Suchergebnisse

Sicherheit und Überleben der menschlichen Rasse hängt unmittelbar davon ab, wie mit den Nuklarwaffen von denen, die sie besitzen, umgegangen wird. Selbst wenn es zu einer nuklaren Abrüstung kommt (was unwahrscheinlich ist) oder wenn es neue Verteidigungssysteme gegen ballistische Flugkörper gibt, bleibt die nuklare Gefahr bestehen. Es kommt also darauf an, ein Krisenmenagement zu schaffen, das in einer nuklearen Krise wirksam ist. Dazu muß die politische Infrastruktur in den USA verbessert werden und durch ein wirkungsvolles command and control-System müssen die Verbindungen zwischen politischer und militärischer Ebene verstärkt werden. Das gilt auch für die Beziehungen zur UdSSR und für das Verhältnis zu den übrigen NATO-Partnern. (BIOst-BwD/Hie)

This book focuses the public debate on fundamental political problem by defining three approaches to arms control. The three approaches are (l) extend or modify the SALT II Treaty; (2) restructure the present or planned nuclear forces; and (3) establish overall equivalence.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Acting U.N. Secretary-General U Thant sent a letter to Soviet Premier Khrushchev asking that he halt the Soviet ships then headed for Cuba in defiance of a U.S. quarantine. U Thant's request gave Khrushchev a plausible—and honorable— explanation for preventing an impending clash, and he accepted it. As Richard Walton states in his Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy: "The Acting Secretary General [was] responsible for the breathing space that avoided confrontation at sea—and possible escalation into nuclear war."

The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"--Based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.

IN THIS STUDY OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THERE ARE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH AND THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WHICH WOULD EXPAND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TO OTHER NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES AND COVER THE UNDECLARED WEAPONS STATES. IT CONCLUDES WITH A PROPOSAL WHICH LOOKS TOWARD A WORKING SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.