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This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.

This book is about which monetary institutions and monetary regimes are most likely to promote: price stability. As such it is a welcome addition to the literature on this much debated question, especially because it provides such a lucid account of Kirchner's side of the debate. The questions he explores are important because central banks have become much more significant in recent times. Indeed, momentous changes in political economy, especially in the last decade in the wake of global and domestic financial deregulation, have propelled monetary policy and central banks to a new prominence.

'Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation' by Peter Evans is reviewed.

Recent theories of the state (pluralism, statism, Marxism and corporatism) are evaluated in terms of their capacity to explain an historic transformation in industry-state relationships in Australia over the last two decades. The explanatory tasks focus on explaining the shift from high protectionism to free trade for manufacturing industry, coupled with an increase in positive industry assistance measures. The paper argues that a suitably tailored Marxist account avoids most of the limitations of the other theories examined. Yet it is stressed that Marxism's strength lies not in explaining policy details but in providing a broad macro-structural theory of the state in capitalist societies. Marxism's explanatory 'superstructure', needs to be filled in at the meso-level by other explanatory elements so that the contours and dynamics of policy making below the macro-structural level can be more fully explained. Concepts such as accumulation strategy, political coalitions and policy networks are suggested for this purpose.