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THIS NONCOOPERATIVE THEORY IS BASED ON A MODEL THAT INCORPORATES AN INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE THAT REFLECTS THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS OF AGENDA FORMATION AND VOTING IN A LEGISLATURE THAT HAS THE TASK OF ALLOCATING PARTICULARISTIC BENEFITS AMONG LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS. THE THEORY IS INTENDED TO IDENTIFY THE INCENTIVES FOR THE FORMATION OF PROPOSAL-COORDINATING COALITIONS AS A FUNCTION OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE RULES THAT GOVERN AGENDA FORMATION. COALITION PROPOSALS ALLOCATE ALL THE BENEFITS TO THEIR DISTRICTS, AND WHENEVER THE COALITION HAS DISCIPLINE OR CONTROLS THE CHAIR, IT WILL BE OF MINIMAL WINNING SIZE WHEN PROPOSALS ARE GOVERNED BY A CLOSED RULE. WHEN COALITION DISCIPLINE IS ABSENT AND THE CHAIR IS NEUTRAL, THE COALITION WILL BE COMPRISED OF APPROXIMATELY 70% OF THE LEGISLATURE. A LEGISLATIVE RULE THAT ALLOWS AMENDMENTS MAY RESULT IN LARGER COALITIONS. COALITION COMPOSITION IS ALSO CONSIDERED.

AbstractA program with a quadratic objective function and quadratic constraints is considered. Two duals to such programs are provided, and an algorithm is presented based upon approximations to the duals. The algorithm consists of a sequence of linear programs and programs involving the optimization of a quadratic function either unconstrained or constrained to the nonnegative orthant. An example involving production planning is presented.

AbstractThe random variables in two‐stage programming under uncertainty are generally treated in a passive manner in that no information regarding the random variables or the process generating the random variables may be obtained. This paper develops the economics of information for the case in which the probability distributions are discrete. A multinomial process is assumed to generate the random variables, and the parameter vector of that process is assumed to be unknown. A Dirichlet prior distribution on the parameter vector is used, and the computation of the value of information thus involves a Dirichlet‐multinomial distribution on the random variables. An example involving producing to meet uncertain demands is presented.

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems that incorporates electoral, government formation, and legislative institutions and focuses on the strategic opportunities inherent in those institutions. The electoral system is proportional representation, and a party is selected as formateur based on its representation in parliament. Parties are assumed to be unable to commit credibly to the policies they will implement once in government. Since the policy chosen by a government in one period becomes the status quo for the next period, a current govemment can strategically position the status quo to affect both the outcome of the next election and subsequenty government formation. When parties have both policy and officeholding preferences, elections are not moderating; i.e., they do not contribute to policy centrality or stability. Policies can be outside the Pareto set, and governments as well as policies change with each election. Those governments are formed by minimal winning coalitions.