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This contribution seeks to explain the numbers of written questions in the Belgian House of Representatives (1995-2007). Important variations over time, party and coalition formula have been observed and 'classic' explanations - such as the size of the parliamentary party group, the linguistic group or the majority vs. opposition status of the party -only partly explain these observed variations. It is argued here that parliamentary party group unity and discipline is an important factor in shaping patterns of questioning. The findings of the statistical analysis confirm that disciplined and cohesive parties are more active in questioning the government than other parties. © 2011 Taylor & Francis. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. The more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests, the more grants the district receives. Using panel data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal grants to congressional districts between 1984 and 2010, we provide evidence that districts represented by loyal legislators receive greater amounts of discretionary spending. This effect holds only for legislators in the majority party, who may enjoy a legislative advantage. Districts represented by loyal legislators who face a greater conflict of interest between following the party and serving their constituents (e.g., Republican legislators representing liberal-leaning districts) are rewarded to a larger extent.

Party discipline is an area that has received considerable attention in the party cohesion literature. While existing comparative research has predominantly focused on the institutional environment that impacts party discipline, we know less about its relationship with party-related variables. In this article, we explore the effect of party ideology on legislators' perceptions of party discipline in Latin America. The difficulties for parliamentary groups to act cohesively in Latin America make party discipline and its study a major task. We argue that party ideology shapes the perceptions of legislators vis-à-vis their relative autonomy and the resulting ability of the party to be cohesive. To perform the analysis, we have constructed a database containing the responses of 1272 parliamentarians from 71 political parties in 17 countries across the 2011–2022 legislatures. In addition to party-related variables, we have included individual- and system-level variables. The results suggest that Latin American parliamentarians belonging to left-wing parties tend to conform to party discipline more frequently than those of the right wing.

This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between her constituents' interests and the party line. Party loyalty is electorally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician's constituency. This effect is greater the more intense the conflict between the voters' and the party's interests. Using data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives and federal payments to congressional districts between 1986 and 2010, we provide evidence that increases in legislators' party discipline raise the amounts of discretionary spending their districts receive. The rewards for discipline are larger the greater the gap between the constituents' and party's preferences (i.e., in conservative-leaning districts represented by Democrats or liberal-leaning districts represented by Republicans).