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We present an overview of the field of conflict economics. We begin by explaining important distinctions between standard textbook economics and conflict economics regarding assumptions, subject matter, and interrelations between economics and conflict. We then provide summaries of selected economic theories and empirical evidence that together help reveal important aspects of conflict – and peace – through an economics lens. Among the topics covered in the theoretical and empirical overview are why violence is sometimes chosen over peaceful approaches to address intergroup disputes, why it is "rational" for political leaders to sometimes mass kill civilians (and what can be done to prevent this), how social norms of committing harm against outgroups can propagate (or be stopped), why it can be difficult to develop laws and institutions to promote stable peace, and how third-party efforts to promote peace can sometimes make things worse. Lastly, we provide samples of data resources, working paper archives and journals, and readings consisting of major textbooks, handbooks, and edited books in the field of conflict economics. ; Apresentamos uma visão geral do campo da economia de conflito. Começamos explicando distinções importantes entre a economia padrão de livros didáticos e economia de conflito em relação a suposições, assunto e inter-relações entre economia e conflito. Em seguida, fornecemos resumos de teorias econômicas selecionadas e evidências empíricas que, juntos, ajudam a revelar aspectos importantes do conflito - e da paz - por meio de uma lente econômica. Entre os tópicos abordados na visão teórica e empíricau, por que é "racional" que líderes políticos às vezes matem civis em massa (e o que pode ser feito para evitar isso), como normas sociais de cometer danos contra grupos externos podem se propagar (ou ser interrompido), por que pode ser difícil desenvolver leis e instituições para promover a paz estável e como os esforços de terceiros para promover a paz podem às vezes piorar as coisas. Por último, fornecemos amostras de recursos de dados, arquivos e periódicos de trabalho, e leituras que consistem em grandes livros-texto, manuais e livros editados no campo da economia de conflito.

In this part we wish to present a short, but compact survey of the main strands of thought in the literature on peace economics up to 1992. A more detailed and thorough survey requires a book-length manuscript currently being written.
There are many ways in which this survey can be organized. One way would address first the question of why there is conflict, proceed to the identification of specific economic factors generating or lying behind conflicts, hone into the consequent phenomena of military expenditures and arms races, perhaps then investigate the interplay of economic factors in specific conflicts (including those leading to major unrest, wars, revolutions and terrorism), examine the basis for arms control, and finally at all stages probe into the manifold direct and indirect effects (the impact) of arms escalation, control and disarmament.
To proceed in this way, however, is not very useful. The literature on peace economics is "helter skelter," appearing in diverse journals and books without adhering to any semblance of organization. Hence we choose to present first some general conceptual materials to help identify the myriad of forces and problems that have been encountered. Then we proceed to survey the literature, for the most part on operational models and hypothesis testing, following the four approaches suggested by economic reasoning that Arrow (chapter 2) uses in treating the economic effects of arms reduction. These are: standard resource allocation theory, macroeconomic stability analysis, modern growth theory, and political economy thinking. We find examination of the literature in this manner at least as good if not better than any other that has been proposed. However, we discuss writings on arms race models and arms control which are the outgrowth of the standard resource allocation problem in a separate section. Also since there are extensive writings on sectoral and regional impacts of military expenditures which employ models derived from both standard resource allocation theory and macroeconomic stability analysis, we add a section on these impacts after the discussion of macroeconomic stability analysis. Finally, we end up with a section on conflict management analysis and procedures, a topic of concern to all social sciences and many professions, and one on which economists have made notable contributions.

We present a geometric generalization of the Intriligator-Brito deterrence/attack model that can accomodate a variety of assumptions about the effectiveness of weapons. Our analysis implies that empirical consideration of weapons effectiveness is crucial to strategic application of the model. We also incorporate consequential damage into the model, i.e., destruction that is not relatively immediate, but is realized over long periods of time after war has broken out. We find that consequential damage significantly alters the deterrence/attack interpretations applied to relative and absolute weapons stocks in a nuclear deterrence relationship.

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict and peace in two important ways. First, it applies economic concepts and models to help one understand diverse conflict activities such as war, terrorism, genocide, and peace. Second, it treats coercive appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. In the second edition of their book Principles of Conflict Economics, Anderton and Carter provide comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Along with new scholarship on well-established areas such as war, terrorism and alliances and under-researched areas including genocides, individual and family aspects of war, and conflict prevention, they apply new economic tools to the study of war and peace such as behavioral economics and economics of identity and offer deeper research and policy insights into how to reconstitute societies after large-scale violence.

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two ways: it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives; it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity

AbstractWe present a rational choice model depicting a regime's incentive to allocate resources to fighting rebels and killing civilians when it perceives an internal threat to its political or territorial control. The model guides our empirical inquiry of risk factors for genocide onset. Based on logit methods applied to a pooled sample of 155 countries over the period 1955–2006, we find that key variables highlighted in the theoretical model elevate genocide risk. Specifically, measures of threat, anocratic Polity scores, new state status, and low income significantly increase genocide risk, which we interpret as consistent with weak state perspectives on mass atrocity. Moreover, the threat measures matter even after controlling for internal war and the anocracy result holds even after removing components of the Polity dataset that are "contaminated" with factional violence, including genocide. Extensions of the empirical analysis to a variety of alternative measures, variables, and estimators show the robustness of weak state risk factors for genocide.