Suchergebnisse

As diplomatic initiatives have thus far failed to achieve the objective of a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Demo­cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and given that a military solution is generally considered to be unfeasible, sanctions have become the central instrument of the international community in dealing with the threat from North Korea. While inherently linked to and built upon the respective resolutions of the UN Security Council, the EU's sanctions regime against North Korea succeeds the former in terms of quantity and quality, constituting the most comprehensive sanctions regime of the EU currently in operation. Since its inception in 2006, the EU's sanctions regime against the DPRK developed in several episodes, which are built upon different logics and objectives: coercion, constraining, signaling. The political explanation for the EU's decision to adopt autonomous sanc­tions results from a set of interrelated factors, most notably the general sup­port for sanctions as an adequate tool for EU member states to use against North Korea, the influence of powerful member states, namely Germany, France, and (before Brexit) the UK, pushing for the imposition of autonomous EU measures, the lack of diplomatic engagement and eco­nomic interest, as well as third party pressure. While sanctions will remain an important aspect of the EU's North Korea strategy in the foreseeable future, it is in Brussels' interest to supplement its sanctions-based strategy with more proactive initiatives vis-à-vis North Korea, as the current approach has distinct negative strategic implications for the EU. (author's abstract)

AbstractThis paper offers a brief overview of the potential interplay of United Nations (UN) sanctions regimes applied in contexts of armed conflict and humanitarian action. It traces how this issue has emerged within the counterterrorism (CT) sphere, before examining the possibilities of compatibility and risks for humanitarian action in conflict-related sanctions regimes. The paper lays out research gaps and outlines a new path for policy research focused on UN sanctions regimes imposed in the context of armed conflicts ("conflict-related") yet falling outside the pure CT space. The paper concludes by illuminating why establishing further evidence on this issue is critical to both the legitimacy and the effective use of UN sanctions.

On 7 December 2020, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted an 'EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime' (EU HRSR). The objective of the EU HRSR is to give the EU to a flexible tool to address serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide. This article starts from the position that setting up an EU HRSR serves a noble objective. The EU HRSR could be desirable tool to flexibly confront those with consequences that commit serious human rights violations. Yet, it would crucially need to comply with human rights itself. This is not a small feat to accomplish. Much hinges on the listing and delisting criteria, the required evidentiary standard, and the information on which the listing decisions are based. Based on a detailed analysis of the Court of Justice's sanctions case law, the article sets out the requirements with which the EU HRSR would have to comply. Finally, the horizontal EU HRSR is an attempt to decouple the protection of human rights from specific (political) conflicts. This decoupling directly charges the protection of human rights, which is traditionally portrayed as 'neutral', with sovereign politics.
Human rights, sanctions, restrictive measures, listing criteria, evidentiary standard, delisting

The European Union's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR), adopted in December 2020, is expected to augment the Union's role in global normative diplomacy. Although the Council has a long history of responding to human rights violations through geographic sanctions regimes, the EUGHRSR is the first thematic sanctions regime on the topic with a general scope of applicability. This article investigates what distinctive added value the thematic design of the EUGHRSR brings compared to the longstanding geographic approach. The EUGHRSR is envisaged as a more legalized accountability mechanism and its added value is presumed to lie in helping depoliticize sanctions by shifting the target focus away from states. The article shows that this presumption can be unattainable or undesirable as the successful implementation of the EUGHRSR necessitates bringing the state into the centre of analysis. The article in particular shows that in order to successfully deploy the EUGHRSR as an integral part of the EU common foreign and security policy, the Council has to (i) align the designation of targets with the EU's foreign policy strategies, and (ii) take pro-human rights reforms in third countries as a ground for de-listing, even in the absence of individual accountability. Taking these positions, however, blurs the line between the EUGHRSR and geographic sanctions, therefore requires careful coordination and trade-off.
damages, non-contractual liability, CFSP acts, normalization, CSDP missions and operations, restrictive measures, jurisdiction, CJEU, sanctions.