Bridging the Gaps: An Integrated Approach to Assessing Aid Effectiveness
In: German Development Institute, 12/2020
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In: German Development Institute, 12/2020
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Does aid contribute to development? If so, under what conditions and to what extent? These questions are as old as the field of development policy itself and they have been controversially discussed among researchers and policymakers ever since. Yet, two main trends put questions related to aid effectiveness high on the political agenda again. First, development actors want to understand and improve their contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Second, populist parties on the radical right fundamentally question the relevance of aid and thereby bring development policy to the fore of public debates in donor countries. In response, donors feel more pressure to demonstrate and communicate the success of aid. Since the early 2000s, donors' efforts to meet their commitments under the international aid and development effectiveness agenda have contributed to a plethora of knowledge on what works, what doesn't work, and why. In parallel, academics have contributed new insights through the study of, for instance, macro effects, impact measurements and research on donor organisations. Increasingly, though, the debate on aid effectiveness has become compartmentalised and fragmented. This briefing maps these fragmented discussions and proposes an integrated approach to aid effectiveness in research and policymaking. We argue that only an integrated perspective can match the new demands for why, when and how aid can make a difference. Typically, policymakers and researchers operate in one or more of four (often disconnected) communities, working on: 1) macro effects of aid; 2) global principles for development cooperation; 3) the structure and instruments of organisations; 4) the impact of individual interventions. The first community focuses on research comparing the effects of aid across countries, especially regarding the effect of aid on economic growth or other development indicators. Recently, this analysis has extended to subnational levels and development actors who do not report development finance as per Official Development Assistance (ODA) guidelines, such as China. The second community engages in the promotion of global principles of effectiveness agreed on by "traditional" providers of aid and partner countries. Five principles of aid effectiveness were enshrined in the 2005 Paris Agenda. As a follow-up, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created in 2011.The third community is concerned with managing development organisations. Development organisations have increasingly applied results-based management tools to steering operations, accountability, learning and communicating. The fourth community focuses on development interventions and the effectiveness of specific development projects. There has been a shift towards more rigorous methods for evaluating project impacts and efforts to aggregate evidence through systematic reviews.The key insight from our analysis is that an integrated approach to assessing aid effectiveness across the four communities can help to leverage synergies and avoid unintended consequences. For instance, it can improve coordination within development organisations and foster joint knowledge creation among researchers. Finally, an integrated perspective can help to clarify the contribution made by aid to the SDGs vis-à-vis that of other policy fields, and can assist in better communicating the effects of aid to the public.
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In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 46, S. 45-65
Development assistance has been criticized for a lack of coordination between aid donors. This paper argues that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from closer coordination of aid activities. To test these hypotheses, we perform logit and fractional logit estimations for a large sample of recipient countries and aid activities since the early 1970s. Our empirical results reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination. Tough less conclusive, we also find some evidence that donors' competition over political support prevents them from coordinating aid activities more closely.
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In: Kiel Working Paper No. 1825
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Working paper
Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time.
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We assess whether bilateral and multilateral donors of foreign aid specialized and coordinated their activities with other donors as agreed in the Paris Declaration of 2005. We account for donor heterogeneity, varying aid priorities and recipient characteristics in order to isolate changes in donor behaviour over time. Recent shifts in aid priorities, such as the rising importance of general budget support, have reduced the fragmentation of aid. Nevertheless, our results reveal that aid fragmentation persisted after the Paris Declaration and coordination among donors has even weakened.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3454
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It is widely believed that the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has grossly fallen short of high expectations raised by the Bush administration in 2002. From the perspective of potential recipient countries, the crucial issue is whether the MCC increased the overall pool of aid resources available to them. We argue that this question extends far beyond the distribution of the limited MCC resources. By employing OLS and treatment-effects estimations, we assess how other US aid agencies and non-US donors reacted to MCC decisions. We find that positive signaling effects tend to dominate possible substitution effects not only for overall US aid but also for multilateral donors. Regarding other bilateral donors the evidence is mixed.
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Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time. We conclude that - if designed properly -conditionality can work.
BASE
Performance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time. We conclude that - if designed properly - conditionality can work.
BASE
It is widely believed that the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has grossly fallen short of high expectations raised by the Bush administration in 2002. From the perspective of potential recipient countries, the crucial issue is whether the MCC increased the overall pool of aid resources available to them. We argue that this question extends far beyond the distribution of the limited MCC resources. By employing OLS and treatmenteffects estimations, we assess how other US aid agencies and non-US donors reacted to MCC decisions. We find that positive signaling effects tend to dominate possible substitution effects not only for overall US aid but also for multilateral donors. Regarding other bilateral donors the evidence is mixed.
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In: CEGE Discussion Paper No. 99
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Working paper
In: Review of Development Economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 126-156
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The targeting of foreign aid within recipient countries is largely unexplored territory. We help close this gap in empirical research on aid allocation by employing Poisson estimations on the determinants of the World Bank's choice of project locations at the district level in India. The evidence of needs-based location choices is very weak, even though World Bank activities tend to concentrate in relatively remote districts. Spatial lags prove to be significant and positive pointing to regional clustering. Institutional conditions matter insofar as project locations cluster in districts belonging to states with greater openness to trade. We do not find any evidence that location choices are affected by political patronage at the state or district level. However, the World Bank prefers districts where foreign direct investors may benefit from projects related to infrastructure.
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