The creation of executive agencies outside core departments has been a major element of administrative reforms throughout Europe during the past two decades, driven by a managerial logic, which also has been at the core of most academic works on "agencification." In this article, the authors take a different perspective by focusing on executive agencies' influence in the policy process. The authors analyze the policy influence of a large executive agency with service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of government (Flanders, Belgium). A comparison of the agency's influence in two major policy processes shows that a complex interplay of policy content, patterns of interaction, and mutual trust with the political leadership and organizational characteristics helps in explaining the observed patterns of influence. The findings also raise normative concerns regarding potential problems of disconnecting operations from policy formulation via agencification.
Résumé Même si l'Allemagne ne figure pas parmi les « précurseurs » en ce qui concerne les réformes managériales du secteur public, elle a une longue tradition d'agences et d'organes non départementaux au niveau fédéral. Au fil du temps, l'administration fédérale a évolué pour devenir un « zoo administratif » extrêmement diversifié, comprenant toute une série d'espèces, remettant en question l'image d'une bureaucratie allemande bien ordonnée. Dans notre article, nous examinons les changements organisationnels survenus au sein d'agences non ministérielles depuis vingt ans et les relations ministère-agence, en nous basant sur des données issues d'une vaste enquête sur l'administration fédérale. Les changements structurels que nous observons ne sont ni exhaustifs, ni prévus, ils sont bien plus évolutionnaires que révolutionnaires, axés sur des politiques sectorielles et non sur une quelconque politique globale, favorisés par des réformes réglementaires et non managériales, et la plupart des changements sont des regroupements horizontaux ou des successions d'organisations existantes, tandis que l'on n'observe presqu'aucun élément attestant d'un essaimage depuis les ministères vers les agences. Parallèlement à cela, les agences fédérales font état d'un grand pouvoir d'appréciation, tandis qu'elles perçoivent des niveaux considérables de « paperasserie » en raison de la réglementation administrative. On constate aussi que les modes traditionnels, hiérarchiques de supervision ministérielle dominent encore ; seules quelques agences ont défini des accords de rendement assortis d'objectifs mesurables. Résumé à l'intention des praticiens Le présent article intéressera les praticiens qui s'intéressent à la nature et à l'orientation du changement organisationnel au sein des pouvoirs publics, et notamment aux processus de différenciation et de direction horizontales et verticales. Nous verrons que même dans un système administratif bureaucratique bien développé et classique comme le système allemand, il existe, et ce depuis longtemps, toute une série d'agences gouvernementales qui bénéficient d'une autonomie considérable. Parallèlement à cela, on observe une évolution continue et une adaptation aux nouvelles circonstances, même si tout cela n'est que très peu lié aux évolutions internationales vers la modernisation, comme le nouveau management public ou l'agencification à grande échelle.
Although Germany does not figure among the 'forerunners' of managerial reforms of the public sector, it has a long tradition of agencies and non-departmental bodies at the federal level. Over time, the federal administration has developed into a highly differentiated 'administrative zoo' with a large number of species, questioning the image of a well-ordered German bureaucracy. The article addresses organizational changes among non-ministerial agencies during the past 20 years and ministry—agency relations, drawing on data from a comprehensive survey of the federal administration. The structural changes we observe are neither comprehensive nor planned; they are much more evolutionary than revolutionary, driven by sectoral policies and not by any overall agency policy, supported more by regulatory than by managerial reforms, and most of the changes are horizontal mergers or successions of existing organizations, while we find almost no evidence for hiving-off from ministries to agencies. At the same time, federal agencies report a lot of bureaucratic discretion, whereas they perceive substantial levels of 'red tape' due to administrative regulations. We also find that traditional, hierarchical modes of ministerial oversight are still dominating; only few agencies have performance agreements with measurable goals. Points for practitioners The article will be of interest to practitioners concerned about the nature and direction of organizational change within government, especially about processes of horizontal and vertical differentiation and steering. It demonstrates that even in a highly developed and classical bureaucratic administrative system such as Germany there is and has for a long time been a large variety of governmental agencies that enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy. At the same time there is continuous change and adaptation to new circumstances, even though all this has very little to do with international modernization trends such as New Public Management or comprehensive agencification.
Les spécialistes de la comparaison soulignent que l'administration publique doit être comprise en termes de modèles d'organisation et de prise de décision liés au contexte. Les agences situées dans un même contexte afficheront plus de points communs que celles situées dans un autre contexte. En parallèle, des données empiriques attestent de la variation au niveau organisationnel dans la prise de décision. Par exemple, toutes les agences d'un pays ne se voient pas déléguer des niveaux similaires d'autonomie dans la gestion du personnel. Le présent article développe une argumentation théorique sur la manière dont la tradition administrative modère l'effet des moteurs organisationnels de l'autonomie dans la gestion du personnel. Nous considérons le degré d'uniformité ancré dans la tradition administrative comme un facteur explicatif clé de cette relation. En termes empiriques, l'article compare la perception de l'autonomie dans la gestion du personnel des agences dans dix pays européens nichés dans trois groupes de pays (scandinaves, latino-napoléoniens et continentaux). L'analyse confirme les attentes théoriques concernant les effets propres au contexte des caractéristiques organisationnelles sur l'autonomie dans la gestion du personnel dans les agences. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Le présent article explique pourquoi le degré perçu d'autonomie dans la gestion du personnel du côté des directeurs d'agence varie selon les différentes traditions administratives. Nous verrons que certains contextes présentent une plus grande hétérogénéité dans la délégation de l'autonomie de gestion du personnel aux directeurs d'agence, alors que d'autres contextes se caractérisent par des pratiques homogènes de délégation à des agences de même forme juridique. Cette observation suggère que les changements dans la forme juridique des agences sont des instruments importants de réforme efficace dans les contextes caractérisés par une forte uniformité, alors qu'ils n'auront qu'un effet limité dans les contextes à l'uniformité limitée.
Comparative scholars emphasise that public administration should be understood in terms of context-bound patterns of organising and decision-making. Agencies in the same context will display more commonalities than those in another. At the same time, there is good empirical evidence for organisational-level variation in decision-making. For instance, not all agencies in one country are delegated similar levels of personnel management autonomy. This article develops a theoretical argument about how administrative tradition moderates the effect of organisational drivers of personnel management autonomy. We identify the degree of uniformity embedded in administrative tradition as a key explanatory factor for this relationship. In empirical terms, the article compares the perceived personnel management autonomy of agencies in 10 European countries nested in three country clusters (Scandinavian, Latin-Napoleonic and Continental). The analysis confirms theoretical expectations about the context-specific effects of organisational characteristics on personnel management autonomy in agencies.Points for practitionersThis article explains why agency managers' perceived degree of personnel management autonomy varies between different administrative traditions. It shows that some contexts display a greater heterogeneity of delegating personnel management autonomy to agency managers, whereas other contexts are characterised by homogeneous practices of delegation to agencies of the same legal type. This finding suggests that changes in agencies' legal type are important instruments of effective reform in high-uniformity contexts, whereas they will have only a limited effect in low-uniformity contexts.
This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of appointments to increase political control over public bureaucracies with often substantial managerial and policy autonomy. Using data from a large-scale executive survey from central government ministries and agencies in 18 European countries, the article provides a comprehensive cross-national and cross-organizational analysis of the autonomy-politicization conundrum and the drivers of the politicization of senior-level appointments. We find that national patterns of politicization correspond fairly well to country families as defined by administrative traditions, with some traditions being more coherent than others. At the organizational level, we find no evidence of efforts by politicians to compensate for extended autonomy by politicizing senior-level appointments, yet we provide evidence of differential effects of both formal and informal organizational characteristics on patterns of politicization. Our analyses show that politicization of senior appointments is lower in organizations with agency status, higher organizational social capital, higher financial autonomy and more extensive use of management tools. The article thereby not only offers comprehensive evidence of cross-country differences in politicization; it also adds to the literature on sub-national variation, by fleshing out an organizational perspective to the study of politicized appointments in the European context.
This article examines the influence of Europeanization on the relationship between ministries and agencies at the national level. The core argument is that the differentiated nature of the international environment (with policy development often transferred to the international level and policy implementation left at the national level) transforms national agencies into policy-developing actors that shape policies without being directly influenced by their national political principals. The increasingly common involvement of national agencies in European policymaking processes thereby increases these agencies' policy-development autonomy but does not change their role in policy implementation. We examine this argument by testing an innovative hypothesis-the differentiation hypothesis-on a combined data set of German and Dutch national agencies. Our empirical findings support the hypothesis in both countries, suggesting that similar effects can be expected in other contexts in which semiautonomous agencies are involved in transnational policymaking. Adapted from the source document.
AbstractThere is an extensive literature on the proliferation of agencies and the delegation of authority to such bodies across different countries. Much of this research asks whether New Public Management (NPM)-style agencification reforms have been implemented according to the original objectives, and what consequences – intended or unintended – the reforms have produced. Yet much of this research lacks an explicit link to the literature on the policymaking functions of public bureaucracies and their interactions with elected politicians. What are the consequences of agencification for the policy process at large? What policy relevant tasks do agencies perform, to what extent are they involved in policy-making, and what factors influence the quality and quantity of their participation? This introductory article gives an overview of key concepts such as "public agencies" and "policy autonomy" and the research literature. Moreover, it critically discusses relevant theoretical perspectives, outlines the articles included in this themed issue and argues for a more systematic and theoretically guided analysis of agencies' role in policy-making.
