Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe big policy challenges of our times are complex problems cutting across policy sectors and levels of government. To answer the question how cross‐sectoral policy coordination in multilevel structures can be achieved, we argue in line with policy integration and multilevel governance scholarship that "loosely coupled" institutions create the interdependency necessary to secure complex coordination. This argument is substantiated empirically by investigating coordination of energy transition in the German Bundesrat. Expectations are derived on how loosely coupled institutions promote coordination. They are tested using a mix of empirical data. It can be shown that loosely coupled institutions indeed enable coordination by linking powers across multiple dimensions, creating incentives for cross‐sectoral communication, using personal ties in negotiations to bridge different institutional backgrounds, and sequencing the decision process to allow strategic shifts between coordination dimensions. Those mechanisms may not guarantee the best possible result, but they provide a satisfactory solution at least.

Während der Covid-19-Pandemie erließen die Bundesländer Rechtsverordnungen, um Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen durchzusetzen. Die Restriktivität der Verordnungen variiert sowohl zwischen den Ländern als auch über die Zeit. In diesem Beitrag präsentieren wir einen neuen Datensatz zur Messung der Restriktivität der Landesverordnungen und gehen der Frage nach, welche Faktoren die Variation der Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen erklären. Eine Serie bivariater Analysen zeigt, dass ,die üblichen Verdächtigen' – Problemdruck und Parteiendifferenz – unterschiedlich wirken. Über alle Länder hinweg folgt die Restriktivität der Verordnungen dem Infektionsgeschehen über Zeit. Niveauunterschiede zwischen den Ländern lassen sich hierdurch jedoch nur bedingt erklären. Eine Annäherung an die ideologischen Positionen der Landesregierungen gegenüber Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen ergibt einen erkennbaren, aber nur mäßig starken Zusammenhang mit der abhängigen Variablen. Insgesamt ist die Variation somit in hohem Maße erklärbar und nicht willkürlich.

In the past decades, Germany was hit – in equal measure to other countries in Europe and beyond – by multiple transboundary and societal crises. We take stock of the ability of the German state to cope with the ensuing complexity in managing these exceptional situations. Conceptually, we apply a systemic perspective that asks about the resilience of the German state in the subsystems of policymaking in crises, implementation of administrative crisis management, as well as societal responses to crises. The paper draws on findings from a range of empirical studies assembled in this special issue, that focus either on the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/16 or the Covid-19 pandemic since 2020. Strikingly, the overall impression emerging from this research is generally favorable of the ability of the German politico-administrative system to master challenging crises – its resilience. But there are also areas for improvement.

Während der Covid-19-Pandemie erließen die Bundesländer Rechtsverordnungen, um Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen durchzusetzen. Die Restriktivität der Verordnungen variiert sowohl zwischen den Ländern als auch über die Zeit. In diesem Beitrag präsentieren wir einen neuen Datensatz zur Messung der Restriktivität der Landesverordnungen und gehen der Frage nach, welche Faktoren die Variation der Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen erklären. Eine Serie bivariater Analysen zeigt, dass 'die üblichen Verdächtigen' - Problemdruck und Parteiendifferenz - unterschiedlich wirken. Über alle Länder hinweg folgt die Restriktivität der Verordnungen dem Infektionsgeschehen über Zeit. Niveauunterschiede zwischen den Ländern lassen sich hierdurch jedoch nur bedingt erklären. Eine Annäherung an die ideologischen Positionen der Landesregierungen gegenüber Infektionsschutzmaßnahmen ergibt einen erkennbaren, aber nur mäßig starken Zusammenhang mit der abhängigen Variablen. Insgesamt ist die Variation somit in hohem Maße erklärbar und nicht willkürlich.

In the past decades, Germany was hit - in equal measure to other countries in Europe and beyond - by multiple transboundary and societal crises. We take stock of the ability of the German state to cope with the ensuing complexity in managing these exceptional situations. Conceptually, we apply a systemic perspective that asks about the resilience of the German state in the subsystems of policymaking in crises, implementation of administrative crisis management, as well as societal responses to crises. The paper draws on findings from a range of empirical studies assembled in this special issue, that focus either on the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/16 or the Covid-19 pandemic since 2020. Strikingly, the overall impression emerging from this research is generally favorable of the ability of the German politico-administrative system to master challenging crises - its resilience. But there are also areas for improvement.

In federalism research, scholars are usually confronted with the problem of a small number of cases (small N). Only a limited number of federal or quasi-federal states exist which lend themselves for comparison. The same is true for within-state variation, as federal states have only a limited number of constituent units. What is more, those federal states vary along many institutional variables characteristic of their political systems, which would need to be controlled for in statistical analysis. Thus, federalism researchers frequently use methods such as single or comparative case studies and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. While some scholars would argue that these methods are not fit for testing hypotheses, we demonstrate that hypotheses testing is also possible in a small N and qualitative data design. Yet, special attention needs to be paid to the problems of case selection and data analysis to enhance internal and external validity of empirical results. In this research case, we explain how we dealt with those problems and which methods we used to test hypotheses with qualitative data.

Intergovernmental councils in Germany comprise 18 sectoral ministerial conferences and the prime ministerial conference as peak organization. They complement the Bundesrat as institutions of Intergovernmental Relations in the German system of cooperative federalism, dealing with matters of shared rule as well as self-rule. Based on expert interviews among ministerial bureaucrats, this contribution finds that contrary to conventional wisdom, vertical influence and autonomy protection are not their main purpose. Rather, they serve primarily information exchange and coordination. Still, the emphasis on either influence and autonomy protection or coordination and information as well as the directions of interaction vary across policy sectors. We further investigate constitutional allocation of power and party political composition as determinants on the specific purpose of ministerial conferences. The findings suggest that the allocation of power is more important than party political composition in explaining variation between sectoral ministerial conferences.

The Conferences of the Ministers of the German 'Lander' (LMKen) are classified as horizontal co-ordination bodies in co-operative federalism, although the federal level is known to be involved in their negotiations. Our paper investigates conditions and extent of federal involvement in order to come to a more precise understanding of the conferences' role in German federalism. An analysis of resolutions of the LMK proceedings shows that federal involvement is far higher than theoretically expected. The LMKen serve not primarily as a shield against federal interference, but rather to coordinate and influence federal decision-making. The combination of obligatory negotiations (Politikverflechtung) and voluntary co-ordination (co-operative federalism) promotes flexible yet committing decisions thus avoiding decision deadlocks. Adapted from the source document.