Suchergebnisse

In 2009 Poland was the only EU member state which recorded the increase in gross domestics product (GDP). In media reports and during the press conferences of the representatives of the Polish government the economic map of Europe was presented with red colour dominating - representing the decrease in GDP. Green colour, symbolising the increase, was only visible within the borders of Poland. Therefore, Poland was declared "a green island". Some economic commentators emphasised either great internal market or weakening zloty which favoured the export of Polish goods and services as an increase drive. The Prime Minister and the ministers indicated their own merits convincing the citizens that the increase in GDP in Poland is to a great extent thanks to an effective government policy. Some, especially during discussions which were far from economic realties, emphasised the importance of the EU funds which have been stimulating Polish growth. In fact, these funds cannot influence the reverse of negative trends in the Polish economy. Their size in an annual perspective equals 3% of Polish GDP. Economic and political analyses seldom indicate, perhaps only indirectly, the cultural phenomenon, which discloses only after sociological surveys. Although the Polish economy has recorded some growth, despite a slight growth, the crisis has also affected Poland and Poles still feel its effects (weakening zloty, unemployment increase, cessation of the dynamics of salary increase, decrease in the value of the investment funds units and company shares). As the crisis in Poland has assumed a light form, does Poland deserve being called "a green island" or perhaps "a never-land" where the optimistic economic data are rather apparent? In this article I will try to show the attitudes of Poles towards the global economic crisis as well as interpret this state. The basic reference consists of the results of the opinion polls. ; Tomasz Wiskulski

In this article the author focuses on the problem of construction of standardogenic behaviors in the area of financial decisions. As the starting point, the author presented the model of social imitation which has been suggested by J.S. Duesenberry. Some later modifications of this model in the Polish market were also presented. The affluent group with the net income over 7,500 zloty per month has been recognized as the potential standardogenic group for popular financial behaviors. The author presents the results of empirical research conducted on representative samples of adult Poles in 2016-2017.

Issued also in Polish. ; At head of title: Republic of Poland. ; Report on the stabilization of the zloty.--Memorandum on revision of articles of association of the Bank of Poland.--The revenue system of Poland, with criticism and recommendations.--Report on the joint stock bank situation and recommendations as to government banks.--Report on the proposed banking fund.--Report on accounting and fiscal control in the Ministry of finance.--Report in support of an organic budget law together with an appendix containing a project of such a law.--Report on the customs administration.--Report on the customs administration of the Free City of Danzig.--Report on the salt industry of Poland.--Report on the Polish tobacco monopoly.--Memorandum on special favours to the export trade.--Memorandum on the public debt policy of Poland. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Nach der Kapitulation Polens im Oktober 1939 setzten sich die Verantwortlichen in der deutschen Wehrmacht mit ihren Plänen durch, das im besetzten Teil Polens - Generalgouvernement (GG) - noch vorhandene und unbeschädigt gebliebene Industriepotential zur Produktion von Rüstungsgütern zu nutzen. Die Führung der zwangsenteigneten Betriebe übertrug die Wehrmacht deutschen Industriellen. Meine Dissertation befasst sich mit den unternehmerischen Entscheidungen und Strategien der für den Aufbau der GG-Betriebe verantwortlichen Manager und dem Verhalten der Führungskräfte im GG gegenüber den polnischen Beschäftigten. Die Arbeit stützt sich schwerpunktmäßig auf Fallanalysen, in die - exemplarisch und vergleichend - drei reichsdeutsche Rüstungsunternehmen mit Zweigbetrieben in der GG-Industrieregion 'COP' (Centralny Okreg Przemyslowy) einbezogen wurden. Bestimmend für die Auswahl der Betriebe war zum einen deren besondere Bedeutung für die Wehrwirtschaft und zum andern der Zugang zu ausreichenden firmenbezogenen Quellen. Bei den Unternehmen handelt es sich um die Hugo Schneider AG, Leipzig (Hasag), die Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG, Steyr, und die Daimler-Benz AG, Stuttgart. Die Geschäftspolitik in den drei ausgewählten Firmen wurde von sehr unterschiedlichen Unternehmerpersönlichkeiten bestimmt. An der Spitze der Steyr-Werke stand mit Dr. Georg Meindl ein überzeugter Nationalsozialist, der seinen Chef-Posten langjährigen Beziehungen zu Göring verdankte. Paul Budin, einem ehemaligen Freimaurer und opportunistischen Karrierist, gelang es, sich den Posten des Hasag-Generaldirektors zu sichern. Meindl und Budin herrschten in ihren Unternehmen nach dem von den Nationalsozialisten propagierten 'Führerprinzip'. Im kollegial geführten Daimler-Vorstand gab es Mitglieder, die dem NS-Staat distanziert bis ablehnend gegenüber standen. Den durch meine Arbeit deutlich herausgearbeiteten unterschiedlichen Unternehmenskulturen stehen letztlich weitgehend gleichgerichtete Betriebsabläufe in den GG-Werken gegenüber. Zur Absicherung des geplanten Umsatzwachstums der Betriebe setzten alle voll auf Hitlers Rüstungspolitik. Die Führungskräfte im GG zögerten dabei nicht, hungernde jüdische Zwangsarbeiter auszubeuten und sie bei Arbeitsunfähigkeit den Mordkommandos der SS auszuliefern. Die damit einhergehende Verstrickung in den barbarischen NS-Terror war der Preis, den die primär am Profit ihrer Betriebe orientierten Manager unter Zurückstellung moralischer Bedenken bereit waren zu bezahlen. Die Ergebnisse meiner Untersuchungen zeigen, dass es die GG-Betriebe während der Besatzungszeit nicht schafften, trotz Hungerlöhnen für die Polen und Tagesmietpreise von 5 Zloty für die Juden, in die Gewinnzone zu kommen. Ursächlich dafür waren der Widerstand der Polen, Waffen für die verhassten Deutschen zu produzieren, der gravierende Facharbeitermangel und vor allem die geringe Arbeitsproduktivität der unterernährten und überwiegend ungelernten Zwangsarbeiter. Obwohl sich die Manager in den untersuchten Unternehmen in erheblichem Ausmaß zu Mittätern der Nationalsozialisten gemacht hatten, konnten sie, von Ausnahmen abgesehen, spätestens ab 1948 ihre Karrieren unbehelligt fortsetzen. Dr. Georg Meindl und Paul Budin entzogen sich kurz nach Kriegsende der Verantwortung durch Selbstmord.

Now before Ukraine on the way to the formation of a stable civil society, along with the problem of national consolidation, is also a problem of adjustment of the normal interethnic relations, protection rights of ethnic and national minorities. In the conditions of the political system's development in Ukrainian society ethnic and national minorities began to engage in the sphere of political activity, seeking to take a rightful place in the process of public and cultural construction.In the multinational composition of Ukraine from time to time the problems of settlement the relations with separate ethnic or national groups, including Russian, Tatar, Romanian and others, are updated and exacerbated. The Polish minority is one of the most numerous national minorities living on the territory of our state. It is marked out by movement strengthening to the self-organization and national identification, and also formation as a subject of policy. There is so important, from our point of view, to research, on the one hand, a role and place of Ukraine in the realization of rights and satisfaction of needs of Poles in Ukraine, and with another – the participations of this minority in social and political processes of the state.Considering the relevance and insufficient studying of this problem, the author set to himself the purpose: 1) to analyze the main features and trends of development of the Polish minority in Ukraine; 2) to identify the key aspects of the participation of the Polish community in the Ukrainian social and political processes.The object of study is the Polish minority in Ukraine as an important part of the civil society and its political system, and the subject is the process of formation, functioning and development of the Polish minority as a subject of modern social and political life of Ukraine.There are 144 130 Poles in Ukraine today, according to the last population census in 2001. It makes 0,3 % from the total number of the population of the state. The Polish take the eighth place in terms of population among the ethnic minorities in Ukraine (after Russians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Hungarians and Romanians).The resettlement of Poles in Ukraine historically was connected primarily with the Right Bank and Eastern Galicia. The most numerous Polish ethnographic communities formed here. The most part of Polish lived in 2001 in Zhytomyr (49 046 persons; 3,5 % of the population), Khmelnytsky (23 005 persons; 1,6 % of the population) and Lvov (18 948 persons; 0,7 % of the population) regions.In general, the present social, political and religious situation in the environment of the Polish minority is stable and loyal to the Ukrainian government. Social and political moods of Ukrainian Poles naturally determine by both positive and negative sentiments.In January 1992, in Lvov at the Congress of Ukrainian Poles the Federation of the Polish Organizations in Ukraine (FPOU) was founded. It is led now by E. Khmelyova. This organization and the Union of Poles in Ukraine are today the most influential organizational structures of the Polish minority in Ukraine.In November 1994, in Kyiv the societies «Consent», «Solidarity», Cultural and Educational Association of Adam Mickiewicz, Kyiv branch of «The Union of Poles» decided to create «The Coordinating Council of Polish Organizations in Kyiv». Before all Polish non-governmental organizations in this country is to not only revive the local Polish national identity, but also comprehensively facilitate to the productive cultural relations between the two countries.In January 2000, the Polish Institute in Kyiv was established with the support of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was led by P. Kozakiewicz. Its tasks include: development and promotion of the image of Poland as a modern and democratic state, supporting the exchange of views, the elimination of negative stereotypes in the Ukrainian-Polish relations.The Polish NGOs practiced such forms of activity: teaching the Polish language; establishment and functioning of libraries and publishing activities; research activities; organizing places and cultural sites associated with the history of Poland; organization of cultural and educational activities; assistance in the process of developing national performances etc.There are five schools with education in Polish in Ukraine. These schools, which have about two thousand pupils, function with the support of Polish NGOs. There are four Polish schools in the Lvov region. Two of these schools are located in Lvov, and another two are in the area of Mostynsk. Another school with education in Polish functions in Ivano-Frankivsk. The curriculum at schools with education in Polish introduced the subjects of «History of Poland» and «Geography of Poland».As a subject Polish is studied in Ukraine by more than 4 thousand students, and more than 3 thousand students study Polish facultatively or in circles. Polish is also studied in numerous Ukrainian universities. At the end of 2012 the Polish organizations in Ukraine initiated to provide Polish the status of regional language in the area of Mostynsk. There are about four villages, which population is made by Poles.The western regions, where the most part of the Poles is living, are characterized by vigorous activity of the Polish community in the media sector. Thus, «The Polish word» (25 min.) in the broadcasting of TV «Zhytomyr» is weekly published. And «TRK Union TV» broadcasts daily for the Polish community on the proposal TV «Polonia».Lvov is the capital of the Polish Radio in Ukraine: «Radio Lwow» tells at a frequency of the radio station «The Independence» in different days. There is a program «Program katolicki». The Lvov city NGO «Polskie Towarzystwo Radiowe» works here. An important role in cross-cultural communication is played by Polish Radio for the abroad. There are news, press reviews, comments and reports of correspondents all over the world, interviews and debates, literary and music plots in the broadcasting.Periodicals of the Polish national minority are represented by the following groups of editions:- informational: «Głos Podola» (Kamenetz-Podolsk), «The Monitor of Volyn» (Lutsk), «Kurier Stanisławowski» and «Kurier Galicyjski» (Ivano-Frankivsk), «The Polish Newspaper» (Zhytomyr), «Dzyennik Kiyovski» (Kyiv);- public: «Lwowskie Spotkania» (Lvov), «Harcerz Kresow» (Lvov), «Wspolne Dzedzictwo» (Ternopol), «KOTWICA» (Mykolaiv);- cultural and educational: «The Mosaic of Berdichev» (Berdichev), «The Voice of Teacher» (Drogobych), «Krynica» (Kyiv);- religious: «The Shouts from Volyn» (Ostrog), «The Joy of Belief» (Lvov).Recently the joint Ukrainian-Polish projects in the media sphere, for example, the international interdisciplinary magazine «Ucrainica Polonica» and «The Ukrainian Polonistic» gain the increasing popularity.The status of the Polish national minority in Ukraine is qualitatively different from the status of other minorities, such as Roma or Crimean Tatars. After all, the Poles have their historical homeland, the neighboring of Ukrainian state – the Republic of Poland, from which a financial and institutional support comes. Therefore the self-determination process in Polish minority is quite successful and quick.The negative phenomenon for the image of Ukraine is the fact that it works and develops mainly by financing from the government of Poland. At the current time, for example, all meetings of the Polish community in Lvov Church and departures of children on rehabilitation and training to the Republic of Poland are financed also by Poland.Thus, according to the Association of Polish culture in Lvov, the local administration level of care to ensure the interests of the Polish community in Lvov region, compared with a sponsorship of the Republic of Poland, is zero. Over the last few years the Association of Polish culture received for its needs from Lvov regional state administration only about 2 thousand UAN. It forces the Ukrainian Poles to address on the constant help to the bureaucracy of Poland. In this aspect the chairman of the society E. Legovich opposed a situation with ensuring of requirements of the Ukrainian diaspora in the territory of the Republic of Poland. There are considerable budgetary funds for the satisfaction of its interests, which in accordance with the established procedure are transmitted through the Sejm to the communities of national minorities. So, 2 million zloty (about 5 million UAN) are annually allocated for the needs of the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland. Thus, E. Lehovych notes that the Polish community would be sufficient amount of 100 thousand UAN.However, speaking about the presence of members of the Polish community in the Ukrainian elected authorities and government agencies, we have to note a negative trend associated with the low levels of its representation. Thus, Ukraine has not any political party of the Polish national minority (for example, Hungarian and Russian communities have its own political parties, such as «The Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine», «KMKS» Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, «The Russian block» and others. And these parties of the national minorities stood on elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). The Polish community is not represented in the Ukrainian parliament. There are two Poles among the 66 members of the regional council of Mostynsk (Lvov region). Poles make 20 % of the number of the residents of Mostynsk and 8 % of Poles are living in the area).Thus, we can conclude, that the Polish minority is one of the largest minorities in Ukraine, and it is on its way of the identification and a political subjektivation. Poles in Ukraine experienced the process of assimilation due to an extended stay in limited contacts with their historical homeland, as indicated the data from recent Ukrainian population census. However, a positive is the fact that today the Polish community in Ukraine will intensify its activities, key points of which are:1) preservation of cultural originality and development of cultural creativity;2) functioning of national and cultural, public organizations;3) contacts with the historical homeland and participation in interstate processes.The negative sides of the position of Polish national minority in Ukraine are:1) absence of political communities (political parties) for the representation the minority at official level;2) low level of participation in formation of power structures and representation at all levels of the power (from local to governmental and parliamentary).Also, despite the existence of numerous guarantees of the rights and protection of the freedoms of national minorities in Ukraine, approved at legislative level, the real practice shows an insufficient attention from the Ukrainian government to these questions. The existence and development of the Polish national minority in Ukraine is provided by the contacts with the historical homeland. It practically finances the diaspora. Therefore Ukraine have to accept a number of scientifically reasonable measures in order to the reforming, carried out in education, sciences, public administration and local government, don't entail to the restriction of the right of the minorities, including Polish, to get an education in a state language, to develop and protect own cultural and a creative heritage, to participate in formation of authorities and to have own representation in electoral bodies. ; Статья посвящена выявлению основных черт и тенденций развития польского национального меньшинства в Украине, а также определению ключевых аспектов участия поляков в украинских общественно-политических процессах. Сделана попытка показать уровень гражданской зрелости, политической культуры польской общины в Украине на современном этапе. Особое внимание уделено роли национальной политики украинского государства в процессе политической субъективации польского национального меньшинства. ; Статтю присвячено виявленню основних рис і тенденцій розвитку польської національної меншини в Україні, а також визначенню ключових аспектів участі поляків в українських суспільно-політичних процесах. Зроблено спробу показати рівень громадянської зрілості, політичної культури польської громади в Україні на сучасному етапі. Окрему увагу приділено ролі національної політики Української держави в процесі політичної суб'єктивації польської національної меншини.

VAT is an indirect tax paid by the subscriber in accordance with the purchase - the sales net. In the European Union the VAT system is strictly regulated, because this tax has a significant influence over the development of the EU's single market and production by ensuring adequate competitiveness. The main document regulating the sale of production, including agricultural and food products, the VAT regime across the EU is 2006, dated 28 November the European Council Directive 2006/112/EB on the common value added tax system. This Directive regulates practically all aspects of the application of VAT. In addition to this threshold, there are still some of the European Council and European Commission directives on the specific application of VAT to the hearings. Lithuania VAT introduced in 1994, at 1 day, entry into force of the Republic of Lithuania Law on value added tax Nr. I - 3455 which operated until 2002 30 June. Since 2002, entered into force on 1 July the new version of the VAT Act. Latest version of the Law 2008 of December 18 and 23 days of the year 2009, June 26 at substantially changed the standard VAT rate and abolished the former VAT exemptions.EU single market, with free movement of goods, the flat agricultural commodity prices, the growing influence of neighbouring countries have a comparative advantage. Realizable at the same price, indirectly, the Polish producers processors a competitive advantage on reduced VAT rates as compared to Lithuania the producers, processors. In addition, the zloty exchange rate fall in a competitive advantage over Lithuanian food products has increased (example: the price 100Lt/kg, Lithuanian producer - processor, realized the product remains 69Lt/kg, while Poland - 100Lt/kg, it is more 45proc). The 5 or 9 per cent rate of VAT is practically the price difference becomes a zloty exchange rate fluctuation. Value added tax increase had a negative impact on Lithuanian and vegetable sector. Trading company, with its significant market power, the VAT increase on to the shoulders ...

Nowadays, the following issues are debated: WHEN, HOW and AT WHICH EXCHANGE RATE should Poland exchange the zloty for the Euro. This thesis contributes to the discussion by focusing on the impact of the exchange rate policy on the structural transformation of the economy. The first chapter summarises how the theory of the choice of an exchange rate system evolved. The second chapter explains Poland's exchange rate policy. In chapter three we then consider the structural transformation of the Polish economy, which leads us to the following question: "can the exchange rate policy enhance the growth of the modern sector?" In order to answer it, we have to find out first of all whether the exchange rate policy has any influence on the real economy, in the short or in the medium run. In the fourth chapter, we will then establish the nominal rigidities of prices and salaries in the Polish economy. The modelling of the Polish economy is discussed in chapter five. The economy suffers two chocks that are typical for transition and economic integration: lower employment in the post-socialist sector and higher progress in the traditional sector. These chocks do not advantage the advanced sector as compared to the traditional sector. As a next step, we find out if the exchange rate can change the situation. We analyse a depreciation of the exchange rate and a decrease of the risk premium, which represents the deepening of the financial market after joining the Euro zone. Since the modern sector is more capital-intensive, it benefits most from a lower risk premium. As a conclusion, the country should adopt the Euro. ; L'euro ou non pas l'euro. Là est la question. Ou plutôt toute une série des questions : QUAND, COMMENT et A QUELLE PARITE. Ce sont les issues principales pour la politique du change actuelle de la Pologne. Ils ont été longuement débattues dans la littérature. Cette thèse participe à la discussion en attirant l'attention sur l'influence des décisions dans le domaine du change sur la transformation structurelle ...

Nowadays, the following issues are debated: WHEN, HOW and AT WHICH EXCHANGE RATE should Poland exchange the zloty for the Euro. This thesis contributes to the discussion by focusing on the impact of the exchange rate policy on the structural transformation of the economy. The first chapter summarises how the theory of the choice of an exchange rate system evolved. The second chapter explains Poland's exchange rate policy. In chapter three we then consider the structural transformation of the Polish economy, which leads us to the following question: "can the exchange rate policy enhance the growth of the modern sector?" In order to answer it, we have to find out first of all whether the exchange rate policy has any influence on the real economy, in the short or in the medium run. In the fourth chapter, we will then establish the nominal rigidities of prices and salaries in the Polish economy. The modelling of the Polish economy is discussed in chapter five. The economy suffers two chocks that are typical for transition and economic integration: lower employment in the post-socialist sector and higher progress in the traditional sector. These chocks do not advantage the advanced sector as compared to the traditional sector. As a next step, we find out if the exchange rate can change the situation. We analyse a depreciation of the exchange rate and a decrease of the risk premium, which represents the deepening of the financial market after joining the Euro zone. Since the modern sector is more capital-intensive, it benefits most from a lower risk premium. As a conclusion, the country should adopt the Euro. ; L'euro ou non pas l'euro. Là est la question. Ou plutôt toute une série des questions : QUAND, COMMENT et A QUELLE PARITE. Ce sont les issues principales pour la politique du change actuelle de la Pologne. Ils ont été longuement débattues dans la littérature. Cette thèse participe à la discussion en attirant l'attention sur l'influence des décisions dans le domaine du change sur la transformation structurelle de l'économie. Le premier chapitre présente l'évolution de la théorie du choix du régime de change à partir des années cinquante. La recherche montre qu'il n'existe pas une solution universelle pour tous les pays. Mieux encore, pour le pays donné le choix du régime ne se fait pas une fois pour toutes, mais peut subir une évolution. Le chapitre deux se concentre alors sur le cas spécifique de la Pologne pendant les années quatre-vingt-dix. Il présente de quelle manière les autorités monétaires polonaises ont fait évoluer le système du change du zloty dans les conditions de la transition et de l'intégration économique européenne. Il se penche aussi sur les défis devant la politique monétaire polonaise au début de troisième millénaire. Dans le chapitre trois nous passons au sujet de notre intérêt principal étant donné l'objectif de cette thèse, à savoir la transformation structurelle de l'économie polonaise à partir du début de la transition en 1990 jusqu'à 2003 inclus – jusqu'à l'intégration à l'Union Européenne. A la fin du chapitre, nous posons la questions suivante : «est–ce que la politique du change peut soutenir l'expansion du secteur moderne ? ». Avant de répondre à cette question il nous est d'abord nécessaire de vérifier si la politique du change a quelconque influence sur le coté réel de l'économie à court et à moyen terme. Dans le chapitre quatre, nous partons alors à la recherche des rigidités nominales des prix et des salaires dans l'économie polonaise. La recherche se fait à l'aide de la courbe de Philipps – traditionnelle et Néo-keynésienne. La modélisation de l'économie polonaise fait le sujet du chapitre cinq. Nous laissons l'économie subir deux chocs caractéristiques pour le procès de la transition et de l'intégration économiques : une baisse de l'emploi dans le secteur post-socialiste et une hausse du progrès dans le secteur traditionnel. Nous trouvons qu'aucun des chocs n'avantage le secteur avancé par rapport au secteur traditionnel. Ensuite, nous cherchons si le change peut changer la donne. Dans ce but, nous analysons une dépréciation du change et une baisse de la prime de risque symbolisant l'approfondissement du marché financier suite à l'adhésion à la zone euro. Puisque le secteur moderne est le plus intensif en capital c'est lui qui profite le plus de la baisse de la prime du risque. Nous concluons alors qu'afin de développer le secteur moderne, d'absorber la main-d'oeuvre libérée du secteur postsocialiste et d'augmenter le bien-être du pays, la Pologne devrait viser l'approfondissement du marché financier et profiter de la suppression de la prime de risque. Le pays devrait donc adopter l'euro.

Abstract
Loans with variable interest rates indexed to foreign currencies carry a double risk for borrowers: a rise of interest rates and an adverse development in the exchange rate. While they therefore could have been forbidden for consumer credit, they are allowed both at EU and (most) national levels. Consumer credit arrangements indexed to foreign currencies that were legal in principle have raised enormous problems when they occurred in large numbers in Eastern and Central European countries and reference was not directly written into the terms (like in Romania), but could change with additional discretionary decisions (such as in Poland and Croatia). While Croatia has introduced special legislation to cure the overall problem, Polish cases are potentially not only causing a systemic risk for the2 whole banking system, but abundantly are the subject of CJEU case law. This triggers the core interest in contract law, namely an unheard-of relevance in EU law of general and more specific questions of the law of restitution – on the basis of unjust enrichment and/or of damages. This article presents the following five main theses. Firstly, while the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) contains too vague a scheme of remedies/sanctions for detailed answers, the overarching benchmark is clear, namely a fair balance of interests and the meeting of justified expectations, which the parties, especially on the consumer side, could have had at the moment when the loan was issued. Secondly, general (EU) principles of unjust enrichment, as well as of damages, are recognised by the CJEU in EU law. They order the restitution of what was gained above the status quo ante, but could not have been acquired on markets even by informed and proper contracting at that time and/or the restitution of losses incurred as compared to the status quo ante. Thirdly, Articles 23 and 24 of the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) constitute a suitable model around which a set of claims in unjust enrichment can be shaped and can be applied also to old cases. Fourthly, any windfall profit of borrowers (gain beyond what could have been achieved at the moment of formation of the contract) has to be avoided in the name of fairness and justified expectations – which are recognised in CJEU case law as the two main benchmarks of the regime of sanctions of the UCTD. Finally, a fair restitution regime is reached if the borrower, who had not been properly informed (with the nullified clause), can now make an informed choice between the different offers that were offered on markets when the loan was issued. Thus, he/she could now opt for a loan in either the national currency plus applicable interbank interest rate (in the Polish case Zloty tied to WIBOR) or their foreign currency counterparts (i.e. a loan in CHF tied to LIBOR). Expropriation (of banks) of the loan capital, as well as the possibility to use that capital to generate interest have to be avoided, for penalisation is neither an aim of European contract law nor of the UCTD.

1) The negotiated terms of Poland's accession to the EU oblige us to accede to the EMU too. However, they do not predetermine the date of our EMU entry. In this paper, four most probable, in the author' opinion, scenarios of our accession to the EMU were presented. Scenario A assumes accession at the earliest possible date, i.e. in 2009-2010. Scenario B1 anticipates a somewhat later EMU membership, i.e. in 2012-2014 because of the inability to fulfil the Maastricht criteria before the end of the current decade. Under scenario B2, like under scenario B1, a more remote accession is assumed, this time however as a result of a deliberate decision of the Polish authorities on postponement of our EMU membership. Finally, scenario C defers our EMU accession into a not precisely defined future in consideration of a permanent inability of the Polish economy to meet the nominal convergence criteria. 2) The main objective of this paper was the attempt at identifying the impact of the above different EMU convergence scenarios on the long-term pace of economic growth in Poland. The main conclusions were formulated basing on two fundamental propositions. The first proposition says that the EMU membership will be advantageous to the long-term economic growth in Poland. Sharpening of the competition resulting from further intensification of the trade and capital flows will create conditions favourable to innovativeness and entrepreneurship. At the same time, the access to the resources of productive factors, especially to capital, will improve. However, the scale of advantages to be achieved and the probability of avoiding serious threats associated with the EMU membership will depend in the first place on the degree of real convergence of the Polish economy with the euro-zone, as well as on the direction of the future evolution of the whole EMU. With a favourable course of events, these long-term advantages to the economic growth can be in the order of 0.5 percentage points a year. The second proposition says that the period preceding the EMU entry (pre-accession period) will generate conditions not very advantageous to the economic growth. Along with the growth-oriented stimuli resulting from the improving economic climate and growing foreign capital inflow, there will also be some marked depressive effects. The latter will stem from the relatively restrictive fiscal and monetary policy imposed by the need of meeting the Maastricht criteria, as well as from the real (and, intermittently, also nominal) appreciation of the zloty. It is to be stressed that both the above propositions were formulated mainly basing on theoretical considerations, since the available empirical material remains very meagre and not always congruent with the Polish economic situation. 3) Our analysis has led to the conclusion that positively best conditions of the economic growth are assured by scenarios A and B2, with a slight preference for the former. However, implementation of these scenarios requires great resoluteness in carrying out the "second wave" of structural reforms as well as discipline in the macroeconomic policy (this, in particular, regards scenario A). In Poland's present political and social situation, this will undoubtedly be difficult. Therefore, unfortunately, it is the B1 scenario that is to be recognized as the most probable from among the scenarios under review, and even scenario C, being a scenario of economic disaster, can not be excluded. 4) On the assumption, however, of a favourable course of events, choice will remain between the scenarios A and B2: to accede to the EMU at the earliest possible date, or deliberately defer the accession by a few years. One of crucial decisions in this respect will have to be made already in 2.5-3.5 years, namely at the time when decision will be necessary whether to enter (or not) the ERM-2. Till that time, the optimum strategy should consist in positively declaring the intention of the possibly earliest EMU entry (and, above all, acting in accordance with such declarations), but without committing oneself by naming any firm dates. Whereas final decisions on the accession to the ERM-2, and later to the EMU, should be made in taking into consideration in the first line the following factors: * the already attained progress not only in the nominal but also in the real convergence, as well assessment of further progress in this respect; * assessment of the utility of maintaining the autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy; * evolution of the EMU itself; * strategy adopted by the remaining new EU members with respect to the question of their EMU accession.