Suchergebnisse

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental for a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.

This paper focuses on the public resort to tax evasion in LDCs as an adjustment tactic during economic downturn. It shows, using a theoretical model of intertemporal consumption, that tax compliance declines, when current income declines, expectations about future income improve, or inflation rises. It then applies the model empirically to the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, countries which have long experience with tax evasion and inflation over the last 40 years. (DSE)

In this paper we present a partial equilibrium model of tax evasion. Several equilibrium concepts are used to analyze the game of the Government against a single taxpayer.

This paper studies whether the Ricardian equivalence holds in a context with tax evasion. In such a context, the degree of uncertainty becomes endogenous since agents control the distribution of their future income through their income report. We find that Ricardian equivalence holds when proportional fines are imposed on evaded taxes, but does not hold when the fines are on the amount of unreported income. We also show that it is possible to explain the empirical negative relation between tax rates & declared income when the path of government spending remains unchanged. 1 Table, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

The problem of tax evasion is becoming more and more prominent, and it is causing large losses in individual state budgets. However, European policies have taken significant steps to eliminate them over the last two decades. National policies also contribute to reducing the estimated extent of tax evasion, as measured by Schneider's MIMIC model. However, these tendencies are not the same in individual countries. Therefore, in our paper, we try to find pattern in tax evasion time trajectories of European Union countries and thus to create homogenous clusters that include countries with similar tax evasion situation. To meet our goal, we use panel data clustering method on our data with information about tax evasion of EU countries from 2000 to 2019. As a next step, we compare created cluster from the perspective of quality indicators of public institutions.