Suchergebnisse

This report discusses several temporary provisions affecting the taxation of capital income that were adopted in the 2001-2003 period. These provisions include lower individual tax rates, bonus depreciation, and lower individual income tax rates on dividends and capital gains.

Heterogeneity is an important determinant of the shape of optimal tax schemes. This is shown here in a model à la Mirrlees. The agents differ in their productivities and opportunity costs of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a given unidimensional combination of these two characteristics. Conditions are provided under which marginal tax rates are everywhere nonnegative. This is the case when work opportunity costs are distributed independently of income. But one can also get negative marginal tax rates, in particular at the bottom of the income distribution. A numerical illustration is given, based on UK data. (JEL H21, H24, H31, J22)

The story of Jeff Bezos' founding of Amazon points to the importance of rewarding those who take risks and make career choices in hopes of striking it rich. Would-be entrepreneurs' choices might be different if additional income were taxed at, say, 90 percent versus 40 percent.
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The aim of this study is to show the tax rate of management control of the legislation according to the tax residence of the people who obtain income from wages. The questions considered here are: Is the income tax rate applied to national resident workers and to residents abroad proportionally? Under the same circumstances, in both cases do they pay similar amounts? The empirical analysis was based on the evaluation of the income tax and tax rate of management control in Mexico based on the Suits progressivity index. It was found that, under similar conditions, the amount of the tax to be paid by a resident abroad is less than that paid by a national resident.

Essential Tables -- Key Tax Dates -- Personal Taxation -- Expenses and Benefits -- Payroll matters -- Shares and share options -- Pensions and investments -- Business profits -- Taxation of companies -- Capital Gains Tax -- Inheritance Tax, gifts and deceased estates -- Capital Allowances -- Stamp Taxes -- VAT -- Other taxes and duties -- National Insurance Contributions (NIC) -- Tax credits and state benefits -- Statutory payments -- HMRC penalties, interest and powers -- Scottish and Welsh Taxes -- International issues -- Index

The main challenge faced Palestinian Public Budget is the weaknesses of tax revenues in meeting the accelerating of public expenditures. One of the main reasons of this weakness is the incompliance of taxpayers from their duties toward their national government. Palestinian legislators tried to develop a new income tax system during last 7 years to increase the income tax revenues. Unfortunately, the public budget still suffering from high deficit, this case could be interpreted because of increasing the tax evasion- side effect of increasing tax rates-. This paper is designed to explore whether the change in tax rates has raised the tax evasion or not. Therefore, this paper used an indirect method to test the change in the percentage of tax evasion among last 5 years (the same periods of issuing new income tax system). Our findings show that there is a positive relationship between changing income tax rates and increasing the percentage of tax evasion in the last 5 years. The estimated tax evasion has been increased by 22% from 2007 to 2015.

In a model of a representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of tax design the constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In this paper, we present a theory of tax substitution as the rationale for a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. In our model the tax system at the status quo is determined by the electoral competition between parties. This political institution aggregates the voters' preferences for tax policy according to the voters' marginal proportion of the expected vote that different coalition of voters can deliver in the election. The approval of a TRL, however, depends on the majority rule, and it aggregates the preferences of the median voter of tax initiatives. Thus, a TRL is the result of two political institutions with different mechanisms to aggregate the preferences of voters. Moreover, our paper distinguishes the role of perfect and imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax systems in approving a tax initiative. In this paper we identify conditions on the distribution of preferences and income of the electorate and the median voter that guarantee the approval (rejection) of tax initiatives. Clasificación JEL: H2; H23; H1