Suchergebnisse

With the idea of 'change' in exiting social system of Pakistan mainly by eradicating corruption, Pakistani Tehrik-e-Insaf emerged in 1996, under the leadership of renowned cricket player Imran Khan. He pledged to promote justice and the establishment of a welfare state. However, the party could hardly attain electoral success until 2012 when it reached on national political peaks. Majority of the Pakistani youth from urban areas follow the party agenda with a new zenith. Unlike other political parties, PTI pledged to challenge the existing transmissible-monarchy and decided to holds the intra party election. By using different primary and secondary sources, this article tries to focus on PTI's intra party elections in order to denounce the existing socio-political culture of Pakistan, yet it could hardly achieve the said goals in the presence of "old-guard" in the front lines of party leadership.

HOW WERE THE UPPER LEVEL LEADERSHIP & THE CONSTITUENCYLEVEL OF PARTY WORKERS ORIENTED TOWARDS SOCIALISM AND WHAT ROLE DID BOTH GROUPS PERFORM IN THE 1970 CAMPAIGN? THROUGH THE ASCENT TO POLITICAL POWER MAY LIE THROUGH RFADICALIZATION, THE LEADERSHIP, IN AUGMENTING THAT POWER, OFTEN RESORTS TO DE-RADICALIZATION BOTH IN POLICY-MAKING AND IN PARTY-BUILDING.

Does secular party incumbency affect religious violence? Existing theory is ambiguous. On the one hand, religiously motivated militants might target areas that vote secularists into office. On the other hand, secular party politicians, reliant on the support of violence-hit communities, may face powerful electoral incentives to quell attacks. Candidates bent on preventing bloodshed might also sort into such parties. To adjudicate these claims, we combine constituency-level election returns with event data on Islamist and sectarian violence in Pakistan (1988–2011). For identification, we compare districts where secular parties narrowly won or lost elections. We find that secularist rule causes a sizable reduction in local religious conflict. Additional analyses suggest that the result stems from electoral pressures to cater to core party supporters and not from politician selection. The effect is concentrated in regions with denser police presence, highlighting the importance of state capacity for suppressing religious disorder.

The South China Sea conflict is spurring a popular nationalist movement in Vietnam that challenges the ruling communist Party by demanding Hà Nội to sever relations with its patron in Beijing. This paper examines this movement by connecting it to the often misunderstood historical relationship between the ruling Party and modern Vietnamese nationalism. This historical relationship explains why the Party has tried to suppress the movement and why movement discourse strives to debunk national myths and reconstruct national history. Linking national interests to democracy and human rights, the currently fragile movement is creating dissent within the Party and damaging its legitimacy.