Suchergebnisse

Les relations entre la République populaire de Chine et l'Égypte sont passées à la vitesse supérieure depuis le début des années 2010. Construisant sur un socle déjà solide, les présidents Xi et al-Sissi ont scellé fin 2014 un « partenariat stratégique intégral » entre leurs deux pays. Cet article vise à restituer les grandes lignes de cette évolution rapide et met en exergue la multiplicité des domaines dans lesquels elle se matérialise. Il s'intéresse en particulier à la coopération dans les domaines bilatéraux et multilatéraux, notamment dans le cadre de la Belt and road initiative lancée par Xi Jinping et ses multiples dimensions géopolitiques. Il montre comment la Chine et l'Égypte se confortent mutuellement dans leur recherche croisée de marges de manœuvre accrues dans le cadre d'un ordre mondial sinon décentré par rapport à l'Occident, du moins multi-centré.

Les relations entre la République populaire de Chine et l'Égypte sont passées à la vitesse supérieure depuis le début des années 2010. Construisant sur un socle déjà solide, les présidents Xi et al-Sissi ont scellé fin 2014 un « partenariat stratégique intégral » entre leurs deux pays. Cet article vise à restituer les grandes lignes de cette évolution rapide et met en exergue la multiplicité des domaines dans lesquels elle se matérialise. Il s'intéresse en particulier à la coopération dans les domaines bilatéraux et multilatéraux, notamment dans le cadre de la Belt and road initiative lancée par Xi Jinping et ses multiples dimensions géopolitiques. Il montre comment la Chine et l'Égypte se confortent mutuellement dans leur recherche croisée de marges de manœuvre accrues dans le cadre d'un ordre mondial sinon décentré par rapport à l'Occident, du moins multi-centré.Relations between the People's Republic of China and Egypt have significantly developed in the 2010s. Building on an already solid foundation, Presidents Xi and al-Sissi sealed an « integral strategic partnership » between their two countries at the end of 2014. This article aims at providing an overview of this rapid evolution and highlights the multiplicity of areas in which it is taking place. It notably sheds some light on cooperation in bilateral and multilateral fields, particularly in the framework of the Belt and road initiative launched by Xi Jinping and its multiple geopolitical dimensions. The article shows how China and Egypt reinforce each other in their search for greater room for maneuver in a world order they want to be less Western-centered and increasingly multi-centered. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Focusing on the evolution of China's interactions with Egypt and the parties to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, this article aims to understand the contexts that encourage increased synergy between Middle Eastern actors and emerging powers. Based on a wide collection of data and a constructivist approach that negates neither realist nor liberal premises but rather enriches them with the role of ideas and identities, the article posits that the observed developments are constitutive of a reordering of global balances. This reordering is seen as challenging the Western-dominated status quo ante, not through the deconstruction of the international system but rather through a resistance to the Western monopoly over the latter's evolution and over the production and interpretation of norms.

China's multifaceted presence in LAC has initiated important and varied transformations in the entire region and in multiple domains - political, economic, social, environmental, etc. - including in terms of power relationship with the global hegemon, i.e. the United States. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving – in a variety of ways – global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity, time and place. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been selected: Hezbollah that supports the Syrian regime, and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our exploratory fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across the borders. Accordingly, the paper will answer notably questions about how some places have been given special meanings, prompting Lebanese youngsters to fight and die in Syria; how identities have been reframed to mobilize across borders; and beyond, how and why such identity mobilizations have been that successful. Based on more than 35 interviews already conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, our research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization: whereas Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by both geo-strategic calculations and identity politics, the involvement of Sunnis is rather made on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities. While "assabiya" proved to be paramount in the first group, social anomy has been found essential in the second one. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these phenomena that make identity so prone to activation that people opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death, are bred by two key factors: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a meaningful political project for the youth, and the failure of both regional and international actors to sooth rather than instrumentalize differences in the region. Both these failures have led to polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization and hence sustained the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving – in a variety of ways – global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity, time and place. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been selected: Hezbollah that supports the Syrian regime, and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our exploratory fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across the borders. Accordingly, the paper will answer notably questions about how some places have been given special meanings, prompting Lebanese youngsters to fight and die in Syria; how identities have been reframed to mobilize across borders; and beyond, how and why such identity mobilizations have been that successful. Based on more than 35 interviews already conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, our research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization: whereas Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by both geo-strategic calculations and identity politics, the involvement of Sunnis is rather made on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities. While "assabiya" proved to be paramount in the first group, social anomy has been found essential in the second one. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these phenomena that make identity so prone to activation that people opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death, are bred by two key factors: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a meaningful political project for the youth, and the failure of both regional and international actors to sooth rather than instrumentalize differences in the region. Both these failures have led to polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization and hence sustained the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

The events that have swept North Africa and the Middle East since December 2010 have caught the European Union totally off guard and demonstrated the inadequacy of traditional approaches to the region. European reactions have been slow and hesitant, and they have displayed two familiar features: divisions between Member States and bandwagoning with the United States. This stands in stark contrast with the many stakes involved for the EU not only because of geographical proximity, but also because of economic, energetic and political interests. While scholars and practitioners agree that the EU needs to accompany more assertively the processes underway, current reorientations look like shallow attempts to recycle previous policies. This also seems to apply for one of the major regional challenges: the Arab-Israeli conflict which has always weighed on European attempts to engage multilaterally its Mediterranean and Arab neighbours. In spite of its heavy economic and low politics involvement aimed at building a would-be Palestinian state, the EU has failed in recent years to take political steps in order to break the stalemate, irrespective of the evolutions on the ground that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution the EU theoretically advocates. In light of current regional developments and impending events (notably the possible declaration of a Palestinian state), this paper will assess whether the EU is in the process of reconsidering its foreign policy towards Arab-Israeli issues and, if so, in which direction and with what possible consequences.

The events that have swept North Africa and the Middle East since December 2010 have caught the European Union totally off guard and demonstrated the inadequacy of traditional approaches to the region. European reactions have been slow and hesitant, and they have displayed two familiar features: divisions between Member States and bandwagoning with the United States. This stands in stark contrast with the many stakes involved for the EU not only because of geographical proximity, but also because of economic, energetic and political interests. While scholars and practitioners agree that the EU needs to accompany more assertively the processes underway, current reorientations look like shallow attempts to recycle previous policies. This also seems to apply for one of the major regional challenges: the Arab-Israeli conflict which has always weighed on European attempts to engage multilaterally its Mediterranean and Arab neighbours. In spite of its heavy economic and low politics involvement aimed at building a would-be Palestinian state, the EU has failed in recent years to take political steps in order to break the stalemate, irrespective of the evolutions on the ground that endanger the feasibility of the two-state solution the EU theoretically advocates. In light of current regional developments and impending events (notably the possible declaration of a Palestinian state), this paper will assess whether the EU is in the process of reconsidering its foreign policy towards Arab-Israeli issues and, if so, in which direction and with what possible consequences.

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been studied: pro-Assad Hezbollah and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across borders. Based on more than 50 semi-directive interviews conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, this matured version of a four-year joint research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization. On one side, Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by geo-strategic calculations and identity politics; for this group, "assabiya" has proven to be paramount. On the other side, the involvement of Sunnis takes place on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities; for these mostly atomized actors, social anomy has been found essential. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these obviously opposite social experiences (excess and lack of belonging) converge in making identity so prone to activation that individuals opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death in a cross-border conflict that is not theirs at first sight. Our research ambitions to understand these dynamics while relating them to broader factors and notably: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a cohesive national project, and the power games of regional and international actors. Both these factors have led to excessive polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization, hence sustaining the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

The "Arab Spring" in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental "policy of dissociation", two non-state actors have been studied: pro-Assad Hezbollah and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across borders. Based on more than 50 semi-directive interviews conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, this matured version of a four-year joint research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization. On one side, Hezbollah's operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by geo-strategic calculations and identity politics; for this group, "assabiya" has proven to be paramount. On the other side, the involvement of Sunnis takes place on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities; for these mostly atomized actors, social anomy has been found essential. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these obviously opposite social experiences (excess and lack of belonging) converge in making identity so prone to activation that individuals opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death in a cross-border conflict that is not theirs at first sight. Our research ambitions to understand these dynamics while relating them to broader factors and notably: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a cohesive national project, and the power games of regional and international actors. Both these factors have led to excessive polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization, hence sustaining the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.