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Public policy generally emerges from interactions among actors embedded within complex governance systems, composed of multiple actors and forums (issue‐based arenas where stakeholders repeatedly interact to resolve collective action problems). Such systems allow actors multiple forums wherein they can influence policy decisions. But actors do not value the decisions made in each forum equally, and it remains unclear how actors allocate resources across forums. This article links actor strategy to their influence within the forums the actors identify as most important (their primary forum). There is theoretical ambiguity about how actors invest their limited resources across the forums that affect their interests to maximize primary forum influence. Do they concentrate all their effort within the primary forum or participate more broadly? To answer this question, we offer two competing theories. First, broad participation may allow actors to develop political capital necessary to influence other actors and thus influence primary forum policies. The second approach notes the opportunity costs of broad participation—actors have fewer resources to invest in their primary forum. An analysis of stakeholder participation in the Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta and Tampa Bay Watershed governance systems demonstrates that broader participation is associated with greater primary forum influence.

AbstractSolving environmental problems on a regional scale demands joint efforts by multiple stakeholders, but coordinating such efforts can be difficult in complex governance systems. In this article, we combine the literature in Adaptive Governance with the Ecology of Policy Games (EPGs) framework to enhance our understanding of how complex governance systems react to environmental focusing events. We study the EPGs in the Paraná River delta in Argentina following widespread fires caused by slash‐and‐burn practices in 2008, and analyze how new forums created to address the consequences of this event differ from the forums created prior to the event in terms of their capacity to attract stakeholders and to provide higher interconnectivity to the whole governance system. Furthermore, we offer an initial evaluation of the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Conservation and Sustainability of the Paraná River delta, the main forum in the EPGs created to address the negative consequences of the focusing event. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the study of complex governance systems where stakeholders are able to address the management of natural resources at a regional scale.

This essay extends theoretical arguments pertaining to single (uniplex) networks on how to solve coordination and cooperation problems associated with institutional collective action to multiplex networks constituting both formal and informal relationships formed by policy actors. While coordination problems reflect difficulties for actors in arriving at jointly desired policy outcomes, cooperation problems mean that actors have conflicting interests and, thus, face incentives to defect on each other. We propose multiplex versions of bridging and bonding networks, which have been found suitable for solving coordination and cooperation problems in single networks. Although our approach is limited to the simultaneous analysis of formal and informal relationships in policy networks, the arguments we present should aid researchers interested in analyzing policy networks beyond these manifestations of inherently complex relationships.

This article presents a conceptual framework for clarifying the network hypotheses embedded in policy theories and how they relate to macrolevel political institutions and microlevel political behavior. We then describe the role of statistical models of networks for testing these hypotheses, including the problem of operationalizing theoretical concepts with the parameters of statistical models. Examples from existing theories of the policy process and empirical research are provided and potential extensions are discussed.

AbstractThis article studies factors affecting how policy actors perceive the effectiveness of political institutions involved in complex water governance systems. The ecology of games framework argues that participants are more likely to perceive institutions as effective when the benefits of solving collective action problems outweigh the transaction costs of developing political contracts within these institutions. The authors hypothesize that transaction costs are a function of conflict, type of participation, political knowledge, scientific knowledge, and actor resources. Survey results suggest that the importance of these different sources of transaction costs varies across study sites in the Tampa Bay watershed in Florida, the Sacramento–San Joaquin River delta in California, and the Paraná River delta in Argentina. Based on the observed differences, some initial ideas are sketched about the evolution of complex governance systems from fairly simple and informal rules and networks to well‐established tapestries of many formal institutions.