Suchergebnisse

Immigrants can increase international trade by shifting preferences towards the goods of their country of origin and by reducing bilateral transaction costs. Using geographical variation across U.S. states for the period 2008 to 2013, I estimate the respective causal impact of immigrants on U.S. exports and imports. I address endogeneity and reverse causality by exploiting the exogenous allocation of political refugees within the U.S. refugee resettlement program that prevents immigrants from choosing the destination location. I find that a 10 percent increase in recent immigrants to a U.S. state raises imports from those immigrants' country of origin by 1.2 percent and exports by 0.8 percent.

In this article we investigate hospitality towards political refugees who were offered prolonged shelter in private homes in the Netherlands during the early 1990s. We assume that the social relationship developing between host and guest in this case will not remain a relationship between
complete strangers, nor will it be based on the intimacy that often characterizes a relationship with friends or family. How does the relationship between host and guest take shape in such a dynamic? We develop a theoretical model based on some basic dimensions of hospitality. Our empirical
analysis shows that the encounter between host and guest-as-stranger is manifested in four different ways: (1) hospitality as a means to control danger represented by the stranger; (2) hospitality as a selective phenomenon, in which those closer in emotional and social distance are preferred
over those farther away in that respect; (3) hospitality as being regulated by the principle of reciprocity; and (4) hospitality as potentially endangered by issues of power and dependency.

"Under the auspices of the President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees." ; Mode of access: Internet.

In the fall of 1949, after the end of the Greek Civil War, the bulk of the defeated Greek Communist (KKE) fighters were covertly transported from Albania to Soviet Uzbekistan. This article addresses the covert relocation project, organized by the Soviet Communist Party, and the social engineering program intended to create a prototype Greek People's Democracy in Tashkent. Drawing on Soviet and Greek Communist Party records, the article raises three major issues: first, the contingencies of postwar transition in the Balkans and the precarious status of the Albanian regime; second, the international Communist response to the military defeat of the KKE in 1949 and the competing visions of the Greek, Soviet, and Albanian parties regarding the future of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG); third, the intentions of the KKE to establish military bases in Albania and the party's ensuing effort to transform the agrarian fighters of the DAG into revolutionary cadres for a future victorious repatriation in Greece. Drawing these elements together, the article elucidates the relocation operation of 1949, positions the Greek political refugee experience within the postwar 'battle of refugees,' and challenges the widespread historiographical assumption that the KKE immediately abandoned the prospect of a renewed armed confrontation. Adapted from the source document.

In the fall of 1949, after the end of the Greek Civil War, the bulk of the defeated Greek Communist (KKE) fighters were covertly transported from Albania to Soviet Uzbekistan. This article addresses the covert relocation project, organized by the Soviet Communist Party, and the social engineering program intended to create a prototype Greek People's Democracy in Tashkent. Drawing on Soviet and Greek Communist Party records, the article raises three major issues: first, the contingencies of postwar transition in the Balkans and the precarious status of the Albanian regime; second, the international Communist response to the military defeat of the KKE in 1949 and the competing visions of the Greek, Soviet, and Albanian parties regarding the future of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG); third, the intentions of the KKE to establish military bases in Albania and the party's ensuing effort to transform the agrarian fighters of the DAG into revolutionary cadres for a future victorious repatriation in Greece. Drawing these elements together, the article elucidates the relocation operation of 1949, positions the Greek political refugee experience within the postwar "battle of refugees," and challenges the widespread historiographical assumption that the KKE immediately abandoned the prospect of a renewed armed confrontation.