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A 2009 G20 official document stated that the era of banking secrecy is over but is it? If banking secrecy is the result of market mechanisms, it suggests that worldwide demand and supply are likely to remain for a long time to come. Since the Global Financial Crisis, many countries have fought to combat banking secrecy, yet it permeates both national and international industries, and global efforts to prevent banking secrecy have been ineffective or at worst counterproductive. In this book, the authors show how the growth of criminal activity has systematically generated a demand for banking secrecy. They explore how national politicians and international banks have been motivated to supply banking secrecy through economic and political incentives, and shed light on the economics and politics of banking secrecy. This book takes a multidisciplinary approach to reveal the variety of behaviours and processes involved in making dirty money appear clean, providing an in-depth study of financial transactions which are characterized by a special purpose: hiding the originally illegal sources. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of economics and finance, and those with an interest in banking secrecy, global finance, international banking, and financial regulation.

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a con

Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi -- The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor -- Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup -- Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini -- Financial supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro -- Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini -- Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Cihak and Richard Podpiera -- Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine Di Noia -- Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriette Prast -- Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini -- Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis

AbstractFinancial crises often seem to be associated with populism, although the populist banking policies introduced to address such crises are far from homogenous. This apparent paradox—a sort of "sight‐unseen consensus"—suggests that specific economic drivers coupled with general psychological components can explain populist consensus. We propose a model of populist consensus, which we term "democratic rioting," in which individuals' decisions to support or resist a specific populist bailout policy after a financial crisis are heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics. Those dynamics, in turn, are driven by general, non‐banking‐related motivations, such as anti‐elite sentiments. In a multiple equilibria setting, the more individuals are unhappy for general economic and/or psychological reasons, the more likely they are to support myopic and redistributive populist banking policies rather than long‐sighted public interventions.