Suchergebnisse

Dennis Mueller has recently made a significant contribution to understanding issues of federalism & confederalism in the European Union -- from a particular public choice point of view. He furnishes an important & provocative discussion of the relationship between the decision-making rules embodied in a constitutional convention (or other means of drafting a form of union for constituent states) & the decision-making rules that will be contained in the constitution that is the outcome of that convention. However, Mueller's veiled preference for a certain ideal form of federalism for Europe tends to reduce the parameters of his discussion, & gives his article an unrealistic & narrow focus, despite its ambitious scope. The present article explores some of the latent complexities in the public choice analysis & design of European integration, particularly by drawing on the wider experience of working federations & theory of federalism, using the unique & synthesizing Australian experience as a point of departure. It argues that Mueller's analysis is biased toward the reduction of decision-making costs of European governance, & thus undervalues the external costs that may be imposed through excessive central government. 40 References. Adapted from the source document.