Suchergebnisse

We propose a novel method for estimating the partisan effects of low voter turnout. Treating non-voters as missing data points on a variable measuring vote choice, we use a statistical model of multiple imputation to estimate the missing values on reported party choice at 28 elections in 25 countries in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset. Calculating the differences between observed and 'complete' (100%) turnout, we identify party and country-level conditions under which changes in turnout affect electoral outcomes. We also provide simulations of election outcomes for incremental changes in turnout. While our findings suggest few systematic gains from increased turnout for left-of-centre parties, we show that small parties and non-incumbents would benefit if everybody voted. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

This paper develops a signaling model of corporate lobbying in democratic capitalist societies to analyze the conditions that lead to a powerful political position of business. Proceeding from the traditional dichotomy of structural economic determinants versus business' political action, our model predicts the conditions under which elected political decisionmakers modify their policy pledges to accommodate business' political preferences, or override business' lobbying messages and honor their pledges. Our results show that the structural power of business over public policy is contingent on two variables: the size of reputation costs of business in relation to its material costs of lobbying; and the ratio of the policymaker's reputation constraints from policy commitments and campaign pledges to the electoral costs arising from adverse effects of policy. We evaluate our model using case studies of business lobbying on environmental and financial services regulation in Britain and Germany.

We examine the commitments of transnational corporations to human rights, labor, environmental, and anti-corruption standards. Modeling commitment as a function of the nature of the firm's business activities and conditioned by neighborhood and audience contexts, we investigate adherence to the principles entailed in the UN Global Compact program by the world's 2000 largest companies. Our results suggest that the decisions to participate in and to take steps to comply with the Global Compact are influenced by the characteristics of the firm as it adapts to its institutional and political environment. Signing up to the program increases the likelihood of firms developing human rights-related company policies and receiving positive external assessments of their performance. Adapted from the source document.

Whereas research on corporate lobbying in the USA has produced a set of robust findings, less is known about the determinants of business political action in other policy arenas and beyond the nation-state. In particular, we do not know how well the standard profit-seeking model of firm political activity travels. The article examines this issue with an analysis of business lobbying in the EU that reflects tactical adaptation to lobbying at the supranational level. Using data on 2000 large companies, we show that a modified profit-seeking model of corporate political behaviour is generalizable to corporate lobbying in Brussels. By contrast, theories emphasizing nationally distinct types of interest intermediation find little support in the data.

"Many citizens, politicians and political activists voice concern about the political influence of business in the European Union (EU). But do business interests really pull the strings in Brussels? Contrary to what is widely expected, this book shows that business interests are no more influential than other interests in shaping contemporary EU policies. Andreas Dür, David Marshall, and Patrick Bernhagen present an original argument that stresses the role of public actors in facilitating or impeding interest groups' lobbying success. Novel data on a large number of legislative proposals on the EU's agenda and three case studies present strong support for this argument. In this process, The Political Influence of Business in the European Union offers new insights in how lobbying success depends on the demand and supply of information as well as new ideas on how to measure lobbying success. The book advances a fresh perspective on the question of business power and sheds new light on why business interests often lose in the policy struggle."