Suchergebnisse

MINT- und Care-Berufe gelten als typisch männlich bzw. weiblich. Digitalisierung und demografischer Wandel bedingen jedoch eine radikale Veränderung von Berufsprofilen aufgrund neuer Tätigkeitserfordernisse sowie auch digitaler Transformationen in MINT- und Care-Berufen, die mit einer Verschiebung der Geschlechtersegregation einhergehen. Dies macht es nötig, die Eckpunkte einer gendersensiblen Berufsorientierung neu zu überdenken. Hemmnisse und Förderung durch formale und informelle Bildung in Schule und Familie werden in diesem Band im nationalen und internationalen Kontext analysiert und vielfältige Praxisvorschläge davon abgeleitet.

To govern effectively, international organizations (IOs) crucially depend on legitimation and support from their member states. But which states claim legitimacy for IOs, which challenge their legitimacy, and why? We address this gap in the literature by analyzing the legitimation strategies that states use in institutionalized discursive spaces within IOs. Specifically, we examine how United Nations (UN) member states seek to legitimate or delegitimate the UN Security Council in public debates in the UN General Assembly. We formulate a set of hypotheses that link specific state characteristics to evaluative statements on the Council's legitimacy. We test these hypotheses on an original dataset using a non-linear regression model. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that legitimation strategies are driven by a state's membership of the Council and by its attitudes towards the United States. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, economically powerful states and states that are willing to delegate authority to supranational organizations are more likely to challenge the Council's legitimacy. Furthermore, we provide evidence that states' legitimacy claims resonate among fellow states, that is, among the Council's primary audience. More generally, our findings suggest that making public claims about the Security Council's legitimacy is not an empty diplomatic exercise, and that states do not make these claims at random. Legitimation strategies follow discernible patterns that can be explained by specific state characteristics.

AbstractDespite repeated calls for reform, the UN Security Council has as yet resisted to satisfy the demands of a group of rising powers – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (G4) – for a permanent seat. We focus on one strategy of institutional adaptation to power shifts mentioned in the introductory article to this special issue and examine why the G4's rhetorical coercion strategy has failed to resonate with the Council's permanent members and the wider UN membership. Looking at the key debate on Security Council reform in the General Assembly in 2005, we examine the justifications the G4 have offered to support their proposal and whether these have been accepted as legitimate by UN member states. We show that the G4's rhetorical coercion strategy has failed to resonate with the targeted audience because the G4 have justified their demand strongly in terms of how their material contributions would enhance the UN's performance. In contrast, the G4's opponents provided justifications predominantly based on fair and democratic procedures, generating higher levels of expressed support. The importance of procedural fairness is consistent with findings in social psychology and challenges the prominent argument that performance is the main path to legitimacy for international institutions.

AbstractTo govern effectively, international organizations (IOs) crucially depend on legitimation and support from their member states. But which states claim legitimacy for IOs, which challenge their legitimacy, and why? We address this gap in the literature by analyzing the legitimation strategies that states use in institutionalized discursive spaces within IOs. Specifically, we examine how United Nations (UN) member states seek to legitimate or delegitimate the UN Security Council in public debates in the UN General Assembly. We formulate a set of hypotheses that link specific state characteristics to evaluative statements on the Council's legitimacy. We test these hypotheses on an original dataset using a non-linear regression model. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that legitimation strategies are driven by a state's membership of the Council and by its attitudes towards the United States. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, economically powerful states and states that are willing to delegate authority to supranational organizations are more likely to challenge the Council's legitimacy. Furthermore, we provide evidence that states' legitimacy claims resonate among fellow states, that is, among the Council's primary audience. More generally, our findings suggest that making public claims about the Security Council's legitimacy is not an empty diplomatic exercise, and that states do not make these claims at random. Legitimation strategies follow discernible patterns that can be explained by specific state characteristics.

AbstractThe United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council's agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council's agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5) matter, but they do not determine the Council's agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council's organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the United Nations (UN) works, and they have implications for the UN's legitimacy.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council's agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council's agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent members (P-5) matter, but they do not determine the Council's agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council's organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity among both the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the United Nations (UN) works, and they have implications for the UN's legitimacy.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council's agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council's agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent (P-5) members matter, but they do not determine the Council's agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council's organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity both among the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the UN works, and they have implications for the UN's legitimacy.

Despite repeated calls for reform, the UN Security Council has as yet resisted to satisfy the demands of a group of rising powers – Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (G4) – for a permanent seat. We focus on one strategy of institutional adaptation to power shifts mentioned in the introductory article to this special issue and examine why the G4's rhetorical coercion strategy has failed to resonate with the Council's permanent members and the wider UN membership. Looking at the key debate on Security Council reform in the General Assembly in 2005, we examine the justifications the G4 have offered to support their proposal and whether these have been accepted as legitimate by UN member states. We show that the G4's rhetorical coercion strategy has failed to resonate with the targeted audience because the G4 have justified their demand strongly in terms of how their material contributions would enhance the UN's performance. In contrast, the G4's opponents provided justifications predominantly based on fair and democratic procedures, generating higher levels of expressed support. The importance of procedural fairness is consistent with findings in social psychology and challenges the prominent argument that performance is the main path to legitimacy for international institutions.

Unemployment has been robustly shown to strongly decrease subjective wellbeing. Using panel quantile regression techniques, we analyse to what extent the negative impact of unemployment varies along the (conditional) subjective wellbeing distribution. In our analysis of British Household Panel Survey data (1996–2008), we find that individuals with high life satisfaction suffer less from becoming unemployed. A similar but stronger effect is found for a broad mental wellbeing variable (GHQ‐12). Higher wellbeing seems to act like a safety net when becoming unemployed. We explore these findings by examining the heterogeneous unemployment effects over the conditional quantiles of various life domain satisfactions.