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Analyzes the current debate regarding the need for reform of arbitration as the preferred method to solve disputes between States and private investors, more specifically regarding the proposals of an appellate mechanism and a multilateral investment court. It presents the novelty of bringing international regime theory into that discussion in order to highlight the idea that the underlying political balance has shifted towards substantially less tolerance of ad-hoc arbitration as an efficient mechanism to solve investor-State disputes. It reviews the main arguments in favor and against of an appellate mechanism and concludes by suggesting how these considerations are necessary in order to reach a legitimate definition of Peru`s position regarding this issue in the current international debate. ; Analiza el debate actual respecto a la necesidad de la reforma del arbitraje como el método preferido para resolver disputas entre Estados e inversionistas privados, específicamente en lo concerniente a las propuestas respecto a un mecanismo de apelaciones y una corte multilateral de inversiones. Presenta la novedad de traer a la discusión la teoría sobre regímenes internacionales a fin de subrayar la idea que el balance político subyacente se ha movido hacia unnivel sustancialmente menor de tolerancia del arbitraje ad hoc como un mecanismo eficiente de resolución de disputas inversionista-Estado. Pasa revista a los principales argumentos a favor y en contra de un mecanismo de apelaciones y concluye sugiriendo cómo es que las consideraciones precedentes resultan necesarias a fin de alcanzar una legítima definición de la posición del Perú respecto a esta cuestión en el debate internacional actual.

This study provides a theoretical explanation, first, as to why some less-developed countries (LDCs) have complained about the OECD negotiations of a multilateral investment agreement (MAI) in 1998 although they were free to join or opt out. Second, it explains why we observe instead an explosion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The explanation rests on an FDI model with three distortions: there is a time-inconsistency problem of extracting rents from FDI, there is an underprovision of public goods in LDCs, and there is a lobbying distortion in political decision making that is initially unobservable to foreign investors which causes political risk. The negotiation of MAI by a club exerts a negative information externality on non-members. A regime of BITs undermines the club agreement and unravels the information-asymmetry problem. However, an appropriately designed MAI is worldwelfare superior compared to a regime of BITs by alleviating the lobbying distortion.

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such a regime increases worldwide FDI and raises the world interest rate. Distinguishing three groups of countries, we show that industrialized countries experience an outflow of capital but benefit overall due to an increase in repatriated profits. Middle income countries are likely to gain from increased inward FDI, whereas least developed countries lose because they receive less FDI. Our results explain the stylized fact that a multilateral investment agreement was opposed by least developed nations and certain groups in rich countries.