Suchergebnisse

In what way does corporatist representation change the behaviour of participating organizations? The classical question is whether the interest organizations' representatives are captured or not. Sweden is one of the countries in which the class‐based interest organizations are heavily represented in the central public administration. The importance of corporatist arrangement in this area in Sweden is due to the fact that the task of implementing government policy is largely given to semi‐independent directorates. Since the early 1970s, the major business organization in Sweden has been strongly demanding cuts in public spending. As it is represented in some of the most important, and expanding, public agencies of the Swedish welfare state, it could be expected that their representatives would demand a decrease in the agencies' yearly budget proposals. During a ten‐year period (1974–1983), there is no sign of such behaviour of the business organization's representatives in these corporatist institutions. On the contrary, business in Sweden can be said to have been more generous with the taxpayers' money than both Social Democratic and bourgeois governments have found possible. Assuming that both its general demand for cuts in public spending and its specific action in the corporatist institutions are rational, it is discussed how this seemingly contradictory behaviour of Swedish business can be explained.The starting point for the debate about corporatism is the organizations' increasing influence on the state. The Confederation's standpoint is that this influence has now reached such a level that there is need for a change On various occasions. representatives of other interest organizations have also emphasized the importance of keeping a clear‐cut distinction between the area of political responsibility and the area of the organizations' responsibility. In political issues it is the politicians' duty to weigh up the different judgments and standpoints and to come to a common public interest. The interest organizations' task is to pursue their special interests. These interest organizations should not take part in decisions in the political sector. I f this were to happen the special interests would have too much influence on the political decisions.

The simultaneous economic & political liberalization experienced by many Middle Eastern countries over the past two decades is traced through the forward & reverse formation of the corporatist state. Recently, many Middle Eastern states have curtailed or even reversed political reform to maintain an established political base, resulting in the breakdown of the corporatist structures that have provided political stability. Implementation of import-substitution industrialism followed by governmental dismantling illustrates this reversal tendency. It is argued that political challenges to the regimes, most evident in Islamic political movements, cannot be contained without resorting to authoritarian practices by the state. D. Bajo

Reviews two official reports disclosing the extent and form of immiseration experienced by two groups of marginal people in the corporatist Australian welfare state: homeless children and Aboriginal peoples. (PAS)

Éric JENNINGS Discours corporatiste, propagande nataliste et contrôle social Le sursaut démographique prôné par le régime de Vichy s'inscrit dans la logique d'une Révolution nationale qui devait transformer la France de fond en comble. Mais à ce jour, on s'est peu intéressé aux vecteurs de dissémination de la propagande nataliste pétainiste. Cet article met en relief la dimension corporatiste du message nataliste propagé par le Secrétariat d'État à la Famille et à la Santé de l'État français. En identifiant dans un premier temps une série de corporations capables d'inciter les Français à procréer, et en privilégiant, dans un deuxième temps, le rôle de certaines professions,occupations,ou corps d'état dans le cheminement de cette croisade, Vichy entendait résoudre une crise à la fois démographique et sociale en ayant recours à un schéma corporatiste. Il en résulta une série de tracts et de brochures, manichéennes, réductrices, et didactiques à souhait,qui visèrent explicitement les pharmaciens, les maires, les enseignants, les étudiants, les prisonniers de guerre, et bien entendu les femmes, comme autant d'unités d'élite dans un combat pour la survie de la «race française». Sont ici interrogées l'efficacité de ce véritable embrigadement corporativonataliste, et sa place dans une bien plus longue tradition nataliste en France.

IN WHAT WAY DOES CORPORATIST REPRESENTATION CHANGE THE BEHAVIOUR OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS? THE CLASSICAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES ARE CAPTURED OR NOT. SWEDEN IS ONE OF THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE CLASS-BASED INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS ARE HEAVILY REPRESENTED IN THE CENTRAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATIST ARRANGEMENT IN THIS AREA IN SWEDEN IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING GOVERNMENT POLICY IS LARGELY GIVEN TO SEMI-INDEPENDENT DIRECTORATES. SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, THE MAJOR BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN SWEDEN HAS BEEN STRONGLY DEMANDING CUTS IN PUBLIC SPENDING. AS IT IS REPRESENTED IN SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND EXPANDING, PUBLIC AGENCIES OF THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE, IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WOULD DEMAND A DECREASE IN THE AGENCIES' YEARLY BUDGET PROPOSALS. DURING A TEN-YEAR PERIOD (1974-1983), THERE IS NO SIGN OF SUCH BEHAVIOUR OF THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION'S REPRESENTATIVES IN THESE CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, BUSINESS IN SWEDEN CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MORE GENEROUS WITH THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY THAN BOTH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS HAVE FOUND POSSIBLE. ASSUMING THAT BOTH ITS GENERAL DEMAND FOR CUTS IN PUBLIC SPENDING AND ITS SPECIFIC ACTION IN THE CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS ARE RATIONAL, IT IS DISCUSSED HOW THIS SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY BEHAVIOUR OF SWEDISH BUSINESS CAN BE EXPLAINED.