its explanatory capacity to describe actions taken by both the member states and the supranational institutions in mitigating the adverse effects of the pandemic. The article argues that while no one theory completely explains the European response to the pandemic, both the theories offer different perspectives in how the EU member states reacted, within the power of their national capabilities and the collective response measures initiated at the level of EU supranational institutions.

"Intergovernmentalism: Old, Liberal, and New" published on by Oxford University Press.

Over the years EU member states favored an intergovernmental approach to policy-making within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This approach emphasized the role played by national authorities, as member states' representatives, within a "soft governance" framework. In this framework, national representatives voluntarily participated in various coordinative networks and committees, which relied on interstate negotiations to create policies. However, the Euro area crisis highlighted the shortcomings of the intergovernmental approach to policy-making, such as divergent implementation of policies and regulatory arbitrage, which undermined the EMU's stability. After the crisis, we are witnessing a centralization of policy creation processes and decision-making within the EMU, with apparently limited room for "old intergovernmentalism". New actors such as the European Supervisory Authorities, perfectly embody this development since they require from member states to commonly agree "under the shadow" of non-majoritarian institutions, at times even against their own policy preferences. This raises important questions on the role of "old" conceptual frameworks in explaining current EU integration. Therefore, this paper explores the concept of intergovernmentalism (and also, "liberal intergovernmentalism") as one the key driving forces within EMU's governance, offering further insight into raised questions as well as arguing in favor of its political and integrationist potential in the years to come.

This paper offers a theoretically informed and empirically grounded explanation of the EU's fiscal response to the coronavirus crisis. Deploying liberal intergovernmentalist theory, it assesses the making and form of the EU's first fiscal support package of 23 April 2020 in terms of national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining, and policy and institutional choice. National preferences resulted both from the overall threat the coronavirus crisis posed to the EU's cohesion and from member states' different affectedness and fiscal position: While all agreed that some common fiscal response was necessary, the particularly hard-hit and fiscally stricken Southern EU countries called for large and unconditional support via the introduction of Corona bonds. The fiscally more stable and conservative Northern EU countries, in turn, preferred more limited measures and the use of existing instruments. Due to their larger financial resources, the fiscally more conservative countries determined the room for agreement and dominated the negotiations. Consequently, the form of the EU's eventual first fiscal support package mostly reflects the preferences and bargaining power of the Northern EU countries.