Suchergebnisse

Die Satzung des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken sieht eine Umverteilung von Geldschöpfungsgewinnen (Seigniorage) zwischen den Notenbanken des Eurosystems vor. Die Diskussion um die "Gewinner" und "Verlierer" aus dieser Regelung wird sehr kontrovers geführt. Die Arbeit versucht, diese Umverteilungsproblematik systematisch zu analysieren. Insbesondere die theoretischen Grundlagen des Seigniorage, die mannigfaltigen Tätigkeiten der EWU-Zentralbanken und deren Auswirkungen auf die Entstehung der Notenbankgewinne sowie die Verwendung der Geldschöpfungsgewinne werden detailliert untersucht.

"Historically, countries have relied on seigniorage. In this paper, we explore a set of features in which a benevolent government will rely on seigniorage. We use a simple overlapping generations model with return-dominated money. Money is valued because of a reserve requirement. The government has to raise a fixed amount of revenue solely for the purposes of making transfers to the old. It has two revenue-generating options: lump-sum taxes (money creation) under the control of the treasury (central bank). We restrict the amount of seigniorage collected to be nonnegative and require that the government's budget constraint be satisfied on a per-period basis. Our question is, Can we find stationary monetary competitive equilibria that are welfare maxima, given that the money stock cannot contract? Computational experiments reveal, somewhat surprisingly, that the answer is yes. Indeed, in our setup, benevolent governments may require that at least part, if not all, of the revenue be raised via money creation"--Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas web site

This paper tests the extended tax‐smoothing model for a sample of 32 developing countries. Importantly, the testable implications employed relax the assumption of constant money velocity. Although seigniorage is an important source of revenue in developing countries, all the evidence indicates that the principles of optimal taxation have not been used when developing countries raise revenue from inflation.

This paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth through a public finance transmission channel. At the theoretical level, we develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries make portfolio decisions on behalf of agents, and bureaucrats collect tax revenues on behalf of the government. Corruption takes the form of the embezzlement of public funds, the effect of which is to increase the government's reliance on seigniorage finance. This leads to an increase in inflation which, in turn, reduces capital accumulation and growth. At the empirical level, we use data on 82 countries over a 20-year period to test the predictions of our model. Taking proper account of the government's budget constraint, we find strong evidence to support these predictions under different estimation strategies. Our results are robust to a wide range of sensitivity tests.

This paper describes the institutional features of China's hybrid economy that have allowed the government to earn high levels of seigniorage. It quantifies both the financial benefits and implicit costs to the government of extracting seigniorage from the economy. The analysis, which is based on the inside/outside money model of Gurley and Shaw (1960), indicates that seigniorage earnings in the period 1987—1994 were large, but were earned at the cost of a rising implicit government debt and potential future inflation. The paper also outlines how the Chinese government's ability to earn seigniorage in the future may decline as the economy becomes fully monetized and as reform alters the economy's unique institutional structure.

Etudes & documents ; Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.

Etudes & documents ; Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.

Etudes & documents ; Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.

Etudes & documents ; Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements.