Suchergebnisse

Much of the alliance literature has focused on the collective defence benefits and burden-sharing. This article considers the potential for developing a defence industrial policy in a military alliance. Previous proposals from the literature are reviewed, especially proposals for economic specialization based on comparative advantage applied to both armed forces and defence industries in a military alliance. European Union (EU) defence policy is outlined, including its armaments agencies (OCCAR and the European Defence Agency), and inefficiencies in EU defence markets are identified. Economic theory offers some policy guidelines for an efficient defence industrial policy in a military alliance, including gains from trade and competition, from learning and scale economies, and from reducing the duplication of costly R&D. These economic principles are applied to the EU and are also applicable to NATO. Evidence of efficiency gains from trade and from economies of scale and learning is reviewed and applied to various scenarios for the creation of a Single European Market for defence equipment. The scenarios include a liberalized competitive market, a centralized EU procurement agency and a 'twin-track' model. Estimates are presented of the cost savings from these scenarios. However, proposals for an efficient defence industrial policy will be opposed by the potential losers who will prefer alternative industrial policies involving international collaboration and offsets. Among these alternatives, collaboration is assessed as a distinctive European policy. The inefficiencies of collaboration are reviewed, including its impact on development and production costs and on delays in delivery. Consideration is given to the research issues to be addressed by an economic evaluation of European collaborative projects. The article concludes by stressing the inefficiencies of current procurement policies in the EU and NATO and the potential cost savings from the adoption of a more efficient defence industrial policy within an alliance.

NATO has promised to address China as "an alliance" but struggles to define underpinning principles. This article explores NATO's policy options and prospects. It traces the evolution of NATO China policy from 2017 on; assesses NATO's ability to pull China under its resiliency policy regime; and evaluates NATO's capacity to address wider issues of global order. The article concludes that NATO is not able to develop a politico-military strategy in line with classical alliance policy. Instead, NATO has pursued an incremental alignment policy to nourish its internal consensus and stave off the dire prospect of leadership abdication. Pushed by China's implicit support for the war in Ukraine, NATO must now become more politically explicit about China, global order, and NATO's approach to it. (Asian Aff/GIGA)

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation "beyond peacetime" to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their "war plans" – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states.

Existing work cannot explain why countries form alliances when direct security threats are not a key political issue, though we know countries routinely do engage in that behavior. Countries form alliances to manage the essential problem that they must use finite budget resources to provide social policy and national security; the 'guns versus butter' dilemma. States ally to 'contract out' national security via the formation of alliance contracts so they can allocate more resources to domestic concerns. Alliances increase the efficiency of security policy by providing the same level of security with fewer resources, thus freeing those resources for use in other domains. Not only should alliances form when security threats do not dominate the political agenda, but also domestic political and economic demands will influence alliance decisions. In positing a domestic politics-based explanation for alliance formation, this article argues that increased demands for social policy goods increase the chances of alliance formation as leaders seek greater policy allocation efficiency. The use of a production possibilities frontier illustrates the central argument. Those claims are examined on a sample of all country-years from 1816—2000 using a probit model. Empirical results suggest changes in the demand for social policy goods, operationalized as changes in the infant mortality rate, are an important cause of alliance behavior.

How effective is the Indian polity in making laws and policies to address changing ground realities? How do its gears work? Which stakeholder groups are more successful in bringing about policy change, through what methods, and in what contexts? Seeking to answer these questions, Shaping Policy in India takes a close look at nine landmark Indian laws and legislative attempts to reveal the socio-political process of policy formulation in the world's largest democracy. Offering in-depth accounts of the evolution of these nine major legislations, this text interrogates the suitability of existing political theories to explain the policy development process in an emerging economy like India.

How effective is the Indian polity in making laws and policies to address changing ground realities? How do its gears work? Which stakeholder groups are more successful in bringing about policy change, through what methods, and in what contexts? Seeking to answer these questions, Shaping Policy in India takes a close look at nine landmark Indian laws and legislative attempts to reveal the socio-political process of policy formulation in the world's largest democracy. Offering in-depth accounts of the evolution of these nine major legislations, this text interrogates the suitability of existing political theories to explain the policy development process in an emerging economy like India.